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PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PRO FUTURE II

Trust, Understanding and Responsibility for the Future

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ABSTRACT

This midterm performance evaluation of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded PRO Future (II) Trust, Understanding and Responsibility for the Future Activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (PRO-Future II) examines the outcomes the activity achieved during the first four years of implementation. The report provides insights for USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina on progress to date and informs programmatic decision-making. PRO-Future II is an \$8 million, six-year activity, implemented by Catholic Relief Services. The evaluation concluded that (1) higher-level politicians and politically dependent media are primary obstacles to peacebuilding and reconciliation; (2) PRO-Future II made substantial contributions in peace promotion, but these efforts struggled to break through a divisive media landscape; (3) the Activity's regional component achieved outcomes such as collaboration, facilitating activism, and reducing prejudices; (4) at the intrapersonal level, living libraries and public speaking events were the most effective in producing empathy, whereas cognitive outcomes include improved knowledge about outgroups, increased openness/readiness for change, and outgroup perspective-taking; (5) at the interpersonal level, outcomes include strengthened relationships, collaboration, and (peace) activism; (6) under the civic movement component, there was limited success in terms of policy change; (7) small grants were used as an effective peacebuilding tool; (8) small grants were numerous and dispersed both geographically and to various recipients and (9) higher-level outcomes require more planning, evaluating, layering and sequencing, and follow-ups.

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ACRONYMS

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CDCS	Country Development, and Cooperation Strategy
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
DO	Development Objective
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FTV	Federal Television
FY	Fiscal Year
HRT	Croatian Radio Television
IRC	Inter-Religious Council
KI	Key Informant
KII	Key Informant Interview
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning
MEASURE-BiH	Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (2014-2019), preceding MEASURE II
MEASURE II	Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity
MoE	Ministry of education
MWG	Municipal working group
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PRO-Future II	PRO Future (II) Trust, Understanding and Responsibility for the Future Activity
RTL	Croatian TV station owned by the Radio Television Luxembourg Group
RTS	Serbian Radio Television
RTRS	Radio Television of Republika Srpska
RYCO	Regional Youth Cooperation Office
SFF	Sarajevo Film Festival
SPPG	Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes
TV	Television
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/BiH	United States Agency for International Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina
USD	U.S. dollars

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The United States Agency for International Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAID/BiH) commissioned the Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II) to conduct a midterm performance evaluation of the Mission's PRO Future (II) Trust, Understanding and Responsibility for the Future (PRO-Future II). PRO-Future II, implemented by Catholic Relief Services, is a six-year, \$8 million activity designed to enhance trust and reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and bring about positive societal transformation, overcoming inter-ethnic divides, antagonism, and prejudices that are still prevalent in BiH society.

This midterm performance evaluation examines PRO-Future II outcomes achieved during the nearly four years of implementation. Furthermore, the evaluation provides the Mission with insights to make informed programmatic decisions and adaptations for the remainder of the activity.

METHODOLOGY

This evaluation was conducted between July and October 2021 and used a mixed-methods design consisting of a desk review of program documents; 41 key informant interviews, 17 focus group discussions; and an online survey of 113 PRO-Future II implementers. The team triangulated data across different sources to develop credible findings, from which the team derived conclusions and recommendations. Due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and to ensure the health and safety of the evaluation team as well as evaluation participants, the evaluation team conducted all interviews and focus groups remotely.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The following provides a high-level overview of the findings and conclusions garnered from this evaluation.

EVALUATION QUESTION 1: WHAT OUTCOMES HAVE PRO-FUTURE II'S KEY INFLUENCERS (POLITICIANS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, MEDIA) ACHIEVED IN PROMOTING INTER-ETHNIC RECONCILIATION?

- While higher-level politicians (state or entity) represent the primary obstacle to peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in BiH, cantonal and local-level politicians are more responsive and willing to engage in these processes.
- As a step forward in achieving peacebuilding and reconciliation outcomes, PRO-Future II introduced action plans and corresponding monitoring mechanisms for the Platform for Peace implementation. During the first three years of the Activity implementation, 31 government institutions adopted the action plans and implemented 36 peacebuilding initiatives.
- Politically dependent media promoting negative political messages are an obstacle to peace and reconciliation. The substantial online media and television (TV) engagement in peace promotion generated by PRO-Future II is still a small portion of generally divisive media content in BiH.
- Engaging religious leaders in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes proved to be challenging, primarily due to centralized decision-making of religious communities and their connections to politics, resulting in some planned interventions not being implemented. However, PRO-Future II adapted and supported the events identified as feasible under the circumstances, such as a symposium in Trebinje; improved visibility of the Inter-Religious Council's (IRC's) regional

chapters in local communities and their engagement in the implementation of the COVID-19 Solidarity Fund; and demonstrated excellent learning and collaboration principles in adapting the inter-religious master's program.

- Although PRO-Future II successfully mobilized war victims to promote peace and reconciliation, victims' engagement in advocating for their own rights was minimal.
- PRO-Future II secured considerable support from cantonal ministries for implementation of their activities, especially for living libraries and peace education in secondary schools.

EVALUATION SUB-QUESTION 1A: WHAT OUTCOMES HAS PRO-FUTURE II ACHIEVED THROUGH INTERVENTIONS FOSTERING REGIONAL DIALOGUE?

- Despite the challenges of a cross-cutting regional component, due to which some regional interventions have not been implemented, in several cases, peace camps, organized in collaboration with the Regional Youth Cooperation Office and activities under the Sarajevo Film Festival (SFF), resulted in relationship building, collaboration, and activism. They also reduced prejudices for people coming from neighboring countries and vice versa.
- The annual "Theology in the Public Sphere" symposium in Trebinje, which gathered local and regional stakeholders and promoted PRO-Future II activities in regional media, was a successful regional intervention.
- The BiH diaspora represents an important target group for peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives, because stakeholders perceived them to have more inter-ethnic prejudices and to be more involved in hate speech in online media compared to BiH citizens living in the country.

EVALUATION QUESTION 2: WHAT OUTCOMES HAS PRO-FUTURE II ACHIEVED IN TERMS OF CHANGING INTER-ETHNIC ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS AMONG SUPPORTED CITIZENS, PARTICULARLY AMONG YOUTH AND STUDENTS?

- At the intrapersonal level, out of all PRO-Future II's activities, living libraries and public speaking events were the most effective among participants in producing empathy for other groups, with open-door days also proving effective in eliciting positive emotions. Most PRO-Future II activities contributed to cognitive-level outcomes, including improved knowledge about outgroups and their experiences; increased openness to or readiness for change; outgroup perspective-taking; and development of different perspectives on the past, present, and future.
- At the interpersonal level, longer-lasting interventions (peace camps; peace education; and some small grants, including collaboration) contributed to inter-ethnic friendships and continued contacts. PRO-Future II was most effective in facilitating collaboration among youth and women in the interventions facilitated primarily through small grants that brought people together; or through the Solidarity Fund, which in some cases resulted in lasting collaboration. Several PRO-Future II interventions, primarily the political academy, public speaking events, peace camps, and online peacebuilding school, facilitated and encouraged peace activism among the young beneficiaries, who already were open-minded and tolerant before participation.
- Under the Platform for Peace supporters' civic movement, PRO-Future II achieved limited success in terms of policy/institutional and behavioral change. Although some behavioral change was identified among the local stakeholders, several advocacy actions did not produce policy or institutional changes to date, due mainly to a deteriorating political situation.

- Although infrastructural interventions represent a precondition for implementing peacebuilding activities and can improve the overall visibility of the Activity and USAID, they are not a guarantee that the facilities will be used for the intended purposes once the Activity ends. Furthermore, it is unclear whether such high-cost projects are worthy investments in terms of their costs and benefits.

EVALUATION QUESTION 3: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE PRO-FUTURE II SMALL-GRANT PROGRAMS CONTRIBUTED TO PEACEBUILDING?

- Even though small grants can serve as an effective peacebuilding tool, they usually include short-term activities that produce short-term outcomes, whereas longer-term and higher-level outcomes require considerable monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) resources; planning, evaluating, and layering and sequencing of the interventions; and follow-ups. Small grants under PRO-Future II include a large number of awards, allocated mainly to geographically dispersed organizations, for the interventions aimed at achieving PRO-Future II general objectives. This is opposed to planning for specific outcomes, evaluating the results, and designing follow-ups to strengthen these results.
- Nearly all implemented PRO-Future II small grants included an inter-ethnic contact component, which, according to research, can be a predictor of inter-ethnic attitudes.
- Small grants that incorporate activities such as public speaking events, peace camps, and activities fostering collaboration among youth and women are likely to be effective.
- Compared to other types of grants, small grants for youth focus to a greater extent on creative activities rather than lectures and seminars, and on facilitated youth peace activism.
- Although grants for war victims associations were perceived to improve the psychological state of victims, foster collaboration between war victims associations, and evoke empathy among the audience, these grants did little to improve war victims' status in society.
- Even though the implementation of small grants for inter-religious dialogue proved challenging due to political pressures, centralized decision-making in religious communities, and grantees' low capacity for project design and implementation, the implemented small grants improved cooperation between religious institutions and youth. However, during data collection, no grants were implemented by the IRC's regional chapters.
- Although the implementation of grants for municipalities has been challenging due to low interest among municipal working groups (MWGs) and the COVID-19 pandemic, the principal strength of these grants lies in fostering connections and collaboration between municipalities and different actors within municipalities.
- The largest portion of financial resources planned for small initiatives was reallocated to PRO-Future II's COVID-19 pandemic emergency fund, thus mobilizing MWGs, IRC regional chapters, and official crisis teams to distribute the assistance to people in need in their communities.
- Although small grants awarded to civil society organizations (CSOs) strengthened connections between organizations across ethnic lines and CSO–government collaboration, little has been achieved in terms of policy/institutional changes due to low interest and the limited capacity of grantees to engage in such activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Focus on cantonal and local governments for the Platform for Peace promotion and implementation. In future programming, focus political academies on establishing cross-ethnic political working groups that address common issues.
2. Continue working with religious leaders, ensuring their inclusion in intervention planning as early as possible. Continue exploring ways to include the highest-level religious leaders in peace promotion. Continue supporting open-door days.
3. Advocate with media partners for greater responsibility for peacebuilding among higher levels of government. In collaboration with media partners, respond to negative media stories with counter-stories that present a more objective and realistic outlook on the situation and that call for peace. Continue facilitating peace promotion through mainstream online media and TV stations. Coordinate with USAID's media activities and those of other donors.
4. Continue engaging war victims in peace promotion and building their capacity to design and implement advocacy interventions and negotiate with governments. Consider connecting them with recognized human rights CSOs as their mentors and providing regular psychological support to speakers.
5. To the extent possible, advocate for expanding the peace education program to more locations and schools.
6. Continue supporting living libraries and public speaking events as part of interventions. Consider using their video recordings in other activities.
7. Facilitate the practice of including all students in peace education classes, not only those who already are open to these concepts. Also ensure that students complete the whole program rather than selected classes. For future interventions, consider adapting the program for younger generations.
8. Continue supporting peace camps. To save resources, organize these at campsites rather than using hotel accommodations.
9. Continue focusing on civic movements under a new peacebuilding activity, using the stakeholder network built under the PRO-Future/PRO-Future II Activities.
10. Continue using the small grants mechanism. Consider investing more effort in defining clear theories of change, expected outcomes, and MEL practices and in expanding grant duration to prolong intergroup contacts. Consider offering follow-up grants for activities that produce desired outcomes, and consider creating a training for grantees on designing projects with a clearly defined chain of results.
11. Monitor the use of infrastructure built during the first round of these projects and make informed decisions about investing in these projects for the remainder of the Activity.
12. Continue supporting regional peace camps and SFF. Consider establishing a separate grant line for regional cooperation. Under future peacebuilding interventions, consider designing activities targeting the diaspora.

INTRODUCTION

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AND THEORY OF CHANGE

PRO Future (II) Trust, Understanding and Responsibility for the Future Activity (PRO-Future II) is a six-year Activity that was initiated in September 2017 by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in partnership with Caritas; Forum of Citizens Tuzla; Helsinki Citizens Assembly; Nansen Dialogue Center; and Mostar, Kult, and Infohouse. The Activity is envisioned to contribute to the Country Development and Cooperation Strategy's (CDCS's) Development Objective 2 (DO2), "Socio-Economic Conditions Improved."

EXHIBIT I. BASIC INFORMATION ON THE TRUST, UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE (PRO-FUTURE II) ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY NAME	TRUST, UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE (PRO-FUTURE II)
USAID OFFICE	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/ Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Democracy Office
IMPLEMENTER	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT #	Cooperative Agreement No. AID-I68-A-17-00005
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST	\$8,000,000 (\$5,000,000 initial, \$8,000,000 with extension)
LIFE OF ACTIVITY	September 17, 2017, to September 16, 2023 (five years initial plus one-year extension)
ACTIVE GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS	Across Bosnia and Herzegovina; particular focus on 75 municipalities
MISSION DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE (DO)	DO2: Socio-Economic Conditions Improved

PRO-Future II aims to enhance trust and reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and bring about positive societal transformation, overcoming inter-ethnic divides, antagonism, and prejudices that are still prevalent in BiH society (IMPAQ International, 2020). Politicians in BiH use divisive rhetoric and hate speech to exacerbate these divisions, attempting to manipulate different ethnic and religious congregations by exacerbating this fear of “others,” for the purpose of scoring political points and maintaining power through the politics of division. The political instrumentalization of the mainstream media aggravates these processes by disseminating and amplifying divisive messages and hate speech (USAID, 2020). The media in BiH often lack a sense of social responsibility (Brunwasser, Turčilo, & Marko, 2016) and are motivated by sensationalism. As the most trusted public figures in BiH (IMPAQ International, LLC, 2020), religious leaders have considerable power and potential to support reconciliation initiatives and peacebuilding processes. Still, they frequently either remain silent or promote disruptive discourse closely tied to the incumbent political elites in BiH.

PRO-Future II incorporates interventions designed to achieve two purposes. Under **Purpose I**, the Activity envisions that key influencers—politicians and government representatives, representatives of religious communities, and media—work together and institutionalize a shared vision for a stable future. This objective incorporates three sub-purposes:

- **Sub-purpose 1.1:** Targeted key influencers in the political and government spheres take tangible actions that focus on political responsibility and promote inter-ethnic reconciliation.
- **Sub-purpose 1.2:** Targeted religious key influencers lead national- and community-level reconciliation initiatives.
- **Sub-purpose 1.3:** Targeted media outlets promote reconciliation and increase respectful and empathetic coverage of inter-ethnic reconciliation initiatives.

Under **Purpose II**, the Activity envisions citizens building a civic movement to strengthen reconciliation and reduce inter-ethnic and inter-religious divisions. This purpose will be achieved through four sub-purposes.

- **Sub-purpose 2.1:** Education institutions incorporate reconciliation topics and approaches into their students' classes to increase acceptance and reconciliation.
- **Sub-purpose 2.2:** Citizens from 70 municipalities have increased opportunities to face the past and to promote reconciliation and inclusiveness.
- **Sub-purpose 2.3:** Citizens from 70 municipalities advocate for institutional changes and demand political responsibility
- **Sub-purpose 2.4:** Municipal working groups lead implementation of infrastructure projects that contribute to overall community life and reconciliation processes.

The PRO-FUTURE II theory of change states that if BiH citizens and key influencers in the political, government, media, and religious spheres are empowered to stand up for peace, demand political responsibility, and advocate for institutional change, and the media cover and promote their efforts, then BiH society as a whole will enjoy increased stability and economic prosperity.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATION PURPOSE

The primary purpose of this performance evaluation is to investigate outcomes achieved by PRO-Future II during the first four years of implementation. The evaluation will provide the Mission with credible and valuable insights to make informed programmatic decisions and potential adaptations for the remainder of the Activity, maximizing the likelihood of achieving the desired results. The Mission and the implementing partner will use the evaluation results to take midterm corrective actions (if necessary) in the Activity design and/or implementation. Knowledge generated by the evaluation will support evidence-based decision-making by USAID/BiH.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation team will answer the following evaluation questions:

- I. What outcomes have PRO-Future II's key influencers (politicians, religious leaders, media) achieved in promoting inter-ethnic reconciliation?
 - I.1. What outcomes has PRO-Future II achieved through interventions fostering regional dialogue?

2. What outcomes has PRO-Future II achieved in terms of changing inter-ethnic attitudes and behaviors among supported citizens, particularly among youth and students?
3. To what extent have the PRO-Future II small-grant programs contributed to peacebuilding?

EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

METHODOLOGY

To examine the effectiveness of PRO-Future II interventions and their outcomes, the evaluation team employed a mixed-methods data collection approach that included data triangulation. This evaluation examined more than three years of PRO-Future II implementation for which reporting data were available: from the end of September 2017 through March 2021. Fieldwork occurred from the end of June 2021 until the middle of September 2021.

The methodology employed by the evaluation team ensured that data were collected systematically and efficiently from the following sources:



ACTIVITY DOCUMENTS, including the program description; Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) plan; work plans; quarterly progress reports; lists of beneficiaries, experts, and other stakeholders involved in Activity implementation; small-grant implementation reports; media reports; and other documents produced by the Activity and its beneficiaries. The evaluation team reviewed the most recent quarterly progress report from fiscal year (FY) 2021, quarter 2 (January through March 2021). Refer to Annex 3 for the full list of documents reviewed.



SECONDARY DOCUMENTATION relevant to the sector, including MEASURE-BiH/MEASURE II research reports and reports and analyses from international organizations and CSOs.



KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (KIIS) with USAID/BiH, PRO-Future II implementing partners and partner organizations, relevant international and donor organizations, cantonal- and municipal-government level representatives, event facilitators, Activity beneficiaries (e.g., activists, journalists), and other stakeholders. A total of 31 individual and group interviews were conducted, including 41 key informants (KIs).



FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS (FGDS) with PRO-Future II grantees and facilitators, municipal working groups, and Activity beneficiaries (e.g., small-grant implementors, public speakers, Our Talks forum implementers, peace education teachers and students, political academy participants, peace activists, peace camp participants, online school for peacebuilding participants, municipal working group members). A total of 17 FGDs were conducted with 73 individuals.



AN ONLINE SURVEY of PRO-Future II Activity implementers.¹

In early September 2021, the evaluation team analyzed the data, triangulating among various data sources to generate robust findings and draw conclusions about the evaluation questions. The team

¹The evaluation team planned to carry out a survey of PRO-Future II event participants. However, the low response rate prevented the team from using the survey results to inform the evaluation findings.

presented its preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations to USAID/BiH during a remote presentation held on September 20, 2021.

LIMITATIONS

PERIOD OF DATA COLLECTION

Because the evaluation began in late July 2021 and most KIIs and FGDs were planned for August (during vacation season), the evaluation team faced challenges in reaching and arranging virtual meetings with stakeholders. The evaluation team addressed this issue by extending data collection into the first half of September 2021.

RECALL BIAS

Given that the Activity is nearly four years into implementation, many individuals who were contacted to participate in KIIs and FGDs had difficulty remembering the interventions. The evaluation team addressed this issue by reminding the KIIs about the topics, time, and date of the events in which they participated.

RESPONSE BIAS

The majority of beneficiaries who participated in the evaluation were those who had been active and engaged in the Activity implementation, and their views may have been different from those who were not as actively engaged. The evaluation team addressed this issue by asking beneficiaries for specific examples about the Activity outcomes and achievements and then combining their responses with those from implementers and donors. Low response rates prevented the evaluation team from using the surveys with beneficiaries to inform the evaluation findings. Instead, the team used PRO-Future II's post-event evaluation forms.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

EVALUATION QUESTION 1: WHAT OUTCOMES HAVE PRO-FUTURE II'S KEY INFLUENCERS (POLITICIANS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS, MEDIA) ACHIEVED IN PROMOTING INTER-ETHNIC RECONCILIATION?

FINDINGS

Finding 1: Engaging higher-level politicians in peace promotion proved challenging; PRO-Future II was more successful in mobilizing support from lower-level politicians and government representatives. According to the PRO-Future II progress reports, during the first year of implementation, the Activity invested significant effort in mobilizing the BiH Parliamentary Assembly to commit to the Platform for Peace (hereafter, the Platform). PRO-Future II invested considerable resources in lobbying for Platform adoption among the members of the parliament, securing public support from mayors, media, and opposition parties. Both the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly signed the Platform in July 2018. However, these institutions were unwilling to continue action plan implementation because of issues with government constitution and a focus on upcoming elections. To date, entity-level governments have not shown a willingness to adopt the Platform.

A lack of dedication to the promotion of peace and reconciliation among political and government stakeholders is not surprising. A vast majority of KIs agreed that politicians, especially those at higher government levels, are the primary obstacle to reconciliation processes in BiH. Additionally, the Political Economy Assessment in Bosnia and Herzegovina (a USAID internal document) completed by MEASURE II in early 2020 found that the politicians manipulate ethnic identities and incite fear to maintain the status quo and maintain positions of power.

PRO-Future II's design envisioned exploring the economic development components of reconciliation by conducting a study on reconciliation and the business environment. The study examining the effects of social cohesion on the business environment and investments conducted in four BiH municipalities indicated that social cohesion is an important precondition for economic development. According to the model, municipalities should adopt a so-called "openness philosophy" to foster economic growth. This philosophy implies opening the communities toward investors, removing obstacles to investments, increasing public confidence in institutions, improving inter-ethnic relations, and enhancing collaboration with other municipalities that disregard their ethnic composition. PRO-Future II is the pioneer in connecting social cohesion with economic development in BiH.

"That's how it is in Republika Srpska and in Federation BiH, Brčko District, and everywhere. Whenever political points are needed or something, nationalism is brought up, and that is the way the people are getting crazy over and the way that new political points are gained."

— A political academy participant

Even though several stakeholders noted that lower-level politicians cannot make decisions without consulting their party leadership, PRO-Future II has been more successful in catalyzing lower levels of government to sign the Platform and take actions to promote peace. According to the implementing partner and Activity progress reports, four cantonals (Posavina, West Herzegovina, Canton 10, and Zenica-Doboj) and 15 local governments signed the Platform under PRO-Future II,² and 31 government institutions adopted the action plans for its implementation and implemented 36 peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives during the first three years of Activity implementation. Although the number of implemented activities is well below the target (50), the Activity made a significant step forward in activating government support for peace and reconciliation processes, which likely would have not had happened without PRO-Future II's contribution to building strong connections with local governments, lobbying, and advocacy.

Finding 2: PRO-Future II political academies successfully facilitated activism among some young politicians. Implementers, beneficiaries, and progress reports identified several civic actions among young politicians trained through the PRO-Future II political academies. PRO-Future II organized two political academies: one in FY 2019 and one in FY 2021. These educational events combined lectures (e.g., peacebuilding, social cohesion, human rights) with PRO-Future II's traditional peacebuilding activities (e.g., online peacebuilding school, public speaking event, peace caravan) and policy development and action planning. The participants voiced satisfaction with the academy, stating it provided them with the opportunity to hear and consider perspectives different from their own. The academy motivated several participants to engage in activism. For instance, two trainees organized a peace caravan, mobilizing about 20 young politicians across party lines to visit

² Under the former PRO-Future Activity, the BiH Council of Ministers and 60 local governments signed the Platform for Peace. Also, under PRO-Future II, a number of religious institutions, media outlets, and cultural institutions signed the Platform, as did the Regional Youth Cooperation Office.

10 locations across BiH, listen to different experiences and perspectives, visit different monuments and religious institutions, and discuss critical issues with mayors. A trainee reported that he left his political party and has engaged in civic activism instead. He realized that due to the political academy, that his voice has not been heard by the party leadership. Several participants reported building relationships and maintaining contact with other attendees.

“The Peace Academy affected me in a way to really care about every human being, to not care about what someone’s name is, which religion they are affiliated with, and to distinguish people only as good or bad.”

– A political academy participant

“[On reducing inter-ethnic prejudice in local communities] That is very hard to implement. We need to adapt to our local community, to some of our needs and, unfortunately, to some opinions of our people and our fellow citizens that we cannot change, but they would like to keep those and pass them from generation to generation.”

– A political academy participant

Finding 3: PRO-Future II’s effort to engage religious leaders in promoting peace and reconciliation processes was challenging, but it is perceived as vital. Most KIs agreed that religious communities play a key role in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes. This is consistent with findings from MEASURE II’s 2019 and 2020 National Survey of Citizens Perceptions, which show that when rating their level of trust in different institutions and organizations, BiH citizens trust religious institutions the most. However, implementers and progress reports suggest that most activities with religious communities and leaders have not been implemented as planned. PRO-Future II envisioned facilitating and supporting annual events, such as joint visits to places of suffering, to engage the highest-ranked religious leaders to promote peace. However, PRO-Future II’s efforts have been stalled due to the proximity of elections and disagreements about the sites to be visited. Further, religious education teachers’ involvement in peacebuilding processes was limited to only a few activities and discontinued by the highest-level religious leaders, apparently due to a communication issue they had with another international project. Collaboration with the Inter-religious Council (IRC) was also challenging because of the organization’s complex internal structure and decision-making processes. This resulted in the IRC’s temporary disengagement from PRO-Future II during FY 2019 before rejoining in 2020. Due to problems in cooperation from the IRC, CRS initiated direct collaboration with churches and religious institutions. A donor noted that establishing collaborative partnerships with religious leaders requires including them in activity planning as early as possible, preferably at the design stage.

Looking for ways to foster religious leaders’ engagement, PRO-Future II supported the “Theology in the Public Sphere” symposium in Trebinje. The symposium has been organized annually by the Center for Philosophy and Theology in Trebinje, bringing together lecturers and students of theological faculties and other key influencers from across the region. In addition to lectures and workshops, the symposium involved three higher-ranked religious leaders, representing the three most prevalent religions in BiH (Islam, Catholic, and Orthodox), discussing topics such as forgiveness and war crimes and responding to sensitive questions posed by the ethnically mixed audience. The 2018 symposium resulted in the Zahumlje-Herzegovina and Primorje Eparchy Bishop signing the Platform on behalf of the Eparchy and IRC and delivering a public speech about peace and reconciliation. The Platform subsequently was signed by the Mostar *mufti*, the cardinal of the Dabrobosanska Archdiocese and Jakob Finci on behalf of the Jewish community.

According to implementers, the BiH IRC representatives and progress reports, PRO-Future II has supported the IRC regional chapters by connecting them with one another, providing financial support for the work of their secretaries, and promoting positive local stories. The implementing partner explained that the chapters have become more recognized in local communities as promoters of peace and inter-religious dialogue. PRO-Future II established a small-grant program for the chapters, but no grants have been implemented so far. The chapters have been the most committed in responding to vulnerable groups' needs during the Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, delivering aid packages through the PRO-Future II Solidarity Fund.

“They [the IRC] must have a consensus between all four religious communities for a decision to be made, and time in religious communities does not run in the same way as time in the civil sector, so sessions are very often prolonged or there is a long period of time between sessions until a decision is made. All the while and they are practically blocked, that is, they cannot do anything.”

– A PRO-Future II implementer

Finding 4: PRO-FUTURE II employed excellent learning and collaboration principles in implementing the university master’s program “Inter-religious Studies and Peacebuilding,” resulting in the graduation of seven students during FY 2021. The program was facilitated under a former CRS project and supported by PRO-Future II through scholarships for students and assistance in improving the program management and curriculum. Through their monitoring activities, PRO-Future II learned that the program was too demanding for students, mostly due to the number of subjects and exams. PRO-Future II funded an external evaluation of the program and modified the program based on the evaluation findings, resulting in the graduation of seven students during Year 4 of implementation. Students of the master’s program were also engaged in other activities that PRO-Future II organized (e.g., online peacebuilding school), especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. Students have regularly participated in the program’s promotion activities. One of the students of the master’s program was promoted into the IRC as a member of the council’s secretariat.

Finding 5: PRO-Future II generated substantial online media engagement and some TV coverage, which contributed to promotion of peace and reconciliation in the public sphere. However, these positive stories are still a small part of a generally divisive media landscape in BiH. According to implementers, PRO-Future II progress reports, and a media database, PRO-Future II events generated substantial media engagement. According to the Activity’s monitoring efforts, this engagement resulted in 1,314 media products during the first three years of implementation. Most media products were online articles (69 percent), accompanied by videos and live TV show appearances.

The evaluation team’s analysis of media articles indicates that a large portion of articles were produced by the mainstream national (25 percent), regional (7 percent), entity (16 percent), cantonal (15 percent), and international media (2 percent), whereas the local media produced 35 percent of articles. Of the 1,314 articles, 414 (32 percent) were event or grant opportunity announcements, and others highlighted PRO-Future II events. The events that drew considerable media attention included, among others, the Zahumlje-Herzegovina and Primorje Eparchy Bishop signing the Platform; adoption of the Platform action plans by Orthodox priests in Zahumlje-Herzegovina Eparchy; disagreements about the Platform among the members of the BiH parliament; the Srdjan Aleksic Journalist Award; activities related to the COVID-19 emergency response; and reconstruction of a kindergarten building in Trebinje.

MEASURE II's analysis indicates that most articles (92 percent) emphasized reconciliation, understanding, and peace as the objectives of PRO-Future II's events, and nearly three-quarters of the articles (74 percent) explicitly discuss reconciliation, peacebuilding, and promotion of peace. In its social media efforts, PRO-Future II used Facebook as its main channel for disseminating information about the Activity, followed by Instagram and LinkedIn. According to progress reports, at the time of the evaluation, PRO-Future II's Facebook page had 9,000 "likes" and 9,471 followers, and their Instagram profile had 938 followers.

PRO-Future II engaged several TV stations in promoting peacebuilding and reconciliation by producing and broadcasting Peace Talks. PRO-Future II envisioned Peace Talks as public debates between key influencers from social, political, and civic areas on important topics and collaboration between two public entity-level broadcasters (Federal Television [FTV] and Radio Television of Republika Srpska [RTRS]) in producing the debates. The first Peace Talks show was produced by CRS and broadcast only by Naša TV from Mostar.³ Afterward, with support from PRO-Future II, FTV produced seven Peace Talks and broadcast them during prime time. Establishing collaboration with RTRS was not successful due to their resistance; however, PRO-Future II continues its efforts to include them in joint production of Peace Talks with FTV. The FTV partner noted that the Peace Talks viewership was similar to that of other similar TV shows, and the debates were usually well received by the TV audience.⁴

Most KIs (implementers, beneficiaries, donors) consider the media to be the biggest obstacle to peacebuilding processes, after politicians. This is particularly the case with the so-called "nationalist media." According to KIs, most of BiH's media outlets are politically dependent. Even though PRO-Future II, its beneficiaries, and its media partners have worked extensively to promote positive peace stories, these stories are still under-represented among media reports⁵ and do not resonate with the population, who are more likely to react to negative stories. Most KIs have not noticed any changes in the last four years regarding the promotion of peace by key influencers—politicians, religious leaders, or the media—which aligns with PRO-Future II's internal evaluation findings.

"I don't think anything has changed. If you read and follow these portals, ... I did not notice anything in the media that the situation is better, that there is peace, that there is a different approach, a more normal one."

– A peace education teacher

"The media have the role assigned to them by their donor, the one who finances them, so I think that in Bosnia we do not have completely free media, at least in my opinion. I might have a wrong perception, but I don't think we have independent media."

– A small-grants implementer

Finding 6: PRO-FUTURE II trainings for journalists generated interest and made some journalists more aware of and sensitive to peace and reconciliation reporting.

According to training descriptions and trainees, there are indications that PRO-Future II trainings for

³ FTV refused to broadcast the product because they had not produced it and because an individual was participating who had previously spoken critically of FTV.

⁴ The importance of partnering with TV stations in peacebuilding and reconciliation promotion is reflected in the fact that TV is still the most followed media type in BiH, particularly for reaching an older audience. The 2020 NSCP-BiH survey showed that 81 percent of respondents consume media content through TV and that TV remains the most trusted source of news for 51 percent of BiH citizens.

⁵ According to several journalists, this under-representation is due to a lack of stories, journalists' awareness of stories, lack of time, or low media interest in these kinds of stories.

journalists had limited results in terms of increased reporting on peace topics among trained journalists. The first training delivered to 14 journalists did not focus on peace and reconciliation but, rather, on general reporting skills (e.g., interviewing). This training was more useful to journalists who were relatively new in their profession. According to trainees, the second training facilitated a dialogue among the participants (four journalists), focusing on how the media can contribute to peacebuilding promotion and stay independent. It was also noted that the training sensitized journalists to the topics of peace and reconciliation in reporting more than skill building, given that most of the journalists who attended the trainings were professionals with many years of experience.

“I think in the sense when we talk about improving skills and reporting and so on, that much can’t be said about that, but if we’re talking about sensitizing to reporting on peace topics, on peace issues, then I think it definitely reminds you of what the focus really is. In this sense, the training did contribute to better reporting and understanding of the importance regarding peace as a topic for all of us.”

– A journalist, PRO-Future II training participant

Finding 7: PRO-FUTURE II’s efforts were more effective in mobilizing war victims to engage in promotion of peace and reconciliation than in advocacy.

PRO-Future II envisioned mobilizing war victims to promote peace. It was planned that war victims would do this through public speaking events and advocacy interventions. With support from PRO-Future II, war victims associations organized 18 public speaking events by the end of the data collection period, thus conveying to the public a joint message of peace among victims of different ethnicities. As one of the KIs noted, the advocacy work was limited and localized to two communities with minimal support from municipalities. In one instance, the municipality provided space for meetings, psychological support for members and some educational events for war victims organizations, and provided support to the association in the local Platform action plan.

In another municipality, two war victims associations, Bosniaks and Croats, expressed interest in organizing a joint visit to places of suffering and demanded access to them from the local government. This initiative has not been implemented yet, but PRO-Future II plans to support it in Year 5 of implementation. Advocacy directed at the higher levels of government, such as that focused on better rights for war victims or monetary reparations, have proved to be challenging due to the lack of government support and dedicated government funding for these matters. Given these challenges, PRO-Future II redirected its focus on connecting war victims associations at the local and cantonal levels with each other, with the aim of strengthening them in acquiring a better status.

“We are aware that, at the moment, we cannot advocate for some higher rights, such as for victims of torture, detainees, and their reparation in cash and so on, because the state simply does not have the finances for that. Whenever we talk to someone who has knowledge from that area, they say that it is almost impossible at the moment to do so. As ugly as it sounds, this has ended in a draw, and these things are hard to change. So, we did not want to direct our capacities and finances towards this, knowing that it was a lost fight in advance, at least for now. But what we can do is, at the local level—and, let’s say, at the cantonal level—to try to link institutions—in this case municipalities, cities, and those associations—and in some way to strengthen that connection and to somehow help those associations.”

– A PRO-Future II partner

PRO-Future II expanded the group of public speakers by including former juvenile fighters. The juvenile fighters were recognized as having the ability to appeal to younger audiences because they themselves were at a young age at the time the war took place, and the youth could more easily

identify with them than with war veterans. Within the Platform implementation, PRO-Future II and war victims associations implemented joint visits to places of suffering, during which speeches and honors were given to all war victims regardless of their ethnic belonging. Inclusion of war victims from all warring parties was mandatory. Because these events were closely tied to certain dates and anniversaries, they received considerable media attention.

Finding 8: PRO-FUTURE II successfully secured support from most cantonal ministries to implement living libraries. Four education ministries supported implementation of peace education. However, the Republika Srpska education authorities have not supported any education activities. Based on the Activity’s progress reports, four cantonal ministries of education (MoEs)—Canton Sarajevo, Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, Central Bosnia Canton, and Una-Sana Canton—signed the Platform and developed their action plans as a mechanism for reconciliation interventions. The Republika Srpska MoE has not responded to PRO-Future II’s efforts to join its peacebuilding interventions. Implementation of the MoEs’ action plans started at the beginning of the 2020–2021 school year.

Of the four MoEs that signed the Platform, three have implemented peace education programs in a total of 51 high schools in 20 municipalities/cities in BiH, engaging 91 high school teachers and more than 420 students. The MoE of Una-Sana Canton was still in the preparation phase, equipping teachers with the skills and knowledge necessary for peace program implementation in their classes. The KIs, teachers who participated in implementation of the PRO-Future II peace education program, view the program as a well-designed approach to tackling peacebuilding and reconciliation issues with students. They also found that the program had positive effects on students. However, teachers recognized that longer-term work with students is necessary. Moreover, teachers suggested that this kind of education should be included in the regular education curriculum.

“Regarding positive changes, what happened is that they got more open. Students are more willing to advocate for positive peace, to spread universal values. (...) They were talking more about the project, and I noticed from speaking to them that they talked to their housemates about what they were doing within some the program activities and so on.”

– A peace education teacher

EVALUATION SUB-QUESTION 1A. WHAT OUTCOMES HAS PRO-FUTURE II ACHIEVED THROUGH INTERVENTIONS FOSTERING REGIONAL DIALOGUE?

FINDINGS

Finding 9: The collaboration between PRO-Future II and the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) in implementing peace camps and the Sarajevo Film Festival’s (SFF’s) Dealing with the Past program resulted in friendships and connections that changed youths’ perceptions about the openness of the people from the region.

PRO-Future II and RYCO organized a regional peace camp that proved effective in changing participants’ views about outgroups. The camps are biennial events that last seven days and include different types of interventions, such as workshops on different topics (e.g., identity concepts, stereotypes, discrimination, social cohesion); public speaking events; discussions about local problems and ways to address them; and informal activities, such as city and museum visits. Several youth who participated in the PRO-Future II peace education classes were invited to join peace camps and were given the opportunity to continue broadening their inter-ethnic views.

Implementers and beneficiaries believe that peace camps result in new intra- and inter-ethnic friendships and positive changes in inter-ethnic attitudes. One KI mentioned that it is important for youth in BiH to gain an outsider's perspective on BiH issues, learn about relationships between regional countries (e.g., Serbia and Kosovo), and break certain stereotypes about peoples from the Western Balkans.

PRO-Future II also collaborates with RYCO in bringing youth from the region to the SFF, where they spend seven days watching and discussing the movies as part of the SFF's "Dealing with the Past" program. According to implementers, the SFF participants are typically active in civil society and know the basics about peace and reconciliation. Several participants emphasized the importance of such events for people coming from smaller communities, because they have the opportunity to come to the capital, learn about different perspectives, and share them with the youth in their communities. Young people learn that diversity is not an obstacle to collaboration with other individuals. One participant explained that regional cultural events are also important for youth from the region because many believe that Bosnian people are divided across ethnic lines, and they learn that people socialize and collaborate with each other. Some beneficiaries stay in contact with their peers from neighboring countries after such events. An implementer noted that these kinds of activities establish a platform for youth to engage in dialogue about the past, which is usually not a topic they prefer to tackle. The online format used in 2020 due to the pandemic may have disrupted some of these processes; there were no opportunities for informal socialization, which implementers and participants consider important.

"It was really interesting to hear different opinions, especially from colleagues coming from North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania because I did not have a chance to talk with youth from these countries, and they are also part of our region, and it is essential to have contacts with them to achieve anything on this peace trajectory of the region."

– A peace camp participant

Finding 10: Several grantees included a regional component in their activities, which improved cross-regional relationships, connections, and collaboration and was perceived as breaking down prejudices about inter-ethnic relations in BiH. These regional grants included, for example, activities for scouts, firefighters, and folklore groups. In one instance, a small grant connected scouts from a small, ethnically mixed BiH local community with youth from Serbia, Macedonia, and Croatia, who came to BiH and stayed with their peers in their homes. A representative of the grantee organization noted that this interaction resulted in collaboration and friendships among participants, who remained in touch in the following years.

Likewise, a firefighter association from a Bosniak majority municipality invited the firefighters from Serbia and Croatia to their events, which included firefighter competitions, visits to places of worship, and historical sights. For most participants from Serbia and Croatia, this was their first time in BiH and their first visit to places of worship from other religious denominations. Afterward, one of the participating organizations from Croatia invited the Bosnian firefighter organization to their event.

In another example, a small Serb majority municipality organized a folklore festival that brought together folklore organizations from BiH, Serbia, and Croatia. The folklore groups promoted the cultural heritage of different countries, and all folklore ensembles (eight) signed the Platform as part of the grant. Most grantees noticed that the participants from the region overcame their prejudices about inter-ethnic relations in BiH. They expected tensions between participants from different

ethnicities and were positively surprised that the reality was different. However, a grantee noted that bringing participants from the region to her community was expensive and complex; one of the reasons was that USAID could not pay for out-of-country participants' expenses. As a result, the grantee expressed high motivation to implement local rather than regional grants in the future.

“Participants thought that the situation here is like during 1992–1995, without cooperation, looking at each other disdainfully.... Now they cannot wait to come again and be our guests.”

– A representative of a grantee organization

Finding I 1: PRO-Future II supported the annual “Theology in the Public Sphere” symposium organized in Trebinje, which included a regional audience. As mentioned under Evaluation Question I, one of these events resulted in the Zahumlje-Herzegovina and Primorje Eparchy Bishop signing the Platform and in its public promotion among guests from neighboring countries. Subsequently, several other religious communities in BiH signed the Platform.

Finding I 2: Some PRO-Future II regional activities could not be implemented as envisioned due to a lack of engagement among key stakeholders. Implementation of regional activities originally envisioned under the PRO-Future II design proved challenging in several cases, due mainly to a lack of engagement among key stakeholders. For instance, before an event to foster cross-border cooperation among Dubrovnik, Trebinje, and Herceg Novi, the mayor of Dubrovnik refused to engage unless the Mayor of Trebinje apologized for actions that occurred during the 1990s war. Furthermore, regional collaboration between theological faculties was hampered by a lack of engagement among the deans in Serbia and Croatia. They explained that, due to a reduced number of students in general, they wanted to keep the students engaged in in-country programs. However, the deans were considering initiating subsequent collaboration through summer schools. PRO-Future II also intends to organize the exhibition “Personal” (an exhibition of war victims photos followed by a speaking-out event) in Belgrade and Zagreb. The regional exhibition was postponed in FY 2022 due to the rising number of COVID-19 cases. The speakers said they are willing to participate in these exhibitions in the neighboring countries.

Finding I 3: Several KIs stated that it is important to include the BiH diaspora in peace and reconciliation processes. One grantee suggested that the hate speech on social media is predominantly spread by diaspora, usually by young individuals who were not involved in the war. Another KI peace activist mentioned participating in an activity, organized by another donor, that focused on reconciliation among diaspora citizens. The KI suggested that other donors regard the diaspora as an important target group. Other KIs said they engaged the diaspora in peacebuilding through diaspora events (Diaspora Days, Diaspora Congress) and by broadcasting a peacebuilding documentary on a TV station popular among the diaspora.

“Well, everyone is referring to those events of the 1990s, that unfortunate war that happened, referring to the victims who were again on both sides. The diaspora is leading. The biggest problem are the comments that come from those people, when you look at the profile, who weren't even born during the war. They picked up that incomplete information through the media or from someone else who told them just their own side of the story.”

– A municipal working group member

Finding I 4: The online school for peacebuilding engaged participants from the region but offered no opportunities for interaction because of the school's online format. The

online school for peacebuilding has a flexible format, enabling access to video materials by any interested party, allowing them to watch lectures any time and anywhere they want. However, this approach limits interaction among participants and opportunities for discussion.

Finding 15: PRO-Future II promoted the Activity through collaboration with several regional media outlets. According to the implementer, Al Jazeera and NI are PRO-Future II's main regional partners. In addition to covering PRO-Future II events on their online platforms, these TV stations promote their events in their programs, such as during the evening news. Further, PRO-Future II staff were invited on multiple occasions to talk about the Activity in the TV shows. PRO-Future II also worked with Al Jazeera on a documentary movie. The implementer explained that the Activity plans to try to engage Croatian Radio Television (HRT), RTL (a Croatian TV station owned by the Radio Television Luxembourg Group), and Serbian Radio Television (RTS) in the following period.

CONCLUSIONS

PRO-Future II invested a substantial effort in mobilizing the most resistant stakeholder groups in promoting peacebuilding and reconciliation processes: politicians, religious leaders, media, war victims, and education stakeholders. The Activity faced a number of challenges in implementation but produced considerable results in peace promotion despite the difficulty of the task.

Higher-level politicians are a primary obstacle to peacebuilding and reconciliation in BiH, and political incentives limit political will for these processes at the state or entity levels. Cantonal- and local-level politicians are more open to this work, but their engagement is conditional on the external facilitation and support. By introducing the municipal action plans and monitoring mechanisms to ensure their implementation, PRO-Future II made a significant step forward from the predecessor PRO-Future Activity, which envisioned the Platform signing as the final step in institutions' commitment to peace. As a result, 31 government institutions adopted the action plans and implemented 36 peacebuilding initiatives during the first three years of implementation. Additionally, the Activity's political academies resulted in peace activism among several young politicians and improved connections between politicians across ethnic lines.

Politically dependent media that promote negative political messages represent an additional obstacle to peace and reconciliation. PRO-Future II generated substantial online media engagement and some TV engagement (particularly by FTV) in peace promotion. PRO-Future II articles were produced by national, regional, and local media, and in a few cases, they raised the attention of international media outlets. However, these positive stories are still a small part of rather divisive media content in general, and there were no changes in the media's behavior in peace promotion, although a few journalists reported that PRO-Future II trainings made them more sensitive to peace and reconciliation reporting.

Engaging religious leaders in peacebuilding processes is vital but also challenging, primarily due to slow and centralized decision-making systems in religious communities and their connections to politics. Although PRO-Future II was unable to implement some interventions with religious leaders, they adapted and supported the events where they had opportunities to act. Collaboration with the IRC was also challenging and irregular, and PRO-Future II started working directly with religious institutions to compensate for the lack of results. Supporting the IRC's regional chapters resulted in improved visibility in local communities and engagement in implementation of the COVID-19 Solidarity Fund. The Activity employed excellent learning and collaboration principles in

implementing the inter-religious master's program, resulting in the graduation of seven students during FY 2021.

PRO-Future II successfully mobilized war victims to promote peace and reconciliation, but their engagement in advocating for their own rights was minimal, due in part to the sensitivities related to working with war victims. PRO-Future II expanded the group of public speakers trained under the predecessor peacebuilding activity by including former juvenile fighters, and there are indications that their stories leave a considerable impression on young people.

Finally, PRO-Future II secured considerable support from cantonal education ministries for implementation of activities, especially for living libraries, and to the extent planned for peace education. Teachers who implemented the peace education program thought it was well designed, interesting, and effective. Some teachers noted that longer-term work with students is necessary and that this type of program should be included in the curriculum.

Implementation of the PRO-Future II cross-cutting regional component proved challenging in several cases, mainly due to the unwillingness of key stakeholders, such as politicians and religious leaders, to engage. However, collaboration with RYCO in organizing a peace camp and activities under the SFF were successful and produced positive outcomes. Beyond the results in building relationships, collaboration, and facilitating activism, the added value of regional activities includes reducing prejudices against people coming from neighboring countries. Several small grants included regional activities in their design, but implementers may be discouraged from using these approaches due to expenses and complexities of organization. Other successful examples of regional interventions included the annual symposium, "Theology in the Public Sphere," in Trebinje. There are indications that BiH citizens among the diaspora may be one of the key target groups for peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives.

EVALUATION QUESTION 2: WHAT OUTCOMES HAS PRO-FUTURE II ACHIEVED IN TERMS OF CHANGING INTER-ETHNIC ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS AMONG SUPPORTED CITIZENS, PARTICULARLY AMONG YOUTH AND STUDENTS?

FINDINGS

Finding I6: Most PRO-Future II activities that aim to change citizens' inter-ethnic attitudes and behaviors focus on youth and students, while adults are involved as implementers and key influencers. Adults were perceived as obstacles to youth's engagement in peacebuilding activities. The only PRO-Future II interventions intended for the general population of adults are public speaking events and occasional small grants. All other events are intended primarily for youth. Adults are, however, involved as event implementers and key influencers.

Several KIs believe that youth are more often open to inter-ethnic cooperation and do not need reconciliation because they did not participate in the conflict in the first place. This mindset is visible, for instance, in living libraries, where youth are more likely to react to and remember the stories unrelated to the war (e.g., a story of a drug user or a visually impaired victim of family abuse) rather than war stories. Adults are generally more engaged than youth in discussions following the public speaking events.

“And now, when we are talking about audience youth versus adults, it seems to me that young people are not as open in terms of readiness to discuss this topic, to ask us or delve deeper, unlike adults, who seem to be more open and ready to share some of their own experiences, that is, war experiences.”

– A living library speaker

However, according to KIs, not all youth are tolerant or open-minded, and the intolerance seen among youth is perceived to be a result of their upbringing. Parents are not always ready to allow children to interact with their peers of a different ethnic background and often prevent youth from participating in peacebuilding interventions because of their own beliefs and attitudes. The same problem exists in schools, especially in communities where “two schools under one roof,” exist and the politically established school principals present another obstacle. For instance, a KI noted that in one such school, the principal often forbade students from participating in extracurricular activities with youth from a neighboring community school, even though the two schools engage in other types of cooperation.

“Parents present an obstacle for children’s participation in activities aimed at peacebuilding.”

– A peace education teacher

“Young people want to connect among themselves, while older ones try to separate us.”

– A small-grant event participant

Finding 17: Among participants, several PRO-Future II interventions regularly evoke emotional reactions toward members of other ethnic groups.⁶ Living libraries and public speaking events bring victims of tragic and difficult life events to share with an audience their stories and lessons learned, illustrating universal human values and messages. Whereas public speaking events focus solely on war stories, living libraries include different types of speakers (e.g., a victim of sexual violence, a former drug abuser). Among the living library and public speaking event participants and implementers whom we interviewed, all reported strong emotions when listening to the speakers’ negative life events. The participants specifically mentioned feeling compassion, catharsis, and connectedness to speakers but also sorrow because the speakers had endure such experiences. Implementers and participants noticed similar reactions among the audience, including crying during the events.

“What I do remember, what remained in my memory, is that it was a very emotional encounter. We all cried when we heard those stories.”

– A living library participant

“Living libraries elicit compassion for the victims. When children hear what these people have been through, they feel sorrow. At the end, while speaking with some of the students, I heard a sentence which really thrilled me: ‘We are all human beings after all.’ ”

– A living library participant

PRO-Future II open-door days are implemented through visits to places of worship—churches, synagogues, and mosques—during which visitors learn about different religions from imams and priests. During Year 1, PRO-Future II implemented these events in cooperation with the IRC and continued their facilitation through small grants from Year 2 to the present. Nearly all implementers and participants reported positive impressions of such events, accompanied by positive emotions

⁶ Emotional reactions are important outcomes because emotions are one component of attitudes, in addition to cognitive and behavioral components (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

described as warm and pleasant feelings. The only negative experience occurred when a participant with Islamic religious affiliation demonstrated visible anxiety when entering an Orthodox church.

“We visited three places of worship belonging to the three ethnic groups.... So, there were many unexpectedly high-quality information, and, of course, the entire group was thrilled.”

– A small-grant event participant

“We have very young members, children, mostly under the age of 18, and they never visited a mosque, for example, and now they had a chance to see what it looks like (...) Now that they had a chance, they were literally surprised with the presentations and everything else inside; they were impressed.”

– A peace activist

Participants in living libraries, public speaking events, and open-door days remember these events years after their participation, suggesting that the events elicit strong emotions. However, these are short, one-off events. Several KIs believe that some people resume their inflexible thinking and behavior patterns after returning to their closed and prejudicial, local communities.

Occasionally, implementers and beneficiaries reported emotional reactions as a result of their experiences in political academies and peace camps. PRO-Future II’s internal post-event evaluation forms, which assess specific outcomes of different Activity interventions,⁷ are consistent with this finding. The results indicate that peace camps and political academies substantially contribute to the development of empathy, followed by living libraries.⁸ In addition to thematic lectures and workshops, these interventions included public speaking events. According to participants, peace camps help build emotional connections between youth, as exemplified in the case of a participant who shared that the group started to feel like another family.

“Concretely, the first thing I’ve done after visiting Stupni Do [a place of Bosniak suffering], was visiting the Borovica municipality [a place of Croat suffering]. Would I do it without the political academy? I am not sure if I would be so brave. I do not think I would. And today, I am really proud I was the first who has done it.”

– A political academy participant

⁷ Post-event evaluations were conducted by CRS. Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire consisting of several statements. The Evaluation Team analyzed the data on four statements: (1) This event helps me to be more willing to hear the attitudes of others, although they are different than mine; (2) This event helps me to have empathy to the others, although they do not belong to my ethnic group; (3) This event helps me to be more able to look at things from multiple angles before I take my stand and make a decision; and (4) After this event, I want to participate in building trust between members of different ethnic and religious groups. Respondents were asked to estimate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statements, on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

⁸ Out of the 20 respondents who participated in a peace camp, 70 percent reported that this activity had a positive impact⁸ on the development of their empathy toward other ethnicities. Sixty-five percent of political academy attendees (48 respondents), and 64 percent of living library participants (1,001 respondents) reported the same positive results. PRO-Future II implementers who responded to the MEASURE II online survey (113 respondents) gave open-door days and peace camps the highest ratings in terms of building empathy among the participants.

Finding 18: Implementers and beneficiaries perceived that different PRO-Future II interventions facilitated changes in participants’ attitudes toward and perceptions of other ethnicities, including improved knowledge about outgroups; understanding of their perspectives; greater acceptance; and different perspectives on the past, present, and future. As reported by implementers and beneficiaries, PRO-Future II interventions facilitated a variety of changes among event participants at the cognitive level. Different PRO-Future II interventions—living libraries, public speaking events, open-door days, peace camps, online peacebuilding school, and documentaries—were perceived to contribute to participants’ knowledge about other ethnic groups and their experiences and to increase their openness or readiness for change. Living libraries, public speaking events, open-door days, and peace camps have been particularly effective in fostering the outgroup perspective-taking, compared to other interventions. Additionally, open-door days and peace camps have contributed to the development of positive attitudes about and greater acceptance toward others. Living libraries and public speaking events have sometimes led to adopting a different perspective on the past, present, and future (e.g., all groups suffered in the war; those who suffered do not have to hate others; peace is the only way forward). The value of documentaries (such as those screened during the Sarajevo Film Festival) is that they highlight difficult topics and provide a platform for dialogue among individuals who are otherwise unwilling to discuss the past.

PRO-Future II faced obstacles in implementing the university reconciliation forum. According to the implementors, BiH universities are reluctant to combine nonformal education opportunities with their formal programs. Because PRO-Future II was unable to organize thematic discussions at universities, as envisioned by the Activity’s design, it adapted and signed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with three universities (University of Sarajevo, Mostar’s University Dzemal Bijedic, and University of Banja Luka; University of East Sarajevo committed to cooperation but did not sign the MoU). As a result, a university peace pedagogy program has been established in collaboration with the University of Sarajevo and the University of East Sarajevo. PRO-Future II expects to establish another peace education program at the Faculty of Law in Mostar. Although the evaluation team was unable to organize any KIs or FGDs with the forum participants, the PRO-Future II post-event evaluation forms indicate that 64 percent of participants believe the forums improved their critical thinking.

Peace camp implementers and participants described these interventions as particularly effective in developing skills that helped dispel stereotypes about other groups and encourage them to work to improve conditions in their local communities. According to several attendees, the online peacebuilding school also helps students build their communication skills in interacting with people of other ethnicities and breaking some of their outgroup stereotypes. In addition, the peacebuilding school contributes to strengthening already existing positive attitudes towards other groups and nurturing pluralistic thinking.⁹

“My local community is heavily monoethnic; therefore, I have not had any opportunity to hear the experience of the two other sides before. It has left a strong impression on me, and I think it is very important to hear those stories so that we start working on reconciliation and building better relations.”
— An online peacebuilding school participant

“What fascinated me was how people who lived through all those agonies truly had not had a single word of hatred. That is what instilled hope in me.”

⁹ According to Novis-Deutsch, pluralistic thinking is an activity of positively embracing multiplicity and complexity (Novis-Deutsch, 2018). People with pluralistic thinking seek out others and find inspiration in multiple perspectives; they interpret the world through a “both/and” lens.

The PRO-Future II post-event evaluation surveys support our finding that all PRO-Future II activities contribute in some way to changes in participants’ perceptions of and attitudes toward outgroups. The survey results suggest that the Activity’s interventions improve the participants’ willingness to hear different perspectives and look at situations from multiple angles.¹⁰ Additionally, a MEASURE II survey conducted to inform this evaluation assessed the extent to which different PRO-Future II interventions improve participants’ active, open-minded thinking.¹¹ According to implementers’ assessments, peace camps had the strongest effect in this regard. This is exemplified by observations from a participant of the peace and advocacy camp who said that the work in the group allowed for the other side of the story to be heard, thus broadening their thinking. Youth had an opportunity to actively engage in a peace negotiation process and to learn more about peacebuilding, inter-religious dialogue, media, and youth networking methods. Through the peace camp, participants had an opportunity to listen to several university professors as well as peacebuilding practitioners and youth leaders who covered topics including media, conflict management and transitional justice, and religion.

Finding 19: PRO-Future II implementers and beneficiaries believe that longer activities, such as bringing youth and women’s groups together and fostering their collaboration (peace camps, peace education, some small grants) contributed to building inter-ethnic relationships and promoting collaboration among youth and women. KIs described a number of cases in which PRO-Future II activities contributed to building inter-ethnic friendships. This was particularly the case with longer activities developed for youth, such as peace camps, peace education, and some small-grant activities intended to foster collaboration among youth (e.g., performing together in a play or concert or participating in sports competitions). In such cases, youth stay in touch and occasionally communicate via social media and, when there are future encounters, their relationships are friendly and cordial. Among adults, representatives of war victims associations who spoke at public speaking events established strong friendships. There are indications that one-off events such as open-door days also can contribute to establishing relationships.

“I find it interesting that many of those young people who meet while participating in our activities maintain their friendships. And, then, their encounters at the activities that follow; when they see each other again. One should see the energy between them; it really needs to be seen what it looks like.”

– A representative of a PRO-Future II partner organization

¹⁰ Seventy-one percent of the political academy attendees who responded to the survey reported that the academy affected their willingness to listen to the opinions of individuals from other ethnic groups. Similar results were obtained for living libraries (71 percent) and peace camps (70 percent), with somewhat lower results for online peacebuilding school (63 percent) and public speaking events (56 percent). Finally, 54 percent of Our Talks forum attendees reported that this activity had a positive effect on their willingness to listen to the opinions of individuals from other ethnic groups.

Approximately 90 percent of peace camp participants, as well as most participants in political academies (83 percent), living libraries (79 percent), peacebuilding school (70 percent), Our Talks (64 percent), and public speaking events (62 percent), reported that, as a result of their participation, they viewed situations from multiple angles before forming an opinion.

¹¹ Actively open-minded thinking is a thinking style described in the literature as the disposition to be fair toward different conclusions even if they go against one’s initially favored conclusion. According to Baron (1985, 1995, 2019), actively open-minded thinking represents a general set of dispositions that reduces “myside bias,” i.e., tendencies to evaluate evidence, generate evidence, and test hypotheses in a manner biased toward one’s own opinions and attitudes. MEASURE II surveys include the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale, which was designed based on the original 10-item Open-Minded Scale (i.e., willingness to change one’s own thinking; willingness to change one’s own beliefs on the basis of firm argument, which is contrary to one’s own opinion; Baron, 2019). Participants were asked to estimate the extent to which certain items describe participants as a result of their involvement in a PRO-Future II intervention.

“They were wearing hijab, during our excursions, our visits to those locations, they made friendships from young people from Croatia and youth of Serb ethnicity. Then, I noticed on the bus, on our way to those locations, they are sitting together. They found joint topics, for example painting, photography, art.”

– A small-grant implementer

PRO-Future II small grants that envision longer-term cultural and sports events bringing together youth from different ethnic groups have produced lasting cooperation. For instance, after being brought together in a sports competition, three basketball coaches from a Serb majority municipality have regularly gone to a Bosniak majority municipality to coach children’s basketball. Furthermore, five accordion students from a Bosniak majority municipality go to a neighboring Serb majority municipality to attend accordion classes. After a grant that brought together children from two municipalities across entity lines to spend three days together, two schools continued cooperating and applied for other projects together. In addition to small-grant interventions, teachers from different municipalities across ethnic lines who were implementing peace education started collaborating and exchanging their opinions and experiences.

Several KIs cited the importance of women’s role in peacebuilding processes, offering examples of improved collaboration between women due to PRO-Future II assistance.¹² For instance, cooperation was established between two women’s associations at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, when women from an association from a Serb majority area made and sent face masks to a women’s association in a Bosniak-Croat mixed municipality. Afterward, the two associations connected and continued cooperating. A similar activity brought together women from two other associations, who collaborated across ethnic lines in teaching children to create face masks. Another activity resulted in economic collaboration between two women-led agricultural associations in Herzegovina. Representatives of these associations met at a small-grant event and participated in a lecture, public speaking event, and open-door days. The collaboration has not yet materialized due to the pandemic, but the women stayed in touch and look forward to future encounters. Additionally, two female war victims of different ethnicities connected and implement public speaking events and other projects together.

“Well, continuation of cooperation, we have developed such a good relationship with (name) Association from (municipality name) that we communicate on a daily basis.... We rent out kayaks and rented sport equipment at (name) lake, while they do the same at (name) lake. So, if they happen to have a larger group of clients that they cannot cater to, we help them out by lending them our kayaks; we either rent them or help each other in a different way.”

– A small-grant implementer

“When it comes to these projects that I personally initiated and worked on, we cooperated with a high school in Tuzla, where we joined students. Students from Tuzla had an opportunity to visit Eastern Sarajevo, and the other way around. We visited them and stayed with them for three days, and they stayed with us for three days as well. That project, which was implemented three years ago, I believe, in my opinion represents the greatest success. Those children are still in touch. It is through PRO-FUTURE II that we got connected with that school and, thanks to a favorable juncture of circumstances, included that very school into another project conducted by RYCO, Skopje. So, thanks to PRO-FUTURE II, we met people from the high school from Tuzla; they were participants of that project as well, and children had an opportunity to socialize again. “

– A municipal working group member

¹² An analysis of PRO-Future II’s database of beneficiaries indicates that there are twice as many female beneficiaries as males. Also, about 60 percent of small-grant participants are female. However, there is no difference by sex among the implementers, and most PRO-Future II peace activists are men (42 of 60 activists), per the internal PRO-Future II database.

Finding 20: PRO-Future II exposed a number of individuals to their first intergroup contacts. For instance, a living library was organized in a small municipality in Herzegovina and attended by 50 high school students, Croats, and Bosniaks. According to a PRO-Future II progress report, this represents a highly atypical event for this community in which young people from different ethnicities rarely have an opportunity to meet each other and jointly participate in any activity. Furthermore, a public speaking event was organized in a Serb majority municipality in which a number of Bosniaks were killed or banished during the war. Additionally, youth from a small Bosniak majority community visited Banja Luka for the first time. There are multiple examples among the PRO-Future II events when people, usually youth, visited others' places of worship for the first time. A donor noted that the local community context must be considered and carefully analyzed when planning any peacebuilding interventions. Organizing even a one-off event with local government support, such as those described above, would be a success in some homogeneous and divided communities. PRO-Future II considers local context when planning their activities by categorizing municipalities based on their readiness for reconciliation and tailoring their assistance approach based on that information.

Finding 21: According to KIs, most PRO-Future II event participants already were open-minded and/or active in their communities before joining the Activity. There are examples of such individuals becoming peace activists after the PRO-Future II initial push. All PRO-Future II beneficiaries who participated in this evaluation as KIs said they already were open-minded when they joined the Activity and that the Activity has not changed them much in that regard. Several implementers noted this as well. For instance, teachers who implemented peace education said they selected the students who participate in CIVITAS¹³ extracurricular activities and debate clubs, class presidents, or those who volunteered or applied to public calls. Peace camps were, by their design, envisioned to include active participants and graduates from peace education. Online peacebuilding school is open to all interested individuals. However, according to the PRO-Future II post-event evaluation data, a considerable percentage of individuals who participated in the peacebuilding school (44 percent), public speaking events (38 percent), Our Talks fora (38 percent), and living libraries (33 percent) already had developed empathy toward other groups before participating in these events. Furthermore, a considerable number of participants already had developed skills in listening to and considering other groups' attitudes, mostly those who participated in public speaking events (41 percent), Our Talks fora (38 percent), and peacebuilding school (33 percent).

The Activity representatives noted that including active individuals in peacebuilding activities is important because it allows people to see that people who want peace exist among all ethnicities. Also, there are indications that PRO-Future II interventions have facilitated peace activism among open-minded, young people in BiH. According to PRO-Future II MEL data, 56 young individuals have engaged in peace activism after participating in a PRO-Future II Activity. For instance, a young politician decided to organize a peace caravan after participating in the PRO-Future II political academy. Several young war veterans decided to join the Activity as speakers after attending such a public speaking event. A participant in peace education decided to continue being active and later participated in the peace camp. An online peacebuilding school participant continued participating in peacebuilding interventions and activism in general.

¹³ CIVITAS refers to extracurricular activities in the democracy and human rights domain. The activities aim to develop research and public advocacy among the interested students. Students plan projects and present them in an annual competition.

The activists themselves noted that after positive experiences facilitated by PRO-Future II, young people want to stay in touch and seek other opportunities to work together. A desire to help their local communities is another motive for young people to engage.¹⁴ The results of the PRO-Future II post-event evaluation identified the peace camps as the most effective intervention concerning the development of a willingness to engage in building trust between members of different ethnic and religious groups, with 80 percent of participants voicing this willingness. A similar percentage of the peace academy attendees (79 percent) expressed this sentiment. Further, 75 percent of living library participants reported a positive outcome in this regard, along with 74 percent of the peacebuilding school students and 65 percent of the public speaking event participants.

Finding 22: Although PRO-Future II has achieved planned results in ensuring local ownership and Activity accountability toward local stakeholders by facilitating the identification of priority local issues as a part of the Platform for Peace supporters' civic movement, it has achieved limited success in making progress toward policy/institutional changes. The civic movement component, as designed under PRO-Future II, represents a set of synergetic activities conducted through cooperation/networking of different stakeholders, who advocate for institutional change. According to progress reports, as part of producing the Platform for Peace civic movement methodology, PRO-Future II conducted a series of KIIs/FGDs (18) with individuals and local influencers, aimed at ensuring adequate identification of local ideas for action and forming a joint vision for reconciliation, thus contributing to local ownership. To facilitate the civic movement component, one of the two planned workshops for Platform civic movement supporters was held (gathering 26 local activists from 16 municipalities) to define areas of activist work under the PRO-Future II umbrella in local communities and to introduce participants to the concept of social cohesion. The other workshop has not been held due to pandemic restrictions.

PRO-Future II initiated several advocacy actions on topics such as Mostar's civic efforts to change the names of streets named after Nazi collaborators and organizing intermunicipal support for the town of Bihać in addressing the migrant crisis. As part of this effort, mayors and representatives from 12 cities and municipalities from different parts of BiH, including both entities, joined the *Let's Help Bihać* campaign and signed a joint statement that called upon all relevant institutions to contribute to solving the migrant crisis and the consequences it produces for the institutions and citizens of Bihać. Such joint advocacy actions are highly atypical for BiH government representatives and thus represent a positive change. Thus far, however, these PRO-Future II interventions have not yielded any policy/institutional changes. As the Activity implementers noted, policy and institutional changes are hard to achieve due to a lack of political will, and they require a substantial amount of time, hard work, and patience.

In addition, PRO-Future II worked with five local communities across the entity line, recognizing the opportunity in connecting those municipalities around a joint benefit: tourism in the Majevisa region. In addition, preparation activities regarding nuclear waste at Trgovska Gora were initiated by establishing cooperation with the Sarajevo Institute for Politics in developing an influencing plan for advocacy activities. As a part of the Platform supporters' civic movement, PRO-Future II

¹⁴ However, according to KIIs, most young people do not participate nor are they interested in activism. They do not see any benefits from activism, and motivating them is not easy. Even in large communities with many people and opportunities, the same people attend all workshops, lectures, and events. Several KIIs noted how traditional CSO activities such as lectures are not appealing to youth and that raising their interest requires more innovative approaches. One of the issues that KIIs mentioned is that youth are given insufficient space in the media and that their positive stories, which could motivate others to engage, are not visible. Youth emigration aggravates the problem, because those who are most active often leave as soon as they learn enough and are independent.

interventions included supporting youth engagement and empowering youth to raise their voice and act together as a group, regardless of their political affiliation. These interventions included the “Peace Caravan” in Vareš and the multichannel campaign *Where are the Young People?*, which consisted of a series of events, a social media campaign, and media promotion. Furthermore, a large portion of civic movement building efforts focused on advocacy aimed at resolving local issues through small grants awarded to CSOs. The results of awarding small grants are presented under Evaluation Question 3.

Finding 23: Infrastructural interventions are perceived as a precondition for implementing peacebuilding activities. However, there are no guarantees that these facilities will be used for peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives. Implementers and beneficiaries believe that quality infrastructure is a precondition for the implementation of peacebuilding interventions. According to the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Breuer & Elson, 2017), these infrastructure investments may improve the general living and social conditions and reduce frustrations related to poor socio-economic circumstances. By the end of the data collection period, PRO-Future II supported nine infrastructural projects. These projects included reconstructing or repairing a playground, city stadium, kindergarten, school, community center, sports halls, fortress, sacral objects, and street lighting. Implementers and municipal representatives believe that the infrastructure will be used for peacebuilding and reconciliation activities. However, no outcomes have been achieved yet, and there are no guarantees that these investments will be used for this purpose or that they would not have been used for such activities without PRO-Future II assistance, once the municipalities fulfill their contractual obligations. However, such projects are naturally more visible than the traditional PRO-Future II activities and may contribute to the Activity’s/USAID’s general visibility. Data collection yielded no sufficient data to enable the evaluation team to conclude whether the investment costs would justify the benefits.

CONCLUSIONS

PRO-Future II activities aimed at the general population and improving their inter-ethnic attitudes and behaviors have, in most cases, engaged the people who already were open-minded and tolerant—more often, youth rather than adults. At the intrapersonal level, multiple outcomes have been observed related to changes in participants’ emotions and cognition. Living libraries and public speaking events were the most effective in producing empathy among the audience members. If implemented in isolation from other activities, the results of these short-term, one-off activities are unlikely to be sustainable. Visits to places of worship were also effective in eliciting positive emotions. Interventions eliciting positive emotions toward outgroups are important because prejudices are based on negative emotions. At the cognitive level, visits to places of worship seem to be effective in changing attitudes toward other religions and their followers and fostering greater acceptance of outgroups. There are indications that all PRO-Future II interventions had some effects on cognitive-level changes, including improved knowledge about outgroups and their experiences; increased openness or readiness for change; outgroup perspective-taking; and developing different perspectives on the past, present, and future. Because stereotypes are based on automatic information processing, interventions that improve knowledge about or awareness of outgroups and their experiences can be useful for breaking stereotypes.

At the interpersonal level, PRO-Future II activities have the potential to build relationships, lasting collaboration, and peace activism among the participants. There are examples showing that PRO-Future II improved cooperation between adults, and others indicating improved relationships and activism among youth. Longer PRO-Future II interventions that bring youth together (peace camps; peace education; some small grants, including collaboration) contributed to inter-ethnic friendships and continuing contact. Friendships have also been established between war victims collaborating on the implementation of public speaking events and political academy attendees. With respect to collaboration, PRO-Future II was most effective in facilitating such behavior among youth and women; activities that bring together youth and women to collaborate have, in some cases, resulted in lasting cooperation. Several PRO-Future II events facilitated peace activism among young beneficiaries, most notably the political academy, public speaking events, peace camps, online and peacebuilding schools, and adults have been perceived as obstacles to youth's engagement in such activities.

PRO-Future II achieved the intended results in ensuring local ownership and the Activity's accountability toward local stakeholders by facilitating the prioritization of local issues as part of the Platform supporters' civic movement. The Activity has, however, achieved limited progress toward policy/institutional and behavioral change. The Activity facilitated several advocacy actions, but no policy or institutional changes have been achieved to date.

PRO-Future II infrastructural interventions are perceived to be a precondition for implementing peacebuilding activities. However, they do not guarantee positive outcomes in peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts. It remains to be seen whether the costs justify the benefits.

EVALUATION QUESTION 3: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE PRO-FUTURE II SMALL-GRANT PROGRAMS CONTRIBUTED TO PEACEBUILDING?

FINDINGS

Finding 24: Small grants are perceived as an important and effective peacebuilding mechanism if resources are invested in MEL, layering, and sequencing. All donors agree that small grants can play an important role in the peacebuilding processes. Grant opportunities generally are rare, and they can provide people who have good ideas with opportunities to implement them. However, to be effective, they need to focus on intervention outcomes rather than outputs. Several KIs noted that although the grant size is important, it is more important to see if that money makes a difference in a specific community at a given time.

A donor implementing a large number of small grants emphasized that using this mechanism requires constant communication with and monitoring of grantees. Weekly monitoring is essential for ensuring that the activities are moving in the right direction and taking corrective actions when necessary, rather than waiting to receive implementation reports to learn how grants have been implemented. Although this approach is expensive, it is, in the opinions of the KIs, essential for achieving the results, especially when engaging informal groups or small organizations without experience with donor projects. MEL information collected should be used to inform new grant designs and implementation. The KI believes that an individual grant cannot accomplish much. Therefore, it is crucial to recognize which grants have the potential to produce the desired results if they continue, support the follow-ups, and pay attention to grant layering and sequencing toward the

expected result, rather than giving multiple grants and implementing a variety of different interventions that focus on different beneficiaries.

“Small grants, if that’s what your program is doing, don’t really necessarily accomplish a whole lot individually on their own. The impact, the outcome has to be cumulative. They have to build up to something, and it’s very easy to monitor an individual grant. It’s very hard to analyze the outcomes of accumulative bunch of grants, but one of the ways that you can sort of ensure that you’re getting accumulative value is have a plan to how you layer and how you sequence these things (...) Have a vision at the beginning: Where do you want to go?”

– A donor representative

PRO-Future II has implemented 87 grants during over four years. Due to the large number of grants and limited human resources, most implementers’ time is dedicated to grant administration, with little time left for monitoring, planning, and careful activity layering and sequencing, even though PRO-Future II gives an advantage to formerly successful grantees. PRO-Future II small-grants reports require the grantees to report on their outcomes, and these reports reveal that many grantees have difficulty distinguishing outcomes from outputs. The same difficulty was identified in KIs with grantees and with most other KIs. Also, the PRO-Future II small-grants manual or public calls require the grantees to produce outputs rather than outcomes.

Several KIs (donors and grantees) noted that small grants usually include short-term activities that produce short-term effects, and that youth revert to their former cognitive and behavioral patterns when they return to their communities. The PRO-Future impact and performance evaluation completed by MEASURE-BiH in 2017 affirmed that peacebuilding is a long-term process. From the grantees’ point of view, it often turns out that the grant duration is too short to achieve its objectives, or the funds are insufficient to achieve the desired scope of activities. From the donors’ perspective, implementing a large number of smaller activities often requires engaging more significant MEL resources. Grant fragmentation leads to diverse outcomes that are sometimes not clearly related to the Activity theory of change and expected results, thus requiring follow-up activities to achieve higher-level outcomes.

“I think small grants are great; they have a great target group. It’s just that they’re short-term, so to say. Maybe we should think about upgrading it to a slightly more serious level, more comprehensive, and it will have a larger and longer-lasting effect.”

– An Our Talks implementer

“You can’t do a small-grants program unless you design it in such a way that you have a lot, [that] you’re willing to pay for a lot of staff to do this properly, because for these things to be done well, you really, really have to work hand in glove with the local grantees. Especially in most small-grant programs, you’re looking for smaller and less experienced groups, and those ones need a lot of help.”

– A donor representative

Finding 25: Small grants incorporating public speaking events, visits to places of worship, peace camps, and youth and women’s collaboration have positive outcomes on beneficiaries’ inter-ethnic attitudes, emotions, relationships, collaboration, and activism.

PRO-Future II grantees completed 87 small grants by the end of the data collection period. As pointed out under Evaluation Question 2, interventions such as speaking-out events and joint visits to places of worship elicit empathy for other ethnic and religious groups. Furthermore, interventions such as peace camps and sports and cultural events that bring youth together often result in lasting cooperation. Grants that facilitate cooperation between women’s associations have, in several cases, produced continued collaboration. Some specific behavioral outcomes shared by implementers and beneficiaries involved an individual crossing the Mostar Bridge for the first time, an inter-ethnic relationship and

marriage, multiple friendships, and continued cooperation. In addition, there are cases of young people becoming more active in their communities, including a young person who established a youth center and another who founded a non-governmental organization (NGO).

Nearly all small grants implemented to date under PRO-Future II include contacts between different ethnicities, which can be a predictor of inter-ethnic attitude improvement (Allport, 1954; Hewstone et al., 2016). Another key predictor is empathy (Hewstone et al., 2016).

“I met a guy; his name is Dejan. He is a Catholic and he met his girlfriend, an Orthodox, in Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka. She is now going to Italy; she has got a scholarship to study, while he is now looking for work to be there together with her. So, well, a Catholic and an Orthodox woman met in a mosque, and they are together in a relationship now.”

– An IRC representative

“In fact, in the same year when the Small School for Peacebuilding finished, I wrote my own project, “Sport and Culture Days in Busovaca,” with the aim to get Croat and Bosniak young people closer to each other, because we are constantly in a quarrel, in conflict. “

– An online peacebuilding school participant

Finding 26: All grantees have positive attitudes about PRO-Future II partners’ support with grant implementation, but some described issues with implementation. In 2020, grant implementation was often disrupted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, some activities had to be canceled, modified (to reduce the scope of activities and number of beneficiaries), or moved to an online setting. Several grantees identified other issues related to financial and technical problems, such as tax returns, disrupted implementation because the last money transfer happened after the implementation, inability to execute advanced payments within grants for informal groups, and lack of feedback given to unsuccessful grant applicants.¹⁵

“There is a very small number of activities that are currently implemented for young people, a very small number. This is due to the appearance of this COVID-19 virus.”

– A municipal working group member

“In that project, the previous practice was for the first payment to be, it seems to me, some 70, 80 percent, and then only in the end, the remaining funds were paid ... and then last year, 50 percent of the funds were transferred, and 50 percent of the funds practically had to be covered by the organization in some way.”

– A grantee (local government representative)

Finding 27: Small grants for youth elicited interest among young people to become active in peacebuilding processes. Youth organizations and informal groups have shown great enthusiasm in applying and implementing the PRO-Future II small grants; 70 out of 90 grants intended for youth already have been awarded. The grantees implemented a variety of activities, including creative activities (producing plays, promotional videos, and documentaries; organizing festivals) and joint inter-ethnic activities (peace camps, sports competitions, visits to cultural and historical sites, and joint actions). Youth-designed interventions included lectures, seminars, workshops, and—to a lesser extent—trainings. Sometimes, these interventions were combined with creative and joint activities. There are indications that these grants can improve peacebuilding activism among youth. For instance, after participating in small grants for youth, a grantee registered

¹⁵ According to PRO-Future II implementors, due to the high number of applicants, the Activity’s practice is to publish the list of successful applicants on its website and send feedback only to the applicants who explicitly request it by phone or email. In addition, the Activity carefully reviews all complaints and provides feedback to applicants.

her own NGO, engaged in community work, participated in other PRO-Future II activities, and initiated collaboration with religious institutions. Another grantee who initially applied for a grant for informal groups became a local council member and, afterward, applied for three PRO-Future II grants. The implementer noted grants for youth and informal groups are particularly important because few grant opportunities are available for these target groups.

“It is similar, for example, with projects from Prozor, Rama, and Mostar. There we have Prozor-Rama Rowing Club and the “Zelena Dolina” Association, who regularly carry out sports activities, but neatly within those sports activities they nicely fit a lecture related to reconciliation. For inter-ethnic relations, that is not so transparent and does not tell these people: “You came here because we want to connect you, because you are Croats and Bosniaks. Now you need to socialize...” But it has some peace activism in it.”

– A PRO-Future II partner organization representative

Finding 28: Grants for war victims associations were intended for advocacy initiatives aiming to improve victims’ legal status and promote reconciliation. These grants seem to improve the psychological state of victims, collaboration between war victims associations, and evoke empathy and perspective-taking among the audience. However, war victims achieved little in improving their own human rights status to date. According to the PRO-Future II award, grants for war victims associations were intended for advocacy initiatives of entity ministries and higher-level institutions to improve the status of victims’ human rights. However, due to political obstacles, most grants implemented by war victims focused on public speaking, improving connections between war victims associations across ethnic lines, and providing psychological assistance to their members. The associations have not made any progress in terms of policy changes, and few advocacy initiatives have been taken to date, one of which was successful in securing local government support for a war victims association.

However, as mentioned before, public speaking events evoke empathy among the audience. They facilitate perspective-taking among audience members, enabling them to see the past from the position of the “other.” These events facilitate friendships and collaboration between war victims. Preparing for these events is also therapeutic for victims, who work through their personal trauma while preparing themselves for public speaking. Further, these events are usually well covered by local media. According to implementers, war victims associations are small organizations with insufficient human and financial resources, requiring extensive donor support and assistance in small-grant implementation. Thus, implementing these grants has represented a challenge for the implementer; one half of 15 grants planned for war victims associations have been implemented to date.

“Today we are great friends primarily thanks to this program. The program itself took us through an education. In the beginning, it was dealing with trauma, going through trauma and all sorts of things that I had already forgotten.”

– A war victim, public speaker

“So one Bosniak, one Serb, and one Croat. Who all talk, who had very, very similar experiences in essence and who all three talk about their experiences. It is like any living library that has made a huge impression on me and everyone else. It was done live, so I could see the reaction of my colleagues around me, I think we all cried in the end, at the end of that day because we got some information and heard some experiences that we absolutely didn’t have a chance to hear before, because we are all from our local communities which are mono-ethnic, monoreligious, although Sarajevo as a whole maybe is not.”

– A living library participant

Finding 29: Implementing grants for inter-religious dialogue is challenging due to political pressures and low interest and capacity of the IRC’s regional chapters. Grants for inter-religious dialogue typically targeted youth and included visits to places of worship, spiritual music concerts, and art competitions accompanied by educational activities (lectures, roundtables, seminars, and workshops) on topics such as reducing prejudice, hate speech, and fostering coexistence. Implementers find these grants to be better at focusing on peacebuilding and reconciliation than on other types of grants. Even though the PRO-Future II design envisioned these grants to be for the IRC regional chapters, religious institutions, and organizations promoting inter-religious dialogue, the regional chapters had not implemented any grants by the end of the data collection period. Most of these grants were implemented by religious institutions and only a few by CSOs. The implementers noted that small grants for inter-religious dialogue resulted in ongoing cooperation between religious institutions and youth. However, their implementation is challenging due to political pressures, the strict hierarchy and slow processes in religious institutions, and their low capacity for grant implementation.

Finding 30: Implementation of grants for municipalities has been challenging due to low interest and capacity among municipal working groups (MWGs) and the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the implementers, less than one third of grants planned for municipalities’ activities had been completed by the end of the data collection period. There is low interest among MWGs to implement these activities due to a lack of motivation and low grant amounts for these institutions’ activities. In addition, municipalities were closed at the beginning of the pandemic, so they were unable to organize any activities. PRO-Future II worked to address this issue by strengthening the MWGs with civil society members and other activists. Local communities implemented various activities: lectures, workshops, and conferences, as well as creative and joint inter-ethnic activities such as documentary production, open-door days, sports competitions, cultural activities, visits to historical and cultural sites, and conferences. Most of their activities target youth and children in local communities. In most cases, these grants are implemented jointly by two or more municipalities. Implementers and MWG representatives stated that beyond the outcomes for youth and other beneficiaries, these grants strengthen connections and collaboration between municipalities.

“In the same manner, we have collaboration with East New Sarajevo and East Sarajevo, and many other[s], Domoljevac and Samac, which maybe used to exist as one municipality, but now are two. We have an example of Foca in the RS [Republika Srpska] and Foca in the FBiH, for which most people do not understand that those are two Focas. When we say that they implemented a grant together, people understand nothing from it. In the part where we have Teocak, Lopare, and Celic, each year they apply for grants, either a municipality on their own or together working on mutual activities.”

– A municipal working group representative

Municipalities and organizations were eligible to apply for small grants of up to USD 500 for local initiatives, supporting events such as art, music, cultural, sports, or others. According to PRO-Future II progress reports, these grants are often used as introductory activities for municipalities when they first join the Activity. These initiatives usually include activities similar to those of other grants: educational activities (e.g., conferences, workshops, roundtables) or contact-based activities (e.g., cultural and sports events, joint visits to places of worship). During 2020, a large portion of the small-initiative funds (USD 68,000 out of a total of 75,000) were reallocated to the COVID-19 pandemic emergency fund (Solidarity Fund). The emergency fund provided communities with groceries, face masks, hand sanitizers, and bedding. PRO-Future II distributed the items to people in need through official crisis teams, MWGs, or IRC regional chapters. The implementers noted that the Solidarity Fund strengthened the connections between the NGOs and MWGs responsible for delivering the assistance.

Finding 3 I: Small grants for CSOs strengthened connections between organizations across ethnic lines and CSO–local government collaboration, but little has been done in terms of institutional change.

Grants for CSOs elicited considerable interest among organizations. All resources intended for CSOs already had been awarded by the end of the data collection period. These grants were implemented mainly by small organizations with poor human, financial, and technical capacity. The CSOs implemented activities similar to those of other grantees, such as educational interventions (workshops, lectures, trainings) and contact-based activities (peace camps, sports competitions, cultural events, open-door days, environmental actions). Women’s organizations implemented several grants for CSOs, and according to the implementer, their capacities were improved in the process. In addition, an implementer noted that these activities usually produce improved knowledge, relationships, collaboration, and activism among beneficiaries, and that the added value of these grants lies in improved connections and cooperation between CSOs from different parts of BiH and CSO–municipality connections. Although the Activity by design intended these grants to be awarded primarily for advocacy interventions, the implementers stated that CSOs were neither interested in, nor did they have the capacity for, designing or implementing these types of initiatives due to their low capacity.

“So, in essence, as much as we tried to have it be some kind of advocacy, they find these kinds of grants are more suitable for them, therefore, in essence we are happy if anything gets implemented in the field. Especially in cases of such organizations, which neither have financial influence or funds with which they can implement all that.”

– A PRO-Future II partner organization representative

CONCLUSIONS

Small grants can be an effective peacebuilding tool. However, they often include short-term activities that produce short-term effects. Longer-term effects and higher-level outcomes require considerable MEL resources, layering, and sequencing. In most cases, PRO-Future II small grants included a large number of awards allocated to different organizations for activities with objectives falling under PRO-Future II’s general results, rather than planning for specific outcomes, evaluating the results, and designing follow-ups to strengthen the obtained results. Limited human and financial resources, combined with a large number of geographically dispersed grants, had limited focus on careful monitoring, evaluating, planning, layering, and sequencing. On a positive note, nearly all PRO-Future II small grants included inter-ethnic contacts, which can be a predictor of inter-ethnic attitude improvement. Small grants that include public speaking events, peace camps, and activities to promote collaboration among youth and women are likely to produce these results.

PRO-Future II allocated six types of small grants for youth CSOs and informal groups, PRO-Future II municipalities, war victims associations, CSOs, inter-religious dialogue, and small initiatives. Small grants for youth and CSOs elicited the most interest and engagement, followed by grants for municipalities. There was considerably less interest among war victim associations and organizations and institutions engaging in inter-religious dialogue. Compared to other grants, small grants for youth seem to focus more on creative activities rather than lectures, workshops, and seminars. These grants have facilitated youth activism and, in some cases, peace activism. Grants for war victims associations improve the psychological state of victims and collaboration between war victims associations, and they evoke empathy among the public speaking event audience. However, little was done to improve war victims’ status in society. Small grants for inter-religious dialogue improved cooperation between religious institutions and youth but did not foster interest among the IRC’s regional chapters. The

implementation of these grants is challenging due to political pressures, centralized decision-making in religious communities, and grantees' low capacity for project design and implementation. Implementation of grants for municipalities has been challenging due to the COVID-19 pandemic and low interest among MWGs. The principal strength of these grants is that they foster connections and collaboration between municipalities across entity and ethnic lines. The largest portion of financial resources envisioned for small initiatives were reallocated to PRO-Future's II COVID-19 pandemic emergency fund. This intervention mobilized MWGs, IRC regional chapters, and official crisis teams to deliver assistance to people in need in their communities. Small grants for CSOs strengthened connections between organizations across ethnic lines and, in some cases, CSO–government collaboration, but little has been done in terms of policy/institutional changes due to low interest and low capacity of grantees to engage in these activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the evaluation findings and conclusions, the evaluation team prepared the following recommendations, which are organized under two broad topics and according to stakeholder (promotion of peace) or intervention type (changing inter-ethnic attitudes and behaviors). USAID and the implementing partner should consider the following recommendations for the remainder of the PRO-Future II Activity implementation and for future peacebuilding and reconciliation interventions.

PROMOTION OF PEACE

1. **POLITICIANS/GOVERNMENT:** For the remainder of the Activity, focus on cantonal and local government levels for Platform promotion and implementation. In future programming, encourage political academies to focus on cross-ethnic working groups that address common issues, rather than on lectures. Explore ways to coordinate and collaborate with and learn from USAID Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes (SPPG) in BiH's Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute (ALPI) program (for more information on ALPI and its successful elements, see the MEASURE II 2021 SPPG midterm performance evaluation report).
2. **RELIGIOUS LEADERS:** When planning to work with religious leaders, make sure they are included in activity planning as early as possible. Continue exploring ways to include the highest-level religious leaders in peace promotion (e.g., by reorienting to apolitical topics, future rather than past; asking them about the kind of peace promotion work in which they want to engage). Continue supporting open-door days.
3. **MEDIA:** Continue engaging in public advocacy with media partners (including those supported through USAID media activities), calling for engagement and responsibility of higher levels of government for maintaining and engaging in peacebuilding. In collaboration with media partners and other USAID Activities, particularly in the media sector, respond to negative stories in the media, e.g., by analyzing the political motivation behind the stories and sending messages of peace. Continue promoting peace through mainstream online media (at all levels) and TV stations. Coordinate with other donor peacebuilding projects to strengthen peacebuilding messages.
4. **WAR VICTIMS:** Continue engaging war victims in peace promotion and building their capacity to design and implement advocacy interventions and negotiate with governments. Consider

connecting low-capacity organizations with human rights CSOs with stronger capacity to serve as their mentors. Consider providing regular psychological support to speakers.

5. **EDUCATION STAKEHOLDERS:** To the extent possible, advocate for expanding peace education programs to more locations and schools to reach more students.

CHANGING INTER-ETHNIC ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS

6. **LIVING LIBRARIES AND PUBLIC SPEAKING EVENTS:** Continue supporting living libraries and public speaking events as part of longer, more complex activities. Consider including these activities as part of all other Activity interventions. In addition, consider making videos of these activities to be used when live events are unavailable, such as in peace education or peace camps. After dealing with difficult topics, ensure a debriefing for participants that is facilitated by a trained professional and provide the participants with information on where they can get psychological support if necessary.
7. **PEACE EDUCATION:** Facilitate practices in which all students, not only those who are open-minded and motivated, participate in the program, and ensure that students complete the whole program rather than selected classes. For future interventions, consider adapting the program to younger generations (teenagers or even younger).
8. **PEACE CAMPS:** Continue supporting peace camps. To save resources, organize these camps through actual campsites rather than using hotel accommodations.
9. **CIVIC MOVEMENT:** Continue focusing on this objective under a new peacebuilding activity by leveraging the stakeholder network built under the PRO-Future/PRO-Future II Activities.
10. **SMALL GRANTS:** Continue using a small-grants mechanism as a peacebuilding tool. Consider awarding fewer grants but investing more effort into defining clear theories of change, expected and desired outcomes, M&E practices (e.g., by introducing a complexity aware M&E approach), and expanded duration of grant activities to prolong intergroup contact. Consider awarding follow-up grants for activities that produce desired outcomes or that are likely to produce such outcomes if followed up, and that replicate successful activities in other geographic areas. Train grantees to think about their activities in terms of outcomes rather than outputs.
11. **INFRASTRUCTURAL INTERVENTIONS:** Closely monitor use of infrastructure built during the first round of these types of projects and make informed decisions about future investment in such projects.
12. **REGIONAL APPROACH:** Continue supporting regional peace camps and SFF. Consider establishing a separate grant line for regional cooperation. Under future peacebuilding interventions, consider designing activities specifically tailored for the diaspora. For instance, consider establishing an online platform that connects young professionals from the diaspora and peace camps for youth from the diaspora.

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ANNEXES

Annex 1: Statement of Work

Annex 2: Reviewed Documentation

Annex 3: Data Collection Instruments

ANNEX I: STATEMENT OF WORK

PURPOSE OF THE ASSIGNMENT

The United States Agency for International Development Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAID/BiH) has requested its Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II) to conduct a midterm performance evaluation of the Trust, Understanding and Responsibility for the Future II (PRO-Future II) Activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This performance evaluation will investigate PRO-Future II outcomes achieved during the first four years of implementation in mobilizing key influencers to promote inter-ethnic reconciliation and changing inter-ethnic attitudes and behaviors among its key target groups. The purpose of this performance evaluation is to provide the Mission with credible and useful insights to make informed programmatic decisions and potential adaptations for the remainder of the Activity, maximizing the likelihood of achieving the desired results. The Mission and the implementing partner will use the evaluation results to take midterm corrective actions (if needed) in the Activity design and/or implementation.

SUMMARY INFORMATION

The Pro Future II Trust, Understanding and Responsibility for the Future (PRO-Future II) is a \$8 million USAID/BiH-funded Activity implemented by Catholic relief Services (CRS). This Activity contributes to Development Objective 2: “Socio-Economic Conditions Improved.” The performance evaluation will focus on analyzing the Activity’s design and progress toward expected results. The evaluation intends to utilize rigorous methods and design to obtain high-quality data and produce credible findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Activity details are presented in Exhibit I.

Exhibit I. Basic Information on the PRO-Future II Activity

Activity Name	Trust, Understanding and Responsibility for the Future – PRO-Future II
USAID Office	USAID/BiH Democracy Office
Implementer	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Cooperative Agreement #	AID-168-A-17-00005
Total Estimated Cost	\$8,000,000 (\$5,000,000 initial, \$8,000,000 with extension)
Life of Activity	September 17, 2017 to September 16, 2023 (5 years initial + 1 year extension)
Active Geographic Region	Across Bosnia and Herzegovina
Target Groups	Politicians and government representatives (all levels); religious leaders, teachers and institutions; media representatives (editors-in-chief, owners, journalists); citizens (active, non-active); CSOs; women; youth (including pupils and students); war victims; business leaders.
CDCS Intermediate Result	DO2: Socio-Economic Conditions Improved IR 2.1: Social Cohesion Strengthened Sub-IR: Community Trust Strengthened
Required evaluation	No
External or internal evaluation	External

BACKGROUND

COUNTRY CONTEXT

Since the end of the war in the 1990s, the United States has assisted BiH's development toward a more tolerant multi-ethnic society. Even though the country has been stable since signing the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995, and even if most citizens engage in some form of inter-ethnic contacts, inter-ethnic divisions, tensions, and prejudice are still omnipresent in society (IMPAQ International, 2020). Politicians reinforce these divisions through divisive rhetoric and hate speech, manipulating citizens and keeping their positions of power by inciting a fear of "others." Highly politicized mainstream media play an important role in such dynamics by spreading and amplifying divisive messages (USAID, 2020). Religious leaders, the most trusted public figures (IMPAQ International, 2020), have potential to strengthen reconciliation efforts. Youth, especially if raised in ethnically homogeneous or divided communities and attending mono-ethnic schools, are particularly vulnerable to adopting the ethno-nationalist narratives primarily due to the instrumentalized education system (Karuna Center, 2020) and lack of inter-ethnic contacts.

Inter-ethnic reconciliation in BiH is among the key prerequisites for democratization, socio-economic development, political stability and Euro-Atlantic integration. However, USAID/BiH's National Survey of Citizen Perceptions (NSCP) suggests that inter-ethnic relationships in BiH are still unsettled. For instance, 40 percent of citizens reported anxiety when engaging in or anticipating contacts with individuals of other ethnicities. The level of inter-ethnic trust in 2020 fell under 40 percent for the first time in the last three years. Less than half of the citizens, 41 percent, say they are ready to forgive other ethnic groups for what happened during the war. This indicates that 25 years after the war, peacebuilding and reconciliation interventions are still relevant.

PRO- FUTURE II DESCRIPTION AND THEORY OF CHANGE

Given this context, PRO-Future II aims to improve trust and reconciliation and facilitate societal change across BiH by empowering citizens and key influencers (politicians, government representatives, religious leaders) to advocate for peace, political responsibility, and institutional changes. PRO-Future II envisages that, if media promote citizens' and key actors' peacebuilding efforts, stability, and economic prosperity in the country will improve. PRO-Future II aims to achieve the following results:

Activity Goal: Improved trust and reconciliation leads to positive societal change across BiH

Purpose 1: Key influencers across political, religious and media spheres work to institutionalize a collective vision for a stable future

- Sub-purpose 1.1: Targeted key influencers in the political and government spheres take tangible actions which focus on political responsibility and promote inter-ethnic reconciliation.
- Sub-purpose 1.2: Targeted religious key influencers lead national- and community-level reconciliation initiatives.
- Sub-purpose 1.3: Targeted media outlets promote reconciliation and increase respectful and empathetic coverage of inter-ethnic reconciliation initiatives.

Purpose 2: Citizens build civic movement to foster reconciliation across ethnic and religious divides.

- Sub-purpose 2.1: Education institutions incorporate reconciliation topics and approaches into their students' classes to increase acceptance and reconciliation.
- Sub-purpose 2.2: Citizens from 70 municipalities have increased opportunities to face the past and promote reconciliation, and inclusiveness.
- Sub-purpose 2.3: Citizens from 70 municipalities advocate for institutional changes and demand political responsibility.
- Sub-purpose 2.4: Municipal working groups lead implementation of infrastructure projects that contribute to overall community life and reconciliation processes.

PRO-Future II's cross-cutting focus is to expand the peacebuilding dialogue to countries in the region. The Activity design emphasizes the importance of active engagement of women and youth in peacebuilding.

PRO- FUTURE II MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING PLAN

PRO-Future (II) is tracking 16 indicators to measure progress in meeting Life of Activity targets (see Exhibit 2).

Exhibit 2. Activity Indicators, with Targets and Actuals for FYs 2018, 2019, 2020, and Life-of-Activity Targets

Level of Result	Narrative Summary	Indicators	Targets (actuals)			
			FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	LOA Targets
Activity Purpose I	Improved trust and reconciliation leads to positive societal change across BiH.	Percentage of adult BiH citizens expressing highest level of out-group trust (trust towards other ethnic groups)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
		Percentage of youth among BiH citizens expressing highest level of out-group trust (trust towards other ethnic groups)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
		Number of PRO-Future (II)-assisted municipalities that are in category three (highest level or reconciliation)	12 (6)	16 (17)	21 (22)	32
Activity Sub-purpose I	Key influencers across political, religious and media spheres work to institutionalize a collective vision for a stable future.	Number of reconciliation initiatives implemented by government institutions at all levels resulting from adopted Action Plans for Implementation of Platform for Peace	10 (1)	20 (11)	20 (24)	95
		Number of implemented reconciliation initiatives led by religious key influencers	9 (1)	33 (15)	40 (44)	182
		Number of media stories disseminated with PRO-Future (II) support that facilitate the advancement of reconciliation or peace process	150 (254)	350 (279)	400 (539)	1,900
Activity Outcome/ Output I.1	Targeted key influencers in the political and government spheres take tangible actions which focus on political responsibility and	Number of government institutions at all levels that adopted Action Plans for Implementation of Platform for Peace	10 (4)	20 (11)	20 (16)	75
		Number of reconciliation initiatives planned by government	30 (15)	60 (62)	50 (78)	225

	promote inter-ethnic reconciliation.	institutions at all levels and included in adopted Action Plans for Implementation of Platform for Peace				
Activity Outcome/ Output 1.2	Targeted religious key influencers lead national and community level reconciliation initiatives.	Number of religious leaders engaged in PRO-Future (II)'s inter-religious and reconciliation initiatives	16 (40)	21 (22)	40 (41)	177
Activity Outcome/ Output 1.3	Targeted media outlets promote reconciliation and increase respectful and empathetic coverage of inter-ethnic reconciliation initiatives.	Number of training days provided to journalists with PRO-Future (II) assistance, measured by person-days of training (SFAI Indicator)	25 (14)	25 (0)	0 (0)	50
Activity Sub-purpose 2	Citizens build civic movement to foster reconciliation across ethnic and religious divides.	Number of people participating in PRO-Future (II) events, trainings, or activities designed to build mass support for peace and reconciliation (SFAI Indicator)	3,500 (6,468)	6,300 (5,654)	7,000 (14,934)	35,300
		Number of youth participating in PRO-Future (II) activities who become peace activists	15 (19)	30 (8)	40 (29)	190
Activity Outcome/ Output 2.1	Education institutions incorporate reconciliation topics and approaches into their students' classes to increase acceptance of others and reconciliation.	Number of education institutions that incorporated reconciliation topics and approaches into students' classes	0 (0)	0 (8)	3 (4)	10
Activity Outcome/ Output 2.2	Citizens from 70 municipalities have increased opportunities to face the past and promote reconciliation and inclusiveness	Number of PRO-Future (II) - supported events, trainings, or activities designed to build support for peace or reconciliation among key actors to the conflict (SFAI Indicator)	40 (110)	90 (115)	140 (239)	590
Activity Outcome/ Output 2.3	Civil society organizations from 70 municipalities advocate for institutional changes and demand political responsibility	Number of implemented reconciliation advocacy campaigns or developed influence plans, by CSOs or informal groups of citizens supported by PRO-Future (II) with the goal to achieve institutional changes and political responsibility	1 (2)	3 (8)	7 (1)	26
Activity Outcome/ Output 2.4	Municipal working groups lead infrastructure projects that contribute to overall community life and reconciliation processes.	Number of infrastructures repaired or constructed	0 (n/a)	0 (n/a)	4 (0)	25

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation team will assess the Activity's work to-date along the following evaluation questions:

1. What outcomes have PRO-Future II's key influencers (politicians, religious leaders, media) achieved in promoting inter-ethnic reconciliation?
 - 1.1. What outcomes has PRO-Future II achieved through interventions fostering regional dialogue?
2. What outcomes has PRO-Future II achieved in terms of changing inter-ethnic attitudes and behaviors among supported citizens, particularly among youth and students?
3. To what extent have the PRO-Future II small-grant programs contributed to peacebuilding?

EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team will employ a mixed-methods data collection approach and triangulate data to assess the efficiency of PRO-Future (II) interventions and activities, utilizing the following data sources:

1. **Activity documents** (including but not limited to the Activity Award; Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plan; work plans; annual and quarterly progress reports; lists of beneficiaries, experts, and other stakeholders involved in Activity implementation; Activity internal evaluation report; documents produced by the Activity and its beneficiaries)
2. **Secondary documentation relevant to trust and reconciliation topics** (e.g., MEASURE-BiH/MEASURE II National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions [NSCP]; evaluation reports of former USAID's peacebuilding interventions [Choosing Peace Together, PRO-Future impact evaluation report]; documents developed by government institutions; international organizations and CSOs).
3. **Key informant interviews (KIIs)** with USAID/BiH and PRO-Future II implementing partner and subcontractors, relevant international and donor organizations, government institutions, religious institutions and media representatives, PRO-Future II grantees, relevant local organizations, and reconciliation experts. The full list of key informants (without identifying information) will be presented in the Evaluation Work Plan and subject to USAID/BiH comments.
4. **Focus group discussions (FGDs)** with PRO-Future II beneficiaries, which may include samples of roundtable participants; Platform for Peace signatories; trained journalists and editors; municipal working group members; students attending inter-ethnic classes; young politicians; audiences in speaking-out events and living libraries; participants in open-door days, peace camps, and fora; small-grant beneficiaries; and other beneficiaries. Draft FGD guide(s) will be presented in the evaluation work plan and subject to USAID/BiH comments.
5. **Online survey(s)** of PRO-Future II beneficiaries (e.g., roundtable participants; Platform for Peace signatories; trained journalists and editors; municipal working group members; students attending inter-ethnic classes; young politicians; audiences in speaking-out events and living Libraries; participants in open-door days, peace camps, and fora; small-grant beneficiaries; and other beneficiaries), to be conducted to capture experiences of wider groups of beneficiaries than covered by KIIs and FGs.

Exhibit 3 presents the evaluation matrix outlining the methodology to be employed to address each evaluation question and sub-question. The evaluation team will start the analysis by reviewing secondary data on peacebuilding and transitional justice in general. The team will then review Activity documents to learn about the outcomes of different interventions. Subsequently, the team will conduct KIIs and FGDs with donors, implementers, and beneficiaries to further explore these outcomes and investigate other outcomes achieved by the Activity. Finally, based on lessons learned through the desk review, KIIs and FGDs, the evaluation team will design and conduct the online surveys to learn about the outcomes and interventions contributing to these outcomes from a wider range of beneficiaries.

The evaluation team will conduct a desk review of the Activity and secondary documents, transcribe and code KII and FGD transcripts, and conduct (at least) descriptive analysis of the survey data. The team will compare data from all sources and further explore any discrepancies to ensure that the evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations are high-quality, valid, credible, and reliable.

EXHIBIT 3. EVALUATION MATRIX		
EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	DATA SOURCES/DATA COLLECTION METHODS	DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH
<p>1. What outcomes have the PRO-Future II key influencers (politicians, religious leaders, media) achieved in promoting inter-ethnic reconciliation?</p> <p>1a. What outcomes has PRO-Future II achieved through interventions fostering regional dialogue?</p>	Activity and secondary documents on the role of politicians, religious leaders and media in reconciliation; KIIs and FGDs with implementors and beneficiaries of interventions with key influencers; mini surveys of beneficiaries of interventions targeting key influencers	Desk review; KII/FG transcript coding; descriptive survey analysis
2. What outcomes has PRO-Future II achieved in terms of changing inter-ethnic attitudes and behaviors among supported citizens, particularly among youth and students?	Activity and secondary documents dealing with improving inter-ethnic attitudes and behaviors among citizens; KIIs and FGDs with implementors and beneficiaries of interventions targeting citizens; mini surveys of beneficiaries of interventions targeting citizens	Desk review; KII/FG transcript coding; descriptive survey analysis
3. To what extent have the PRO-Future II small-grant programs contributed to peacebuilding?	Activity and secondary documents on small-grant programs and their results in terms of facilitating reconciliation; KIIs and FGDs with small-grant implementors and beneficiaries; mini surveys of small-grant beneficiaries	Desk review; KII/FG transcript coding; descriptive survey analysis

SCHEDULE

The overview of the tentative evaluation timeline is provided in Exhibit 5.

EXHIBIT 5. TENTATIVE EVALUATION TIMELINE	
TENTATIVE DATES	TASKS AND DELIVERABLES
July 20, 2021	Finalize the Evaluation work plan
July 22–August 23, 2021	Data collection
September 10, 2021	Preliminary data analysis
Week of September 13, 2021	Briefing for the Mission
October 8, 2021	Submission of the draft evaluation report
October 29, 2021	Submission of the final evaluation report
First week of November, 2021	Evaluation follow-up workshop

ANNEX 2: REVIEWED DOCUMENTATION

1. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Activity Award
2. USAID PRO-FUTURE Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
3. USAID PRO-FUTURE II 2018 Annual Report
4. USAID PRO-FUTURE II 2019 Annual Report
5. USAID PRO-FUTURE II 2020 Annual Report
6. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year I-IV Work Plans
7. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year I First Quarterly Report
8. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year I Fourth Quarterly Report
9. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year I Second Quarterly Report
10. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year I Third Quarterly Report
11. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year II First Quarterly Report
12. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year II Fourth Quarterly Report
13. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year II Second Quarterly Report
14. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year II Third Quarterly Report
15. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year III First Quarterly Report
16. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year III Fourth Quarterly Report
17. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year III Second Quarterly Report
18. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year III Third Quarterly Report
19. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year IV First Quarterly Report
20. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Year IV Second Quarterly Report
21. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Small-Grants Manual
22. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Small-Grants Implementation Reports
23. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Lists of Beneficiaries
24. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Infrastructure Projects Tracking Document
25. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Attendance Lists for Small Grants
26. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Attendance Lists for Our Talks Fora
27. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Attendance Lists for Peace Talks
28. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Attendance Lists for Peace and Advocacy Camps
29. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Peace Education Program Participants
30. PRO-FUTURE II list of published media content
31. PRO-FUTURE II database of small grants
32. PRO-FUTURE II database of grantees and beneficiaries
33. USAID PRO-FUTURE II Training/Event Agendas (training sessions for war victims, local coordinators, political academies, juvenile war veterans, peace education, peace camps, journalists, municipal working groups, peace activists, university reconciliation fora participants, public speaking events)
34. External Evaluation of Interreligious Studies and Peacebuilding Master programme, 2020
35. INFOHOUSE Internal Assessment of 14 PRO-FUTURE II Communities Capacity, Category I, (2018)
36. Overview of Reconciliation Conceptual Framework in International Literature and Research on Reconciliation in BiH, MEASURE-BiH, 2017
37. Reconciliation in Practice, United States Institute of Peace, 2015
38. Role of Social Cohesion in Creation of Successful Economic Development Within Local Communities, CRS, 2020
39. Societal Transformation and Reconciliation Activity (STAR), Final Narrative Report (draft)—Reporting Period 10/15/2018–10/14/2020
40. Study of the Impact of Social Cohesion on the Creation of a Favorable Environment for Economic Development and Attracting Investments in Municipalities and Cities, PROMENTE and Economic Institute Banja Luka
41. National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions (NSCP-BiH) 2019
42. National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions (NSCP-BiH) 2020

ANNEX 3: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDES

MISSION, IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS, AND PARTNERS

Please describe the PRO-Future II theory of change and, in your experience, how it works in practice?

For IP: what were the responsibilities of each PRO-Future II partner?

Ask the following questions for each group of interventions below:

1. What were the expected outcomes of these interventions?
2. Of all interventions targeting ..., which proved to be the most effective?
3. Which outcomes (positive, negative, unintended) have been achieved based on these interventions?
4. Which interventions failed to produce any outcomes?
5. What have you learned based on the implementation of these interventions?
6. What interventions would you like to learn more about in terms of their outcomes on beneficiaries' attitudes and behaviors?

Sub-purpose 1.1: Interventions targeting key influencers in political and government spheres to institutionalize collective vision for a stable future

- Commitment to the Platform for Peace at a national level
- Advocacy by war victims
- Political Academy
- Our Talks Fora
- Cultural Events
- Study of reconciliation and business environment

Sub-purpose 1.2: Interventions targeting key religious influencers to lead national and community level reconciliation initiatives

- Joint visits to places of suffering
- Engaging religious education teachers
- Open-door Days`
- National events led by top religious leaders
- IRC regional chapters
- Small grants for inter-religious dialogue
- Direct cooperation with churches and religious institutions
- Joint master's degree in inter-religious studies and peacebuilding
- Religious freedoms*

Sub-purpose 1.3: Interventions targeting media outlets to promote reconciliation and increase respectful and empathetic coverage of inter-ethnic reconciliation initiatives

- Documenting and publicizing reconciliation initiatives
- Training of journalists and editors on peacebuilding lenses
- Production of documentary
- Peace talks

Sub-purpose 2.1: Interventions targeting education institutions to incorporate reconciliation topics and approaches into their students' classes to increase acceptance and reconciliation

- Integrated and Inter-ethnic classes
- Living libraries
- University reconciliation fora
- Online school for peacebuilding
- Implementation of the platform for peace by ministries of education

Sub-purpose 2.2: Interventions targeting citizens from 70 municipalities to have increased opportunities to face the past and promote reconciliation and inclusiveness

- Active engagement of 70 municipalities (inter-community trust*)
- Small grants for municipalities
- Small grants for local initiatives
- Advanced peace advocacy camps
- Small grants to support youth

Sub-purpose 2.3: Interventions targeting citizens from 70 municipalities to advocate for institutional changes and demand political responsibility,

- Platform for Peace supporters' civic movement
- Small grants for civil society

Sub-purpose 2.4: Interventions targeting municipal working groups to lead implementation of infrastructure projects that contribute to overall community life and reconciliation processes

- Construction or reconstruction of infrastructure

Cross-cutting: Interventions targeting regional actors and facilitating regional dialogue to increase opportunities to face the past and promote reconciliation and inclusiveness

General questions:

- a. What are the greatest opportunities and threats to peace in BiH today?
- b. To what extent can young politicians push forward their own ideas in political parties?
- c. To what extent can local religious leaders push forward their ideas?
- d. What are the issues in which citizens are willing to engage and advocate for change?
- e. How can young people be encouraged and supported to engage in peace activism?
- f. What changes in curricula (high school or college) are required to raise open, tolerant, and active children?

DONORS

1. Please describe your ongoing and upcoming peacebuilding projects.
 - a. Project name
 - b. Targeted audience
 - c. Intervention type
 - d. Geographic coverage
 - e. Expected and achieved outcomes (positive, negative, unintended)
 - f. Lessons learned
2. Have you ever heard of PRO-Future II? If yes, what are your general impressions of the project?

3. To what extent would you say that peacebuilding interventions are still relevant for the BiH society?
4. What are the primary impediments to peacebuilding and reconciliation?
5. Who are the most important key influencers who can affect the general population's attitudes and behaviors when it comes to peace and reconciliation?
6. Who are the most important key influencers who can affect youth attitudes on peace and reconciliation?
7. Have you noticed any improvements in civic activism and increased demands for political responsibility in BiH?
8. Have you noticed that any of the following are more active in promoting reconciliation than they were three or four years ago?
 - a. Government representatives at state-level and lower levels
 - b. Religious leaders at a higher level and local level
 - c. Mainstream and local media
9. Who are other donors working on peacebuilding and reconciliation in BiH, and how effective have they been in coordinating their projects?

General questions:

- a. What are the greatest opportunities and threats to peace in BiH today?
- b. To what extent can young politicians push forward their own ideas in political parties?
- c. To what extent can local religious leaders push forward their ideas?
- d. What are the issues in which citizens are willing to engage and advocate for change?
- e. How can young people be encouraged and supported to engage in peace activism?
- f. What changes in curricula (high school or college) are required to raise open, tolerant, and active children?

KEY INFLUENCERS

1. Please describe the PRO-Future II activity in which you participated, and your overall impression of the activity. What did you like, and what do you think can be improved?
 - a. Project name
 - b. Targeted audience
 - c. Intervention type
 - d. Geographic coverage
 - e. Expected and achieved outcomes (positive, negative, unintended)
 - f. Lessons learned
2. Do you know how this activity has affected the audience/beneficiaries in terms of their inter-ethnic attitudes? If yes, please share the examples.
3. If yes, what specific activity components affected their opinions and behaviors?
4. What are the primary impediments to peacebuilding and reconciliation in BiH?

5. Who are the most important key influencers who can affect the general population's attitudes when it comes to peace and reconciliation?
6. Who are the most important key influencers who can affect youth attitudes on peace and reconciliation?
7. Have you noticed that any of the following have become more active in promoting peace and reconciliation than they were three or four years ago?
 - a. Government representatives at state-level and lower levels
 - b. Religious leaders at a higher level and local level
 - c. Mainstream and local media
8. Have you noticed any improvements in civic activism and increased demands for political responsibility in your local community or in general?

General questions:

- a. What are the greatest opportunities and threats to peace in BiH today?
- b. To what extent can young politicians push forward their own ideas in political parties?
- c. To what extent can local religious leaders push forward their ideas?
- d. What are the issues in which citizens are willing to engage and advocate for change?
- e. How can young people be encouraged and supported to engage in peace activism?
- f. What changes in curricula (high school or college) are required to raise open, tolerant, and active children?

FOCUS GROUP GUIDES

PRO-FUTURE II EVENT PARTICIPANTS

(to include the participants of: speaking out events, cultural events, living libraries, open-door days, Peace Talks audience, peace camps, small-grant beneficiaries)

1. Please describe the PRO-Future II activity in which you participated, and your overall impression of the activity.
2. What did you like, and what do you think can be improved?
3. Has your opinion toward other ethnicities changed due to participation in this activity? If yes, how? PROBE:
 - a. What attitudes did you have before? What do you think about them now? Specifically, have your attitudes about the 1990s war and experiences of other ethnicities changed?
 - b. Have you learned more about the war and the historical perspectives of people belonging to other ethnic groups? If yes, what have you learned?
 - c. Has your anxiety when encountering people belonging to other ethnicities changed?
 - d. Would you say you are more able to understand and share the feelings of people from other ethnicities and their war experiences, or would you say that this has not changed?
 - e. Has anything changed in terms of your willingness to forgive others for what happened during the war?

4. Has anything changed in your life regarding your contacts and relationships with people from other ethnic groups due to participation in this activity? If yes, how? PROBE:
 - a. Do you engage in contact with other ethnicities more often than before?
 - b. Have you developed any relationships with people from other ethnicities?
 - c. Have you done something together with people from other ethnicities?
 - d. Have you become more active in your community?
5. Has your experience had any effect on people around you (family, friends, colleagues) to change their attitude and/or behavior toward other ethnicities?
6. What specific activity component affected your opinions and behaviors?
7. Have you noticed any improvements in civic activism and increased demands for political responsibility in your local community or in general?
8. Have you noticed that any of the following have been more active in promoting peace and reconciliation than they were three or four years ago?
 - a. Government representatives at state-level and lower levels
 - b. Religious leaders at a higher level and local level
 - c. Mainstream and local media

BENEFICIARIES OF EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

(to include the beneficiaries of: political academy, trainings for journalists, integrated and inter-ethnic classes, university reconciliation fora, small school of peacebuilding, inter-religious master's program)

1. Please describe the PRO-Future II activity in which you participated, and your overall impression of the activity.
2. What did you like, and what do you think can be improved?
3. How long were you engaged in the activity?
4. Please rate your level of satisfaction with the training:
 - a. How would you rate the training in general?
 - b. How would you rate the curriculum?
 - c. How would you rate the quality of teachers?
 - d. What kind of skills would you say you adopted due to the training?
5. Has your opinion toward other ethnicities changed due to participation in this activity? If yes, how? PROBE:
 - a. What attitudes did you have before? What do you think about them now?
 - b. Have your attitudes about the 1990s war and experiences of other ethnicities changed?
 - c. Have you learned more about war and the historical perspectives of people belonging to other ethnic groups? If yes, what have you learned?
 - d. Has your anxiety when encountering people belonging to other ethnicities changed?
 - e. Would you say you are more able to understand and share the feelings of people from other ethnicities and their war experiences, or would you say that this has not changed?
 - f. Has anything changed in terms of your willingness to forgive others for what happened during the war?

6. Has anything changed in your life regarding your contacts and relationships with people from other ethnic groups due to participation in this activity? If yes, how? PROBE:
 - a. Do you engage in contact with other ethnicities more often than before?
 - b. Have you developed any relationships with people from other ethnicities?
 - c. Have you done something together with people from other ethnicities?
 - d. Have you become more active in your community?
7. Has your experience had any effect on people around you (family, friends, colleagues) to change their attitude and/or behavior toward other ethnicities?
8. What specific activity component affected your opinions and behaviors?
9. Have you noticed any improvements in civic activism and increased demands for political responsibility in your local community or in general?
10. Have you noticed that any of the following have been more active in promoting peace and reconciliation than they were three or four years ago?
 - a. Government representatives at state-level and lower levels
 - b. Religious leaders at a higher level and local level
 - c. Mainstream and local media

SMALL-GRANT RECIPIENTS

1. Please describe the PRO-Future II activity in which you participated, and your overall impression of the activity. What did you like, and what do you think can be improved?
 - a. Project name
 - b. Targeted audience
 - c. Intervention type
 - d. Duration
 - e. Geographic coverage
 - f. Expected and achieved outcomes (positive, negative, unintended)
 - g. Lessons learned
2. Have the participants' opinions toward other ethnicities changed due to participation in this activity? If yes, how?
3. Have you noticed any changes in their lives regarding contacts or relationships with people from other ethnic groups due to participation in this activity? If yes, how?
4. Has their level of engagement in the community changed? If yes, how?
5. Which specific activity component was crucial for changing their opinions and behaviors?
6. Have you noticed any improvements in civic activism and increased demands for political responsibility in your local community or in general?
7. Have you noticed that any of the following have been more active in promoting peace and reconciliation than they were three or four years ago?
 - a. Government representatives at state-level and lower levels
 - b. Religious leaders at a higher level and local level
 - c. Mainstream and local media

WORKING GROUP MEMBERS AND CIVIC MOVEMENT FACILITATORS

1. Please describe your relationship with PRO-Future II and your overall impression of the activity.
2. What types of interventions have you done with PRO-Future II?
 - a. Project/intervention name
 - b. Intervention type
 - c. Duration
 - d. Targeted audience
 - e. Expected and achieved outcomes (positive, negative, unintended)
 - f. Lessons learned
3. What did you like and what do you think can be improved?
4. To what extent are you satisfied with the structures and activity of your working group?
8. To what extent have the PRO-Future II interventions in your municipality improved citizens attitude about other ethnicities, and how?
9. Have you noticed any changes in inter-ethnic relationships and collaboration in your community? What changes occurred? To what extent would you say that PRO-Future II contributed to these changes?
10. Have you noticed any improvements in civic activism and increased demands for political responsibility in your local community or in general?
11. Have you noticed that any of the following have been more active in promoting peace and reconciliation than they were three or four years ago?
 - a. Government representatives at state-level and lower levels
 - b. Religious leaders at a higher level and local level
 - c. Mainstream and local media

General questions:

- a. What are the greatest opportunities and threats to peace in BiH today?
- b. To what extent can young politicians push forward their own ideas in political parties?
- c. To what extent can local religious leaders push forward their ideas?
- d. What are the issues in which citizens are willing to engage and advocate for change?
- e. How can young people be encouraged and supported to engage in peace activism?
- f. What changes in curricula (high school or college) are required to raise open, tolerant, and active children?

ONLINE SURVEY

1. Sex
2. Age
3. Municipality
4. Entity

5. Ethnicity
6. In which of the following PRO-Future II interventions did you participate in:
7. When did you participate in the PRO-Future II interventions? (year)
8. How long did the event last? (hours)
9. What did you particularly like about the intervention(s)?
10. What do you think should be improved?
11. For education interventions: Please rate your satisfaction with the training on the scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the best rating.
 - a. Curriculum
 - b. Teachers' work
 - c. Practical work
12. To what extent do the following statements apply to you? (1. Do not apply at all, 2. Somewhat apply, 3. Apply to a great extent)
 - a. My opinions of other ethnicities improved due to participation in the PRO-Future II activity.
 - b. I learned new things about war and the historical perspectives of people belonging to other ethnic groups through participation in the PRO-Future II activity.
 - c. I feel less anxious when encountering people from other ethnic groups due to participation in the PRO-Future II activity.
 - d. I better understand and share the feelings of people from other ethnicities and their war experiences due to participation in the PRO-Future II activity.
 - e. I am now more ready to forgive others for what happened during the war due to participation in the PRO-Future II activity.
 - f. I have more contact with people from other ethnic groups due to participation in the PRO-Future II activity.
 - g. I have more friends with people from other ethnic groups due to participation in the PRO-Future II activity.
 - h. I am collaborating more with people from other ethnic groups due to participation in the PRO-Future II activity.
 - i. I became more active in my community due to participation in the PRO-Future II activity.
 - j. My experience had effect on people around me (e.g.. family, friends, colleagues) to change their attitude and/or behavior toward other ethnicities
13. Have any other things in your life changed due to your participation in the PRO-Future II Activity? If yes, please describe.
14. Have you noticed any attempts of the following key actors in terms of promoting peace and reconciliation values?
 - a. High-profile politicians and government representatives
 - b. Representatives of local government in your community
 - c. Highest-level religious leaders
 - d. Local religious leaders
 - e. Mainstream media
 - f. Local media in your community

On a scale from 1 to 7, indicate the extent to which the intervention contributed to the below-mentioned way of thinking, feeling, or behaving.

1. My willingness to change my own beliefs is based on solid arguments, which are contrary to my opinion.
2. Considering the evidence that goes against conclusions I favor.
3. Revising my conclusions in response to relevant new information.
4. Changing my own opinion.
5. Searching actively for reasons why I might be wrong.
6. Ignoring evidence against my own established beliefs.
7. Being loyal to my own beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear against them.
8. Giving the first answer I come up with, without much thinking.
9. Considering more than one possible answer before reaching a conclusion when facing a new question or problem.
10. My concern for less fortunate people.
11. Seeing things from the “other person’s” point of view.
12. Pity other people when they find themselves in trouble.
13. Experiencing other people’s feelings.
14. Considering everybody’s side of a disagreement before making a decision.
15. My need to protect someone being taken advantage of by others.
16. Better understanding of my friends by imagining how things look from their perspective.
17. My disturbance because of other people’s misfortunes.
18. Ignoring other people’s arguments if I’m sure I’m right about something.
19. Understanding and empathizing with the person being treated unfairly by others.
20. Own belief that every problem has two sides and endeavor to look at them both.
21. Perceiving other person’s position, even when I have negative feelings towards him/her.
22. Perceiving other person’s position, even when I want to criticize him/her.

**MONITORING AND EVALUATION
SUPPORT ACTIVITY (MEASURE II)**

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