MIDTERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes (SPPG) in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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ABSTRACT

This midterm performance evaluation of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes (SPPG) activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina examines the activity's progress toward expected outcomes and the relative effectiveness of interventions. The report provides insights for USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAID/BiH) on progress to date to inform programmatic decision-making and potential adaptations. SPPG is a $4 million, 4r-year democracy and governance activity running through September 2023, implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS). The midterm performance evaluation was conducted between April and July 2021 and assesses the first 21 months of SPPG implementation. The evaluation concluded that: 1) most mayoral candidates had finalized their campaign platforms before receiving the SPPG support for issue-based campaigning in 2020; 2) SPPG's design is not focused on building the capacity of anti-corruption caucuses nor has this capacity been built; 3) SPPG is designed to improve youth political leadership more than women's leadership; 4) SPPG has contributed significantly to increased cross-party cooperation by Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute (ALPI) participants; 5) The Central Election Commission (CEC) used recommendations of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) for conducting the 2020 elections during the COVID-19 pandemic, but most recommendations on cybersecurity were not implemented due to funding constraints; 6) Support for municipal candidates, the ALPI, and the European Integration and Security Caucus (EISC) produced the most sustainable results in terms of the development of political parties' issue-based policy development capacity and enhancement of cross-party collaboration. The report provides 15 recommendations for improving SPPG programming, several of which suggest that CEPPS redirect resources to expand its most successful and sustainable interventions, such as ALPI and EISC.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ACRONYMS

ADS	Automated Directives System
AEO	Association of Election Officials
ALPI	The Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute
AOR	Agreement Officer Representative
ASR	Abuse of State Resources
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CCPI	Catalyzing Cross-Party Initiative in BiH
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CEC	Central Election Commission
CEPPS	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
CHPG	Cultural Heritage Parliamentary Group
CLA	Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease of 2019
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
DF	Democratic Front
DO	Development Objective
EISC	The European Integration and Security Caucus
EQ	Evaluation Question
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FCR	Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FY	Fiscal Year
GOTV	Get Out the Vote (SPPG campaign)
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IICJ	Interim Investigative Committee on the Judiciary
IP	Implementing Partner
IRI	International Republican Institute
KII	Key Informant Interview
MEASURE	Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NS	Naša Stranka
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PD	Program Description
PDP	Party of Democratic Progress
PMP	Performance Management Plan
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PSC	Polling Station Committee
RS	Republika Srpska
SDA	Party of Democratic Action
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SOW	Scope of Work

SPPG	Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes Activity
TI	Transparency International
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training of Trainers
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The United States Agency for International Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAID/BiH) commissioned IMPAQ International to conduct a midterm performance evaluation of the Mission's Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes Activity (SPPG). SPPG, implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), is a 4-year, $4 million activity designed to improve issue-based campaigning in BiH prior to the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections, and strengthen policy-driven governance post elections.

This midterm performance evaluation sought to examine SPPG's progress toward expected outcomes and the relative effectiveness of interventions to date. Furthermore, the evaluation sought to provide useful insights to USAID/BiH and its implementing partners to make informed programmatic decisions and adaptations for the remainder of the activity.

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation was conducted between April and July 2021 and used a mixed-methods design, consisting of a desk review of program documents, interviews with 58 key informants, 12 focus group discussions with 50 individuals, and online surveys of 15 party representatives and 29 local council candidates. The team triangulated data among different sources to develop credible findings, from which the team derived conclusions and recommendations. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in an effort to ensure the health and safety of the evaluation team as well as evaluation participants, all interviews and focus groups were conducted remotely.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The following provides a high-level overview of the key findings and conclusions garnered from this evaluation.

EVALUATION QUESTION 1: To what extent has SPPG strengthened parties', coalitions', and candidates' capacity for issue-based campaigning and policy and campaign platform development in advance of the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections?

- Prior to the 2020 municipal elections, SPPG successfully strengthened the capacity of individual candidates to conduct issue-based campaigns. According to beneficiaries themselves, many candidates feel capable of running such campaigns in the future as a result of SPPG support. These candidates were most appreciative of the trainings in communication and social media strategies.
- SPPG efforts to strengthen policy and campaign-platform development with respect to the 2020 elections were less fruitful than they could have been because in many cases efforts came after the candidates had already developed the campaign platforms.
- SPPG has not yet started capacity-building programming for the 2022 general elections.

EVALUATION QUESTION 2: To what extent have issue-based caucuses built their capacities to promote anti-corruption reforms?

- SPPG has done little with the anti-corruption caucuses at the entity and cantonal level because the anti-corruption component of CEPPS programming was shifted to SPPG in March 2021.
- Support to the Interim Investigative Committee on the Judiciary (IICJ) provides an opportunity to expand interaction with the state parliament and to support future investigative committees.

EVALUATION QUESTION 3: To what extent can the current SPPG design contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth? Sub-question: Is there any evidence that SPPG interventions contributed to increasing women and youth voter turnout in the 2020 local elections?

- ALPI and campaign training for women and young candidates contributed to improving political leadership among women and youth.
- The current SPPG design focuses on youth to a larger extent than women.
- The SPPG design addresses obstacles to women's and youths' political leadership in terms of skill building, but not in terms of traditional social norms or party democratization.
- The evaluation found no evidence that the SPPG's get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaign improved youth voter turnout in the 2020 elections.
- SPPG's theory of change aiming to improve women and youth voter turnout is insufficient to bring about change on BiH's political scene.

EVALUATION QUESTION 4: To what extent has SPPG contributed to increased cross-party cooperation by the Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute (ALPI) members?

- ALPI participants praised the program for its design, quality of inputs, and facilitation.
- Even though it is too early to talk about SPPG's contribution to cross-party cooperation, based on USAID's Catalyzing Cross-Party Initiatives (CCPI) experiences the current Activity is expected to bring about tangible results.
- SPPG used ALPI alumni in new cross-party initiatives but to a limited extent; the program primarily focuses on current participants and gives comparably low attention to alumni.

EVALUATION QUESTION 5: How were the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) recommendations utilized by electoral stakeholders to support electoral reforms before and after the 2020 elections?

- IFES recommendations on conducting elections under the global COVID-19 pandemic were the most valuable assistance provided before the 2020 election, and the Central Election Commission (CEC) adopted nearly all of the recommendations.
- The CEC did not implement most IFES' recommendations related to digital solutions and cybersecurity, due to a lack of funding.
- Work on longer-term reforms, including campaign finance and abuse of state resources, stalled due to the CEC's focus on the 2020 elections.

EVALUATION QUESTION 6: Which interventions related to the development of individual political parties' issue-based policy development capacity and enhancement of cross-party collaboration are most likely to bring about sustainable results (and which produce results that will be difficult to sustain)?

- The informal nature of parliamentary caucuses threatens their sustainability; however, the informal nature is a key reason for their effectiveness in the short-term.
- The European Integration and Security Caucus (EISC) shows promise for sustainability.
- SPPG-trained municipal candidates have a sustainable capacity for issue-based campaigning.
- Formalization of the ALPI alumni network could help sustain its cross-party initiatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

SPPG should consider the following recommendations for the remainder of the SPPG implementation:

1. Start work with parties early on issue-based platforms, so that parties have time to incorporate findings into their campaigns.
2. Work with candidates on messaging, communications, and social media campaigning to help them reach their target audiences.
3. Focus anti-corruption work on parliamentary investigative committees rather than caucuses.
4. Ensure all interventions contribute equally to men's and women's political leadership.
5. Conduct exit polling after the 2022 elections to capture the effectiveness of the GOTV campaign on youth voter turnout.
6. Redirect resources (e.g., from other youth leadership programming) to expand ALPI participation. Ensure that women comprise 50 percent of ALPI participants.
7. Support ALPI alumni to expand their role in their parties, particularly during the 2022 campaign.
8. To build sustainability, use ALPI alumni to coach and mentor new ALPI generations. Support ALPI alumni to formalize their cooperation.
9. Continue engagement on electoral reform legislation prior to the 2022 elections.
10. Seek opportunities to support electoral reform legislation.
11. Continue collaboration with CEC on increasing use of technology.
12. Continue work on Abuse of State Resources (ASR) and campaign finance reform.
13. Continue efforts to improve voter registration system, including voters abroad.
14. Keep caucuses informal and outside the control of parliamentary leadership to ensure their effectiveness.
15. Focus support for caucuses on EISC as it shows the greatest sustainability potential and focuses on European Union integration. Provide support to other caucuses upon request.

INTRODUCTION

COUNTRY CONTEXT

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has been in political crisis since the Dayton Peace Accords of 1996. The constitutional reform process that began in 2006 has become a smokescreen for governance failure. Issues that dominate the public discourse are mostly derivatives of the constitutional reform debate and largely divorced from issues that citizens repeatedly have identified as the most important. Media continue to focus on those political issues rather than issues of citizen concern. A related problem is the partocratic character of the state and state capture by domestic political elites, which extends to a majority of nominally independent bodies.

In recent years, the country made little progress in improving the overall socioeconomic situation and made virtually no progress towards the EU or NATO membership. Very few observers noted changes in campaign tone of the local elections in 2020 compared to the general elections in 2018 or the local elections in 2016. While the local elections in 2020 were generally considered to be more issue-based, most observers found them to be equally populist. However, the governing coalition in Sarajevo after the elections in 2018, and the coalition for municipal elections in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, ran issue-based campaigns focusing primarily on the fight against deep-rooted corruption.

This is not to say that ethnic-based populism suddenly and inexplicably gave way to issues of concern for citizens at elections; rather, major political subjects forming these new coalitions maintain their ethnic credentials while focusing on issues of concern for citizens. While opposition coalitions in the Republika Srpska (RS) and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) have reached across entity lines to agree on a platform, there remains concern that the current governing coalition will plunge the country into a series of crisis and rising inter-ethnic tensions that might limit the maneuvering space for the opposition in their dealings with one another. Opposition parties have been successful in averting such criticism, but with elections drawing closer, crises could become more serious.

The complex and unstable political environment represents a significant obstacle to implementing any donor programs in BiH. In only 18 months of implementation, SPPG faced several such changes and obstacles, which hampered and slowed their work, including government changes at the state, entity, and cantonal levels; changes in the CEC composition; election postponement, and; negative attention from the RS political leadership and media. In addition to political factors, the COVID-19 pandemic affected SPPG implementation.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AND THEORY OF CHANGE

Exhibit 1: Basic Information on the SPPG Activity

Activity Name	Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes (SPPG)
USAID Office	USAID/BiH Democracy Office
Implementer	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)
Cooperative Agreement #	Leader Cooperative Agreement: AID-OAA-L-15-00007 Associate Cooperative Agreement: #72016819LA00001
Total Estimated Cost	$4,000,000
Life of Activity	September 30, 2019, to September 29, 2023
Active Geographic Region	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mission Development Objective (DO)	DO 1: Government Accountability to Citizens Strengthened

The SPPG is a 4-year activity designed to improve issue-based campaigning before the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections and policy-driven governance after the elections. The SPPG is implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS),

composed of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), and International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).

SPPG is the successor to USAID's Catalyzing Cross-Party Initiatives (CCPI) activity, implemented by CEPPS from September 2017 through February 2021, and is the latest in a series of IFES, IRI, and NDI activities implemented in BiH since the late 1990s. SPPG ran concurrently with CCPI during the first 17 months of the Activity, and in March 2021 SPPG took over implementation of several CCPI initiatives. Notable among these were IRI's work with the ALPI and NDI's work with parliamentary anti-corruption caucuses and committees.

The Activity design is based on the assumption that diverse party activists and elected representatives – across party, entity, and ethnic lines, and including women, youth, and other marginalized groups – share common policy priorities for BiH's reform agenda. SPPG intends to achieve its objectives by providing a broad range of technical assistance interventions for the targeted stakeholders and by fostering cross-party collaboration and horizontal and vertical integration between different government levels and institutions. An important element of the theory of change holds that building candidates' capacity for inclusive public outreach will result in more participatory and competitive elections.

The SPPG theory of change states that capacity building of and technical assistance to various political persons and structures will improve representation of citizen interests and advance reform processes. By strengthening the capacities of candidates, coalitions, political parties, multi-party groups, and issue-based caucuses to coordinate on shared policy goals, engage in inclusive, responsive policy development, and conduct outreach to citizens, SPPG aims to foster increased pluralism in BiH's political life and support development and adoption of campaign approaches and good governance practices that reflect citizen concerns.

SPPG interventions fall under four objectives, each with specific sub-objectives:

- Objective 1: To strengthen parties', coalitions', and candidates' capacity to respond to citizen interests in advance of the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections.
  - o Sub-Objective 1.1: To improve the capacity and performance of candidates, parties, and coalitions in issue-based campaign skills and techniques.
  - o Sub-Objective 1.2: To support parties and/or coalitions in building their policy and campaign platform development capacities to better respond to citizen concerns, particularly in areas of corruption and socio-economic policy.
  - o Sub-Objective 1.3: To encourage voter turnout, particularly the youth vote, through get-out-the-vote campaigns.

- Objective 2: Improve governance through policy-driven technical assistance to parties, coalitions, caucuses, and elected officials at various levels of government.
  - o Sub-Objective 2.1: To strengthen policymaking and legislative cohesion within political parties.
  - o Sub-Objective 2.2: To advance multi-party legislative initiatives and increase stakeholder outreach.

- Objective 3: Enhance skills and capacity of young political persons to take a more visible role in deepening democratic values of BiH society.
  - o Sub-Objective 3.1: Ethnic divisions are reduced among young politicians by shifting their attention on policy issues in a cross-party, cross-ethnic environment.
  - o Sub-Objective 3.2: To strengthen the capacity of women and youth candidates to conduct citizen-oriented, issue-based campaigns.

- Objective 4: Support to free and fair election processes.

o   Sub-Objective 4.1: Electoral framework and processes are improved and strengthened.
o   Sub-Objective 4.2: The CEC's capacity is strengthened to fulfill its mandate professionally and transparently.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATION PURPOSE

USAID/BiH requested the Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II) to conduct a mid-term performance evaluation of SPPG. This performance evaluation examines SPPG's progress toward the expected outcomes and the relative effectiveness of interventions to date. This evaluation provides credible and valuable insights for USAID/BiH to make informed programmatic decisions and adaptations for the remainder of the Activity, maximizing the likelihood of achieving the desired results. The implementing partner will use the evaluation results to take mid-term adaptive actions (if needed) in terms of Activity implementation. Since this is the first evaluation of a USAID democracy and governance activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it will contribute to the body of evidence on development results in the sphere of fostering political pluralism and policy-driven governance.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The SPPG performance evaluation answers the following evaluation questions (EQs):

1.   To what extent has SPPG strengthened parties', coalitions', and candidates' capacity for issue-based campaigning and policy and campaign platform development in advance of the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections?
2.   To what extent have issue-based caucuses built their capacities to promote anti-corruption reforms?
3.   To what extent can the current SPPG design contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth? Sub-question: Is there any evidence that SPPG interventions contributed to increasing women and youth voter turnout in the 2020 local elections?
4.   To what extent has SPPG contributed to increased cross-party cooperation by ALPI members?
5.   How have IFES recommendations been used by electoral stakeholders to support electoral reforms before and after the 2020 elections?
6.   Which interventions related to the development of individual political parties' issue-based policy development capacity and enhancement of cross-party collaboration are most likely to bring about sustainable results (and which produce results that will be difficult to sustain)?

EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team used a mixed-method data collection approach to assess the effectiveness of the SPPG's capacity building interventions and their early outcomes. This evaluation examined the first 18 months of SPPG implementation for which reporting data was available: from the end of September 2019 through March 2021. Fieldwork was conducted from May 10 to June 10, 2021, providing additional, incomplete data on SPPG activities that were conducted in April and May 2021 and hence not covered by the reporting data.

The methodology ensured systematic and efficient collection of data from the following sources:

- **Activity documents,** including the program description; Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plan; work plans; quarterly progress reports; lists of beneficiaries, experts, and other stakeholders involved in Activity implementation; and documents produced by the Activity and its beneficiaries. The most recent quarterly progress report reviewed was from Fiscal Year 2021, Quarter 2 (January-March 2021).

- **Secondary documentation relevant to the sector**, including MEASURE-BiH/MEASURE II research reports; international organizations and civil society organizations (CSOs) reports and analyses; and CEC statistics.

- **Key informant interviews (KIIs)** with USAID/BiH, SPPG, relevant international and donor organizations, Activity beneficiaries (municipal election candidates, political party staff, members of parliament, CEC officials), and other stakeholders. Annex 3 presents a list of key informants. A total of 58 individuals were interviewed.

- **Focus group discussions (FGDs)** with beneficiaries and with media and CSO representatives. A total of 12 FGDs were conducted with 50 individuals.

- **Online surveys** of municipal council candidates and political party staff who received SPPG training.

The evaluation team analyzed the data in early June 2021, triangulating among different data sources to develop robust findings, from which the team derived conclusions about the evaluation questions. The team presented its preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations to USAID/BiH during a remote presentation held on June 16, 2021. Annex 2 presents more details on the methodology.

LIMITATIONS

COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the evaluation team (ET) was unable to conduct interviews and focus groups in person; therefore, the ET used the Zoom platform for KIIs and FGDs. Zoom also supported simultaneous interpretation between English and Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian (BCS) when necessary.

Because of the time difference between the United States (U.S.) and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the U.S.-based evaluation co-leader was not able to participate in interviews conducted during the morning hours in Bosnia. The ET generally scheduled afternoon interviews where the U.S.-based co-leader's expertise was most relevant, and team members provided notes in English for the morning interviews.

ACTIVITY TIMEFRAME

As noted above, SPPG did not begin work on several interventions until March 2021, after the predecessor CCPI activity ended. As a result, the ET had only 1 month of reporting data on those interventions, because the January-March 2021 quarterly report was the latest progress report available during the evaluation.

This limitation was particularly relevant to SPPG work with anti-corruption caucuses and ALPI, each of which is the subject of an evaluation question. To answer those evaluation questions in spite of limited data, the ET reviewed activities under CCPI and used that information to formulate interview questions about possible future anti-corruption interventions, speaking not only to anti-corruption caucus members, but also to members of the Interim Investigative Committee on the Judiciary (IICJ)

of the state parliament. The ET reviewed SPPG work with ALPI alumni, both alumni engagement with the third generation of ALPI participants and other SPPG engagement with alumni on initiatives such as the GOTV activities.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

EVALUATION QUESTION 1: ISSUE-BASED CAMPAIGNING AND CAMPAIGN-PLATFORM DEVELOPMENT

To what extent has SPPG strengthened parties', coalitions', and candidates' capacity for issue-based campaigning and policy and campaign-platform development in advance of the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections?

POLITICAL PARTIES AND ISSUE-BASED CAMPAIGNING

The 2020 municipal elections were held on November 15 (December 20 in Mostar), having been postponed from October 4 due to a lack of funding. According to the Activity documentation and implementers, much of SPPG's work with party workers in 2020 was directed to the campaign teams of mayoral and municipal council candidates[1]. Among the topics covered in consultations and trainings for campaign staff were campaign management, outreach plans, social media, door-to-door campaigning, GOTV planning, poll watching, and messaging and communication.

SPPG reported[2] training 380 individuals (229 men, 151 women) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, including party workers and also staff of multi-party working groups, issue-based caucuses, multi-party parliamentary initiatives, ALPI members, and parliamentary support groups. This number was just short of the FY 2020 target of 410 individuals (246 men, 164 women).

The ET conducted an online survey of party workers who received training in 2020, through the training-of-trainers (ToT) program. The survey was sent to a total of 36 party workers whose contacts were provided by CEPPS, of whom 15 individuals (5 men, 9 women, 1 choosing not to identify based on sex) responded. Thirteen respondents received training through the ToT program, and two received the ToT training directly from SPPG. Of those 15, eight reported a "positive" or "very positive" experience with the training, while six were neutral and one negative. **Two-thirds reported learning a new skill – most citing improved communication skills – and 90 percent of those used that skill in the 2020 campaign.** While 80 percent of party staff said their party ran an issue-based campaign, only 29 percent said issues were the primary factor in voters' decisions (refer to Exhibit 2).

NDI implemented a ToT program from March to October 2020 completed by 24 party members (17 men, 7 women) from 12 parties. The trained individuals in turn provided training for members of their parties. According to the IP and progress reports, the ToTs delivered several trainings during SPPG implementation, training more than 200 political party members. However, **several party trainers trained by NDI in 2020 said they encountered resistance from their party peers, who did not recognize them as experts and were skeptical that the trainers had anything to teach them**. Some trainers were lower-level party staff who did not command respect in their party.

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[1] Not all campaign workers were members of political parties.
[2] The data source for this finding is the Activity's performance indicator tracking table.

Exhibit 2: SPPG trainees' perceptions of the 2020 local elections (source: online survey of 15 SPPG trainees)

POLITICAL PARTIES, POLICY, AND CAMPAIGN-PLATFORM DEVELOPMENT

According to SPPG reports and implementers, SPPG did not work directly with political parties on policy and campaign-platform development in advance of the 2020 municipal elections. Implementers said in May 2021 that they had begun preliminary consultations with parties about support for the 2022 parliamentary elections, and that support to parties was scheduled to begin in autumn 2021.

Implementers and mayoral candidates said only the larger, more established parties have developed internal capacities to formulate policies in coalitions or multi-party groups, which is a result of long-term donor support[3] and parties' own efforts. Those interviewees said the Social Democratic Party (SDP) is the strongest party in terms of its policy-development and coalition-building capacity, but only at the top levels, and they noted ongoing collaboration between SDP and the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP). Implementers and candidates said the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ), and Naša Stranka (NS) are also strong in these areas.

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[3] According to the Activity AOR, CEPPS's former activities contributed to capacity development of SDP and PDP in this regard. The evaluation team did not collect any data on this, as this is out of the evaluation's scope.

COALITIONS

SPPG did not work to create coalitions in advance of the 2020 municipal elections. The activity provided support to individuals who were endorsed by multiple parties as their joint candidate. In particular, IRI supported seven such candidates. SPPG reported one issue-based policy proposal developed by parties and/or coalitions during the pre-election period with SPPG support, well short of the target of 17 for FY 2020.

Campaign Platform Development

Joint candidates said they developed their campaign platforms in consultation with local members of the parties that endorsed them, a point confirmed by members of parliament and other donors. Candidates said they reviewed guidelines provided by the parties that endorsed them and selected elements that they thought would resonate with local voters, using those individual planks to build their campaign platform. Candidates emphasized that they, not the parties, ultimately decided their own platforms. Candidates said that parties that came together to endorse a joint mayoral candidate still fielded their own lists of candidates for municipal councils. Candidates also said it is likely that parties would field their own lists for the 2022 general elections, but it is possible that opposition parties in the RS will unite behind a joint candidate for the presidency.

Policy Development

Outside of elections, NDI under SPPG has worked with three parliamentary working groups at the Federation, cross-entity, and cantonal levels:

- The Center-Left Party Group, comprised of SDP, Democratic Front (DF) and NS, which is working on a legislative initiative to facilitate public-private partnerships (PPP);
- The FBiH-RS Working Group, which brings together PDP and SDP to work across entity lines on reforms related to media freedom, political parties, and election processes;
- The Cross-Cantonal Working Group, which brings together six parties in three cantonal assemblies (Sarajevo, Zenica-Doboj, and Tuzla) to address air pollution.

NDI began its work with the three working groups in winter 2019 under the previous CCPI activity, and SPPG first included work with the groups in its Year 2 workplan, covering September 2020-September 2021.

The PPP bill in the Federation parliament was developed and drafted in 2019 and 2020 under the previous CCPI activity. **In winter 2021, SPPG assisted the group's public outreach, and reported that its interventions helped build sufficient support for the bill to be included on the 2021 parliamentary agenda. In total, SPPG reported two joint issue-based policy proposals developed with SPPG support by multi-party groups, issue-based caucuses, or multi-party parliamentary initiatives, short of the target of five for FY 2020.**

CANDIDATES AND ISSUE-BASED CAMPAIGNING

SPPG reported that they assisted running seven issue-based electoral campaigns, achieving its target for FY 2020. NDI and IRI focused their programming before the 2020 municipal elections on support to candidates. Specifically, IRI concentrated its work on seven municipalities: Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Pale, Brčko, Buzim, Sanski Most, and Kostajnica, providing September 2020 training for candidates and parties that formed pre-election coalitions.

NDI worked across a greater range of municipalities and divided into 3 tiers: 4 Tier I municipalities (Sarajevo Center, Banja Luka, Teslić and Mostar), which received the greatest attention; 6 Tier II municipalities (Visoko, Bihać, Bijeljina, Doboj, Kozarska Dubica and Gradiška), which were offered occasional consultation sessions; and 2 Tier III municipalities (Ilidža and Old Town Sarajevo), which received one-off consultations.

Six out of 17 (35 percent) of mayoral candidates supported by SPPG won their elections. **Mayoral candidates cited messaging – particularly, how to condense a broad policy platform into a narrower campaign message – and communication skills, including social media, as the most valuable support they received from SPPG for their campaigns. Candidates felt optimistic about their ability to apply these new skills, garnered from SPPG support, in the upcoming and future campaigns.**

Some outside observers pointed to the Sarajevo municipal election as an example of an issue-based campaign resulting in the victory of the opposition candidate. "That was a fairly new phenomenon," one international official said. International officials said mayors in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Mostar "all spoke about efforts to build pragmatic, issue-based leadership". However, most CSO and media representatives, as well as some representatives of international community, did not notice that 2020 elections in general were based more on citizen concerns compared to previous election cycles.

The ET invited municipal council candidates[4] trained by SPPG to participate in an online survey, and 29 candidates responded. Of those, 83 percent reported a positive or very positive experience with SPPG; the others classified their experience as "neutral." **A total of 76 percent reported learning new skills, mostly communication, public speaking and marketing, and 95 percent of those who learned a new skill said they used that skill in the campaign.**

CANDIDATES, POLICY, AND CAMPAIGN-PLATFORM DEVELOPMENT

Candidates said SPPG's support on policy and campaign-platform development in 2020 was not as effective as it could have been. Several mayoral candidates (four out of six interviewed in municipalities which received this assistance type) said SPPG support to policy and campaign-platform development came too late to be of much assistance. An NDI official said the polls were conducted in September 2020 to provide candidates with the "freshest" data possible, but most mayoral candidates said they had finalized their platforms by the time SPPG assistance was offered. Despite the delays in SPPG assistance, candidates said they most valued public opinion polling and focus group research as policy-development tools, but would have liked more time to integrate this data into their platforms. Polling and focus groups were conducted in September, and data were presented to candidates between October 10 and 13, less than 5 weeks before the elections. Data were presented in Mostar on November 18, less than 5 weeks before the December 20 elections there.

> *"This help was a bit late, because we have started our collaboration after the start of our campaign, the result would be better if they had contacted us earlier."* – Mayoral candidate
>
> *"If this survey had been done in [my municipality] earlier, it would have made a difference… When the results of the survey came in, we realized we were on the wrong path."* – Mayoral candidate

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[4] The online survey was sent to a total of 45 party members and 47 municipal council candidates.

Most key informants do not believe that campaign platforms are the main factor in voting decisions. While 88 percent of council candidates said their party had an issue-based platform, only four percent of them said the platform was the main factor in voters' decisions (refer to Exhibit 3). The other respondents cited candidate personalities or national party identification as more important than platforms. Fifteen percent of candidates who responded to the survey won election, and all of the winners credited SPPG assistance with helping them "somewhat" or "a lot." Mayoral candidates corroborated this finding, saying that voters generally cast their votes for parties that they believe will deliver public works for their municipalities. Both candidates and journalists said the media are also in part responsible for the lack of attention on campaign platforms, as they tend to report on personalities and nationalist rhetoric, rather than issues.

Exhibit 3: SPPG local council candidates' perceptions of the 2020 elections
(source: online survey of 29 SPPG's local council candidates)

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND SECURITY CAUCUS

SPPG facilitated limited engagement between the European Integration and Security Caucus (EISC) and other levels of government. The EISC is an informal cross-party body composed of 10 members of the state-level parliament representing 10 political parties interested in reforms needed for accession to the European Union (EU) and in security issues such as cybersecurity, migration, countering violent extremism, and addressing hate speech. While IRI historically has supported the work of the EISC, which IRI helped to create under the previous CCPI activity, SPPG's work with the EISC did not begin until September 2020. Most of this work concerned state-level parliamentary inquiries; requests for state-level government reports on cybersecurity, migration, and human trafficking; and meetings with state-level agencies. A parliamentary initiative by EISC in September 2020 resulted in a parliamentary debate on the migration crisis and a parliamentary call for the government to respond quickly and transparently to the migration crisis.

To date, only two visits facilitating engagement between EISC and other levels of government under SPPG were identified. According to the SPPG quarterly report for January-March 2021 a field visit that IRI organized in March 2021 brought EISC members to the town of Tešanj, where members of parliament (MPs) met with local leaders, entrepreneurs, and factory workers to discuss economic development. IRI staff said they organized a May 2021 EISC visit to Banja Luka where the caucus met with the mayor, as well as with officials of the national drug and tax agencies. An EISC visit to Vitez was scheduled for September 2021.

In advance of the 2020 municipal elections, the main contribution of SPPG to strengthening the capacity of parties to campaign was to train campaign staff on various campaign-related issues. SPPG did not sufficiently help create coalitions for the 2020 elections, but the activity did strengthen coalitions that had already formed. The primary capacity building accomplishment was building the capacity of individual candidates, particularly mayoral candidates, to conduct issue-based campaigns. Candidates participating in these trainings expressed confidence that they could apply lessons learned to running future issue-based campaigns. The most valuable support was helping candidates narrow their messages and develop communication strategies and skills, such as social media strategies. However, moving forward, small parties and their candidates need more external support in issue-based campaigning, including polling and focus groups with constituents, with sufficient time to leverage that data into the formation of their platforms and campaign strategies.

SPPG efforts to strengthen policy and campaign-platform development proved less fruitful than they could have been because they came too late in the campaign. Candidates welcomed this support, particularly data from opinion polling and focus groups, but several regretted that it came too late to integrate into their platforms. Future support for policy and platform development will need to occur earlier in the campaign cycle if candidates and parties are to have time to integrate polls and focus groups into platform development and to develop messaging and communications strategies.

Five Bosnian political parties have developed internal capacities to formulate policies, and two of them – SDP and PDP – have demonstrated the ability to formulate coalition policies. However, these results cannot be attributed to SPPG assistance, but rather stem from long-term donor support and parties' own efforts.

Beyond the visits to Tešanj and Banja Luka, EISC members have not increased engagement with other levels of government since SPPG began to work with the caucus.

SPPG has not yet started the capacity-building programming for the 2022 general elections.

EVALUATION QUESTION 2: ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS

To what extent have issue-based caucuses built their capacities to promote anti-corruption reforms?

ENTITY-LEVEL ANTI-CORRUPTION CAUCUSES

Under the previous CCPI initiative, NDI helped create parliamentary anti-corruption caucuses in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. These caucuses were informal bodies outside of formal parliamentary structures and not under control of parliamentary leadership. SPPG took over this component in March 2021 after CCPI ended. Improving anti-corruption policymaking was one of the four objectives of CCPI, whereas it is not part of the SPPG design. Anti-corruption activities were subsumed under SPPG's Sub-Objective 2.2: To advance multi-party legislative initiatives and increase stakeholder outreach.

According to a CEPPS official and members of the 15-member Federation anti-corruption caucus, SPPG has not engaged with the FBiH anti-corruption caucus. The three-member anti-corruption caucus in RS failed in its effort to have anti-corruption legislation added to the parliamentary agenda in October 2019 and dissolved soon thereafter. MPs said they have been pre-occupied with addressing the COVID-19 pandemic,

particularly with regard to procurement and distribution of vaccines. While MPs have not received support from SPPG, MPs said the inactivity of the caucus was due to their (MPs') lack of initiative.

CANTONAL-LEVEL ANTI-CORRUPTION CAUCUSES

Toward the end of the CCPI activity, NDI in early 2021 initiated contact with anti-corruption caucuses of the cantonal assemblies in Zenica-Doboj, Bosnian-Podrinje, and Canton 10. Subsequently, SPPG began work with the Bosnian-Podrinje and Canton 10 caucuses in March 2021. **NDI collaborated with Transparency International (TI) to provide support to those two caucuses to develop codes of ethics for elected officials in the caucuses, and members of the two cantonal caucuses met in May 2021 to prepare amendments to the codes they will present to their assemblies. Members said they are satisfied with support from NDI and TI, stating that they can call any time if they need support.**

"We have received significant assistance from NDI in finalizing the Code of Ethics and ensuring the quality and persuasiveness of the document itself." - A Cantonal Anti-Corruption Caucus member

"We got many ideas during the workshop with Transparency International, which has defined all the things we needed. We would have possibly missed a lot of those things without the workshop." – A Cantonal Anti-Corruption Caucus member

CEPPS officials and cantonal anti-corruption caucus members reported that interest in anti-corruption caucuses among MPs is limited, with only three members in Canton 10 and two members in Bosnian-Podrinje. Members said more initiative is needed on their part to push forward anti-corruption efforts.

STATE-LEVEL INTERIM INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEES

Interim investigative committees – ad hoc panels in the state-level parliament created to investigate a specific issue – are relatively new in Bosnia and Herzegovina, having been authorized under a 2018 law on parliamentary oversight. The Interim Investigative Committee on the Judiciary (IICJ) was created in June 2019 and fully constituted in May 2020 with 8 members, 5 members from the Federation and 3 from RS, representing 6 parties. According to its chairperson, the IICJ held 31 sessions in its first year of existence; this activity can be compared to the parliament itself, which has held only 20 sessions over the past 2½ years. "It is important to sell the message that things can work in Bosnia and Herzegovina," the chairperson said.

The IICJ has pioneered the use of oversight hearings in the Bosnian parliament. "Parliamentary oversight was a complete novelty," the chairperson said. The committee's investigation led to the December 2020 resignation of the head of the Bosnian High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, the Bosnian state's top judicial institution. The committee was preparing to submit its draft report to parliament on June 30.

NDI began to assist the IICJ under the previous CCPI activity, and NDI support has continued under SPPG**.** Specifically, under CCPI, NDI supported the work of the Public Procurement Working Group (PPWG), a subcommittee of the IICJ, and organized an anti-corruption conference in February 2021, just before NDI's support was subsumed under SPPG. **NDI in March 2021 engaged a local public procurement expert to analyze procurement related to COVID-19 in the RS, and IICJ members said additional meetings with NDI experts were held in June, just before the report was released.** The chairperson noted that reforming public procurement is a priority for the European Union in considering Bosnia and Herzegovina's candidacy for EU membership.

IICJ members also cited NDI support with public relations as important for the committee to communicate its work to the public through news media. "We have received enormously helpful support from NDI. We are absolutely satisfied with NDI," the committee chairperson said. He suggested that other investigative committees could be created before parliament's term ends in autumn 2022; for example, a committee to investigate the response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

CONCLUSIONS

Anti-corruption is not a key objective of SPPG, and the activity has done little with the anti-corruption caucuses at the entity and cantonal levels since the anti-corruption component of CEPPS programming was shifted to SPPG in March 2021. MPs have shown limited interest in those caucuses: the RS caucus is dormant; Federation MPs have been occupied with other issues; and few MPs have joined the cantonal caucuses. As a result, the caucuses' capacity to promote anti-corruption reforms is limited, though the cantonal caucuses may be able to advance codes of ethics in two of the 10 cantonal assemblies.

The IICJ has developed significant capacity to promote anti-corruption reforms by pioneering use of investigative committees in the state parliament. The committee has initiated use of oversight hearings in parliament and has demonstrated the ability to conduct investigations and report its findings to parliament for action. Beyond its work in fighting judicial corruption and promoting procurement reform, the IICJ offers an example for future investigative committees and for increased oversight by standing parliamentary committees. NDI support to IICJ is one of the few areas in which SPPG has engaged with the state parliament.

EVALUATION QUESTION 3: WOMEN AND YOUTH'S POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

To what extent can the current SPPG design contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth?

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP – WOMEN

The SPPG design aims to improve political leadership among women and youth[5] through its Objective 3: Enhance skills and capacity of politically engaged youth and women to take a more visible role in deepening democratic values of BiH society.

According to the program description, the current SPPG design focuses on addressing youth leadership more than women's leadership. Under the Objective 3, the first sub-objective (3.1) is dedicated solely to youth and aims to reduce ethnic divisions among them. The main intervention envisaged to achieve this is the continuation of the ALPI - a professional development program for young political leaders piloted by IRI under the CCPI activity, while the SPPG design does not include similar intervention for women. However, the second sub-objective (3.2) focuses on youth and women, and aims to strengthen the capacity of female and young candidates to conduct citizen-oriented, issue-based campaigns

Under Sub-Objective 3.2, SPPG did provide campaign training specifically for female candidates in advance of the 2020 municipal elections, and the ET found that that training contributed to women's political leadership skills. According to progress reports and focus group participants, two online trainings for women candidates were held in October 2020.

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[5] The SPPG PD defines young politicians as those under the age of 40.

The trainings focused on campaign management skills, communication skills, using social media, and leadership knowledge and skills such as setting campaign goals and developing strategies.

The trainings included guidance on how to respond to chauvinist and misogynist remarks, an important skill for female candidates in BiH because this evaluation identified verbal attacks on women in politics as one obstacle to women's political leadership. The assistance also included a presentation specifically for female candidates aimed at understanding the electoral system, the impact of gender bias and electoral stereotypes, and developing their own campaign approach that increases the chances of success in the electoral process.. A majority of young and female candidates in focus groups (five of six) noted the usefulness of communication-related trainings, including social media, which helped them improve their leadership qualities such as communication with the electorate and public speaking skills, especially with large audiences. Two women said the training also helped them understand constituents' needs as a particularly important leadership quality.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP – YOUTH

ALPI began in late 2017 under the previous CCPI activity, which trained the first two generations of ALPI participants. ALPI is a youth program that consists of six modules and provides training and mentorship to young political party members focusing on skills that enhance leadership abilities, such as debate, coalition building, policy development, communication strategies, and research. The program was assumed by SPPG in December 2020, and SPPG held the first training module for the third generation of ALPI participants in March 2021.

ALPI is designed to improve political leadership competencies among its participants. However, in light of SPPG's limited activity with ALPI, it is too early to make any findings about how ALPI enabled SPPG to contribute to youth political leadership. However, evidence indicates that ALPI contributed to improving political leadership under CCPI. Because the ALPI intervention designed under SPPG embodies the same leadership values and objectives, it is likely that SPPG will similarly contribute to increasing leadership among the third and fourth generations of ALPI participants.

According to the SPPG Program Description (PD) and CEPPS, some ALPI members from the first two generations under CCPI have risen to positions of political importance, including a member who was appointed Minister of Labor, Social Policy Displaced Persons and Refugees in Sarajevo Canton, which testifies to ALPI's past contribution to enhancing youth leadership. In addition, ALPI alumni provided examples of leadership skills, as exemplified in the formation of a new political party in Eastern Sarajevo and a Youth Election Committee, which brought together youth from 10 political parties in Bijeljina to advocate for a higher voter turnout among youth and resulted in fielding a joint mayoral candidate.

Furthermore, ALPI promotes cross-party collaboration, which represents an important leadership skill. Two ALPI alumni reported that ALPI was their first opportunity to meet and collaborate with peers from other political parties, especially those that do not belong to the same political family. According to ALPI alumni, they have demonstrated leadership skills and acquired knowledge through collaboration. This is exemplified by an alumnus reporting post-ALPI coalition building activities between his political party and a fellow alumnus's political party, which stemmed from their collaboration and relationship formed during ALPI. In addition, according to progress reports, leadership skills were further strengthened through the first ALPI regional meeting, which gathered young political leaders from Southeastern Europe. Another ALPI alumnus cited critical thinking as another leadership quality that ALPI promoted.

Under Sub-Objective 3.2, SPPG provided campaign training specifically for young candidates in advance of the 2020 municipal elections, and the ET found that training contributed to youth political leadership. According to progress reports, two online trainings for young candidates were held in October 2020. The trainings focused on campaign management

skills, communication skills and using social media in campaigning, with the intent of contributing to increasing leadership knowledge and skills such as setting campaign goals, composing key political messages and defining their target groups. Several candidates who received the online trainings said they learned how to organize pre-election campaign, how to introduce themselves and use social networks in campaigning.

> *"When we introduced ourselves on Facebook and some other social networks, everybody could tell the difference between me and other candidates."* – A young candidate

VOTER TURNOUT
Contribution of SPPG interventions to 2020 turnout

The breakdown of voter turnout by sex and age is not available for the 2016 local elections, making it impossible to determine whether women or youth turnout increased in 2020 compared to previous local elections. However, there are indications that BiH voter turnout data are generally unreliable. As outlined in the table below (Exhibit 4), according to the official data recorded by CEC, the 2020 voter turnout was 50 percent. The data does not indicate major differences in voter turnout between men and women or between young and adult voters in 2020. However, IFES officials noted that the official data does not reflect significant emigration from BiH. The CEC states that the 2020 electorate (population 18 years of age or older) was 3.38 million, but the 2013 census found that the 18 years of age or older population was 2.84 million. The discrepancy is likely due to Bosnian adults living outside the country but remaining on the voter rolls. The BiH's electoral law envisages passive registration, where all individuals who are 18 years of age or older who have a BiH personal ID are counted as part of the electorate. However, many people living in the diaspora have BiH personal IDs, but they do not vote. For instance, according to the BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more than 100,000 out of the country voters submitted a request to vote in the 2020 elections, while the size of the BiH diaspora is estimated at about 2,000,000 citizens[6]. When calculated based on the 2013 Census data, voter turnout rises to 60 percent and suggests that younger individuals and women are less likely to vote compared to adults and men. However, this data is also outdated and does not account for the last 8 years of continued emigration.

To compare, the turnout in the United States 2018 midterm elections was 53 percent of the citizen voting-age population, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, which was the highest midterm election turnout in 4 decades and a 12-percentage-point increase over 2014. U.S. turnout for adults 18 to 29 was 36 percent in 2018, and turnout for women was 55 percent.[7] Based on the official data, voter turnout in BiH is only slightly lower compared to the U.S., and based on the Census data it is considerably higher.

Exhibit 4: BiH 2020 local elections detailed data

CEC DATA				CENSUS 2013 DATA		
Category	**Electorate** *(CEC 2020)*	**Voted 2020**	**Turnout (%)** *(based on CEC 2020 electorate)*	**Category**	**Electorate** *(CENSUS 2013 18+)*	**Turnout (%)** *(based on CENSUS 2013 electorate)*
Total	**3384244**	**1705520**	**50%**	**Total**	**2838458**	**60%**
Total >=30	2825068	1417879	50%	Total 30+	2264324	63%
Total <30	559176	287641	51%	Total 18-29	574134	50%

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[6]https://www.undp.org/content/dam/bosnia_and_herzegovina/docs/Operations/Projects/PR/D4D/BiH%20Diaspora_prodoc _core_FINAL_BiH.pdf?download
[7] https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/04/behind-2018-united-states-midterm-election-turnout.html, accessed on June 30, 2021.

Male	1687689	863934	51%	Male	1376597	63%
Male >=30	1400297	714599	51%	Male 30+	1082263	66%
Male <30	287392	149335	52%	Male 18-29	294334	51%
Female	1696555	841586	50%	Female	1461861	58%
Female >=30	1424771	703280	49%	Female 30+	1182061	60%
Female <30	271784	138306	51%	Female 18-29	279800	49%

While there is a lack of data to determine whether women and youth voter turnout changed from 2016 to 2020 or the extent to which SPPG interventions contributed to any observed change; **some anecdotal evidence suggests that the SPPG GOTV campaign contributed to the voter turnout among youth.** As pointed out by an ALPI participant and a KI from the international community, youth voters tend to be more engaged in social media, which were the tools primarily employed in the GOTV campaign. An ALPI participant emphasized that she joined ALPI because she was impressed by ALPI's GOTV activities. In addition, according to SPPG progress reports, there were widespread interactions of voters responding to the campaign; e.g., a profile-picture frame that said, "Yes, I did" (vote) went viral, with thousands of Facebook users across the country applying it to their profile picture. Also, GOTV used attention-grabbing slogans and visuals that typically appeal to youth.

> *"it's very important but it's very hard to reach out to youth, the way you can reach out to them is through social media, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, they're not watching television, not reading the newspaper, they just care about what the influencer will do."- An ALPI participant*

Theory of change

The SPPG theory of change (ToC) postulates: "If candidates build their capacities to conduct inclusive public outreach, then the elections will be more participatory, competitive, and reflective of citizen priorities."

According to most KIs, the theory of change is reasonable to increase women and youth voter turnout. However, few KIs said the improving voter turnout is not sufficient to bring about change on BiH's political scene. Most KIs, including representatives of the international community, media, and youth, believe that the SPPG ToC is sound. In their opinion, many people in BiH, including women and youth, do not believe that the situation in the country can be changed. If politicians communicated with them and discussed their problems and possible solutions, that would make them realize that it is possible to make a change.

However, according to few KIs, the ToC sounds great in an ideal world, but in practice, the turnout is not important because elections are vulnerable to corrupt polling station commissions and other election fraud. One young candidate said elections are virtually non-existent in his town due to the depth of election fraud schemes, and women and youth in the town assembly are easily manipulated and carry no political weight whatsoever. Moreover, improved voter turnout does not guarantee that new voters will vote for solutions that improve the situation in the country; for instance, that youth are more likely to be progressive and promote democratic values, or that women vote for women.

OBSTACLES TO WOMEN AND YOUTH POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND TURNOUT

According to KIs, key constraints that hinder political leadership among women are traditional gender roles; female politicians are particularly exposed to criticism and

hate speech; lack of democratization in political parties; and lack of motivation to enter politics.

Traditionally, women in BiH are underrepresented across society, including in politics. This situation is reflected in the numbers of women either occupying leadership positions in parties or holding elected official positions. For example, women only hold 20 percent of seats in the upper chamber of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly[8]. Twenty KIs from different categories emphasized **traditional gender roles** as an obstacle to women's political participation and leadership in BiH, where politics is viewed as a male job while the woman's primary responsibility is family. The two surveys the ET conducted with local council candidates and party members corroborate this finding, identifying traditional gender roles as the main obstacle to participation of women in leadership positions (68 percent and 57 percent).

> *"If you are a woman and dare to jump out of the frame in which society places you, the environment will try to hit you on the head until you return to your place that they consider belongs to you." – Journalist*

Other research identifies traditional gender roles as one of the main obstacles to women's political participation and leadership.[9] According to MEASURE II's 2020 National Survey of Citizen's Perception (NSCP), women's political underrepresentation is closely tied to persistent traditional views of gender roles in society. About one-third of the survey respondents perceive men as better political leaders than women, including almost one-third of female respondents.[10] However, SPPG's design does not include any interventions aimed at addressing traditional gender norms that hinder women's political participation and leadership.

Several KIs noted another obstacle: **hate speech and verbal attacks** on women in public life and politics in particular, based on their private life rather than their political activities. This finding is supported by other research that "verbal attacks and harassment, and defamatory statements through media and social networks" are among recurrent issues reported by female candidates.[11]

> *"Women politicians, when they do something wrong, are not attacked on the basis of their actions, but on the basis of their private life or their personal appearance." – Journalist*

KIs and surveyed local council candidates and party members also recognized **lack of motivation** to enter the BiH political arena as an obstacle to women's political participation and leadership (by 44 percent and 36 percent respectively).

Several KIs, particularly female candidates, and media and CSO focus group participants, said a **lack of internal democracy in political parties and a lack of party support for women limits** participation by women and youth. They said women are used only to meet quotas for electoral lists. An IFES official said women are rarely the leading candidate on party lists, and MEASURE II research found 81 percent of municipalities did not have a female candidate in the top position.[12] Also, almost half (44 percent) of surveyed local council candidates believe that party leadership does not provide women and youth with enough space in campaigns. One female candidate said women

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[8] Inter-Parliamentary Union for Democracy for Everyone's Monthly ranking of women in national parliaments, https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=4&year=2021, last accessed on June 25, 2021.
[9] UNDP's Baseline study on barriers to political participation of women in BiH, file:///C:/Users/sbosnjak/Downloads/WIE%20Baseline%20study.FINAL.ENG.pdf, p 54, last accessed on June 25, 2021.
[10] NSCP 2020, Preliminary Data Findings
[11] UNDP's Baseline study on barriers to political participation of women in BiH file:///C:/Users/sbosnjak/Downloads/WIE%20Baseline%20study.FINAL.ENG.pdf, p 32, last accessed on June 25, 2021.
[12] Gender (IN)equality in 2020 Local Elections- Issue Brief, Mayf 2021

are often used to get votes for the preferred candidates and their party, which is corroborated by another study noting that women made up 42 percent of local council candidates, but only 20 percent of those elected.[13] As explained by a CSO focus group participant, party leaders decide everything important and install their people on the top of the electoral list, making them do as told. This particularly affects youth and women. According to its design, SPPG does not envisage addressing lack of democracy within political parties, which hinders youth and women participation and leadership. However, as corroborated in more detail under the evaluation question 4, some ALPI members find that this program helped them improve their intra-party communication skills, which could help them improve their position in the parties.

KIs said factors that hinder political leadership and voter turnout among youth include passivity and apathy; inexperience, lack of education and knowledge of the election processes; manipulation of youth by political parties; and questionable motivation for entering politics. Youth[14] in BiH have traditionally been underrepresented in politics. This is, among other data, reflected in their low political participation, with only 6 percent of young people joining political parties[15] and only 4.6 percent of the seats in the lower chamber of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly occupied by people under the age of 40.[16] According to KIs, one of the main factors influencing political leadership among youth and their turnout at elections is their **passivity and apathy**.

An NDI official said young people in high schools are still not aware that they can raise political issues and engage in political activities. Several KIs pointed out **lack of education and knowledge** among youth, especially lack of knowledge of the electoral system, as one of the reasons for **manipulation of young people** in political parties. According to civil society and media representatives, manipulation of youth represents one of the main obstacles for youth participation. Political parties use young people as workforce for election campaigns. However, this does not translate into large numbers of youth among elected officials.

> *"Most of young people are recruited, it is not they who choose parties, but rather the other way around. They are chosen for being who they are because that is what suits the political establishment."* – Journalist

According to a journalist, young people do not join political parties based on their platform; rather, they are recruited, often through student organizations, offering them benefits in exchange for their loyalty. For instance, several KIs said young people enter politics to ensure they have a stable job.

SPPG youth interventions addressed obstacles to youth leadership, particularly ALPI. The design of ALPI, campaign assistance provided to young candidates, and GOTV aims to address passiveness and apathy of the BIH youth; inexperience; lack of education and knowledge; and manipulation of youth by political parties as obstacles to youth leadership and turnout. The activity did so by increasing youth capacities and knowledge, through ALPI and campaign assistance to young candidates focused on increasing the skills and competencies of youth in politics as well as through GOTV focused on the youth turnout at elections.

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[13] WFD's Representation of women in local government in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 2020 elections, https://www.wfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Representation-of-women_WEB.pdf, last accessed June 22, 2021
[14] For the purposes of this evaluation, youth is defined as under 30 years of age, while, based on the SPPG Program Description, young candidates are defined as under 40 years of age.
[15] Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina's official website, http://www.mladi.gov.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=%20view&id=46&lang=en, last accessed on June 26, 2021.
[16] Inter-Parliamentary Union for Democracy for Everyone's Youth participation in national parliaments file:///C:/Users/sbosnjak/Downloads/IPU_Youthreport_EN_LR.pdf, last accessed on June 26, 2021.

Several interventions designed under SPPG contributed to improving political leadership among women and youth in BiH. These include ALPI, whose contribution to improving political leadership among young men and women under SPPG is expected to equal if not surpass that of the original two generations (under CCPI). Campaign trainings designed specifically for youth and women candidates contribute to leadership skills among youth and women by enhancing their communication and campaign management skills. The current SPPG design focuses on youth to a larger extent than women.

No conclusive evidence shows that the GOTV campaign, the only SPPG intervention aimed at increasing the voter turnout among youth, has resulted in such an increase. This is due to a lack of reliable data that could enable a comparison of youth voter turnout between 2016 and 2020. Without exit polling to establish to what extent the GOTV campaign contributed to youth voter turnout, it is difficult to identify GOTV as the reason for any increase.

The main obstacles to enhancing political leadership among women are traditional gender roles, female politicians' exposure to hate speech and verbal attacks, and lack of motivation to enter politics. Factors that hinder political leadership among youth include passiveness and apathy of Bosnian youth, lack of education and experience, manipulation by political parties, and problematic motivation for entering the political arena. Lack of democracy within political parties is a hindrance to political leadership among both women and youth.

The SPPG design has addressed the obstacles in terms of skill building, but not in terms of traditional social norms or lack of democratization of political parties. The theory of change is reasonable to increase voter turnout among women and youth, but not all voters value issue-based campaigns.

EVALUATION QUESTION 4: ALPI PROGRAM

To what extent have ALPI members increased cross-party cooperation due to SPPG?

ALPI BACKGROUND

As mentioned above, the ALPI is a professional development program for young political leaders, piloted by IRI in Bosnia and Herzegovina beginning in late 2017 under CCPI. ALPI brings together young political leaders from different political parties with an aim to empower and create a space for young leaders. Participants are active young politicians from political parties with opposing views or from different ethnic backgrounds. The ALPI activity has expanded to Serbia and Montenegro, giving it a regional dimension[17]. IRI organized two generations of ALPI under CCPI between late 2017 and December 2020, including training for 13 ALPI participants running in local elections, 8 of whom were elected.

ALPI THIRD GENERATION

SPPG assumed responsibility for ALPI in December 2020, when the third generation of participants -- 13 men and 10 women from 12 political parties and 16 municipalities -- was selected. The first training module for the third generation began in March 2021. **As of June 2021, only one of the six modules had been completed. According to IRI officials, participants from different**

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[17] ALPI activity in Montenegro is funded by a grant from the NED and the ALPI activity in Serbia by a USAID grant to CEPPS in Serbia

parties are expected to work together on policy initiatives between modules, and new participants told the ET that they had just begun to engage in this cross-party work.

Beneficiaries commended ALPI for its design, quality of input, and facilitation by IRI. They expressed satisfaction with the three program committees: Research, Policy Development, and Communications. Beneficiaries who have attended multiple political programs stated that ALPI is better than other programs because it goes beyond lectures and requires participants from different parties and ethnic groups to work together regularly between training modules to cooperatively research and draft policy papers on topics of their choosing. Current participants learned about the program through word-of-mouth from their peers and colleagues who had participated, and more than 100 people applied for the 23 positions in the current class. Most outside observers had not heard of ALPI, but those who did know the program have positive impressions of it.

Participants mentioned specifically that none of them felt treated differently in any way because of their political opinions. The program allowed each of them to choose what their focus would be (research, policy development, or communications) based on their preferences, and they expressed a high level of satisfaction with experts' assistance in their work. The participants expressed the same level of satisfaction with the tasks they need to work on between the modules, and with IRI's work and support in general.

A few KIs complained that ALPI program is very demanding and time-consuming, and one noted that his engagement was insufficient due to other obligations. These examples imply that only highly motivated individuals will fully engage and complete the program.

Most participants agreed that the program helped them improve skills for intra-party communication. Participants said they were empowered to communicate their positions and attitudes better and more confidently. Several participants became more critical of their own party, and one alumna left her party and founded a new one.

> *"I am now able to talk to the president of the party and say that I think that politics should be conducted in a certain way. Now I have more confidence about some things, and I can give them my opinion. I haven't noticed it brought some changes so far, but I haven't been active myself enough too. But now I have started with some activities, and I am ready to talk to people at the cantonal or federal level to get things moving on some issues." – ALPI Alumnus*

ALPI ALUMNI

According to KIs, the ALPI alumni network consists of some 100 people regionally, and around 50 in BiH. Resources allocated for alumni events are relatively limited (1 or 2 events a year). "Our program does not have a strong ALPI alumni component," an IRI official said. "It's no mystery: If we have more funds, we have more activities."

According to KIs, cross-party cooperation activities between participants also exist outside of ALPI framework. According to SPPG reports, ALPI alumni developed several alumni initiatives within the Making Youth Voices Heard and contributed to GOTV initiative. Initiatives such as "Šta te pali", "Generation D", and "Democracy Fight Club", along with GOTV activities helped increase cross-party cooperation of ALPI members. Joint activities were implemented with only limited assistance from IRI, which provided digital communication training and facilitated communication and content development with ALPI alumni/Generation Democracy members who have launched ALPI's Making Youth Voices Heard project. In one case, the ALPI alumni (from HDZ and SDA) cooperated and established new channels of communication between parties completely outside of ALPI. One participant mentioned using ALPI connections for cross-party backchannel negotiations.

> *"I wish to especially emphasize the value of the ALPI program. Usually, all these programs they end after the formal part. However, we all managed to stay in touch even after it, not only on the friendly basis but on the political etc."* –
> ALPI alumnus

CONCLUSIONS

SPPG has improved cross-party cooperation among ALPI members and alumni. SPPG effectively used ALPI alumni in new cross-party initiatives such as Making Youth Voices Heard and its GOTV campaign. However, the program focuses on current participants and gives less attention to alumni.

ALPI's challenging and demanding program appears to be one of the key ingredients of Program's success and rating it enjoys. Quality of input and the support provided by IRI are other reasons. Success of ALPI has resulted in an ever growing, diverse group of young politicians from different political parties seeking to participate in ALPI under SPPG.

EVALUATION QUESTION 5: SUPPORT TO THE CENTRAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION

How have IFES recommendations been utilized by electoral stakeholders to support electoral reforms before and after the 2020 elections?

ELECTORAL LAW REFORM
Review, Consultations, and Agreements

Following the October 2018 recommendations made by the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), **CEPPS conducted an initial review of the electoral legal framework, identifying key vulnerabilities and protracted gaps, and prepared an analysis of findings to inform any electoral legal reform processes in the post-election period**. CEPPS shared t**he review with USAID and provided the basis for the IFES comprehensive review of the electoral legal framework, beginning in spring 2021.**

Interlocutors were skeptical that meaningful change on electoral reform initiatives could be accomplished before the 2022 elections, citing the lack of political will as the key obstacle to moving forward. KIs said the interdepartmental election reform working group was not actively promoting electoral reform initiatives as of June 2021. The CEC is not part of the working group; and it is unlikely the working group will reach a consensus without international pressure. The SPPG program description recognized this challenge and conditioned SPPG support for electoral reform on sufficient political will. Nevertheless, IFES planned to proceed with its comprehensive review.

Political Finance and Abuse of State Resources
Illicit political financing and abuse of state resources (ASR) in election campaigns are at the heart of endemic corruption in BiH, and no adequate legal and regulatory framework exists to address the challenge. KIs agreed to the need for enhancing the transparency of political finance and curbing ASR, and IFES work in this area is based on the Abuse of State Resources Assessment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, produced in 2017 under the CCPI project.[18] T**he COVID-19 pandemic, a change**

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[18] https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/bosnia_and_herzegovina_final_report_english_april_2018.pdf

in the membership of the CEC, and a focus on 2020 local elections stalled IFES support to combat ASR.

> *"The misuse of public resources is completely uncovered by the election legislation. I would say, it's almost legal, except that it's also a part of the criminal code of conduct."* - CSO representative

IFES' activities enhancing the oversight capacity of civil society and media to curb illicit political finance and ASR were also delayed. A subgrant to the Association of Election Officials in BiH (AEOBIH) to develop a program to educate public officials and civil society on ASR did not materialize. However, TI received a subgrant to train public servants to recognize and report different ASR types during the election campaigns. The trainings began in June 2021, while IFES was developing its plans in advance of the 2022 elections.

CEC officials said IFES has provided recommendations on how to improve the laws and regulations, including enhanced sanctions for violations and requiring campaign accounts to remain separate from other party accounts. **A CEC official said minor improvements made during the 2020 elections** included intensifying CEC cooperation with two monitoring CSOs – TI and Coalition Pod Lupom – and imposing sanctions on candidates identified as violators by TI's Election Campaign Monitoring Report. However, **CEC officials and CSO representatives recognized the remaining legal vacuum regulating political finance and ASR and the lack of political will by political parties and parliament to introduce any substantive changes.**

COVID-19

In preparing for the 2020 elections, the CEC faced considerable challenges in resources and capacity to mitigate the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The CEC asked IFES for specific technical assistance related to conducting safe elections, and IFES's focus shifted to providing technical guidance to address impacts of the health crisis. IFES shared international electoral standards and practices from other countries that held elections during the pandemic, and this assistance contributed to the safe conduct of elections.

CEC officials said nearly all of IFES's recommendations related to pandemic safety were implemented and the instructions were published in the Official Gazette. Specific recommendations cited in SPPG quarterly reports included social distancing protocols at polling stations for voters and observers. Another recommendation responded to the unexpected Election Day death of the victorious mayoral candidate in Travnik, as IFES provided information on global practices in such situations, enabling the CEC to promptly update its procedures and mitigation measures, register new candidates, inform the public, and maintain confidence in the integrity of the election.

E-LEARNING PLATFORM

In advance of the 2020 elections, IFES developed an open-source e-learning platform and launched a pilot, online poll-worker training on the platform. **CEC officials said the e-learning platform helped the CEC improve and expand the reach of its education on electoral processes.** The platform trained poll workers and other interested citizens on: their roles and responsibilities on election day; election day procedures and compliance with the electoral legal framework; and how to reduce the risk of COVID-19 transmission in polling stations. Interested citizens could access the platform and learn through interactive videos, quizzes, resources, and practical skill-building exercises. More than 750 citizens (383 or 51 percent women) completed some or all chapters of the online poll worker training module by election day.

POLLING STATION INTEGRITY

Most KIs cited the compromised integrity of polling station committees (PSCs) as one of the most critical challenges to address in advance of the 2022 elections. A CEC official said the commission received a high number of PSC complaints during the 2020 elections. While the CEC submitted those complaints to the competent prosecutor offices, no sanctions were imposed, which the CEC official attributed to judges' and prosecutors' lack of knowledge of electoral legislation. Both the electoral law and criminal code contain provisions dealing with electoral fraud and misconduct, but sanctions are ineffective, he said. **SPPG included support for polling station committees in its program description; however, KIs said the OSCE is the primary donor working with PSCs, and SPPG has not done any work in this area.**

VOTER REGISTRATION (VR)

KIs said public confidence in the voter registration process is low due to significant problems in past elections, and CEC officials said they needed assistance to ensure the accuracy and integrity of voter registration systems and data. Under the CCPI award, IFES conducted a comprehensive analysis of the operational and technical framework of the voter registration processes in BiH and presented a detailed set of recommendations for improvements to the CEC. CEC officials said the assessment highlighted the need to address voter registration vulnerabilities in advance of the 2022 elections, especially those relating to out-of-country voters and difficulties with processing applications. A CEC official said that introducing electronic registration, an IFES recommendation, would address 90 percent of the vulnerabilities.

Under SPPG, IFES intended to work with the CEC implementing some of the recommendations from the VR analysis through development of technical specifications for implementation of Web-based, out-of-country voter registration module; development of a Terms of Reference (ToR) for proposed CEC-led stakeholder consultative working group on voter registration; an in-depth assessment of the CEC's ICT capacity; conducting a voter registration Data Integrity Test; and developing technical procedures to support the process of removal of deceased voters. **Although CEPPS intended to assist the CEC to address the VR recommendations before the 2020 elections, this assistance was not provided due to overall programmatic delays. IFES plans to support the CEC to make improvements in advance of the 2022 elections.** The European Union and USAID are discussing the possibility of co-funding activities to support the integrity of the voter registration process by following IFES and OSCE recommendations.

CYBERSECURITY

Drawing on its 2020 Cybersecurity and Elections Assessment, IFES developed a list of short-term recommendations to strengthen CEC system integrity before the 2020 elections. IFES intended these recommendations to be implementable before the elections and to address critical vulnerabilities while requiring few resources. However, **due to the local elections cycle, severe budgetary constraints, and lack of IT expertise, none of the recommendations were implemented with the exception of developing a cybersecurity manual (not yet completed) and short-term patching of servers.** IFES also developed a cyber-hygiene awareness course, based on vulnerabilities and areas of opportunities identified. The course provided the tools and knowledge the CEC needed to strengthen its own information management systems and its cybersecurity infrastructure.

CEC officials said the cybersecurity assessment, the specific short- and long-term recommendations for improvements, and the related trainings were helpful, and CEC officials said they would organize a follow-up ToT training so that all CEC employees, including those at the municipal level, go through this curriculum. A more substantial course of trainings was planned for summer 2021. IFES

officials said they expect that more of their recommendations will be implemented before the 2022 elections.

Several KIs noted the severity of the budgetary constraints for addressing many of the IFES recommendations, especially those related to the overall ICT infrastructure and security of servers. Nevertheless, CEC officials said awareness of vulnerabilities was a necessary first step to developing a strategy to tackle the identified cybersecurity challenges. IFES and CEC officials said they were developing a step-by-step approach in the run-up to the 2022 elections.

DISINFORMATION AND HATE SPEECH

Hate speech has a devastating impact on an already highly polarized and tense multiethnic environment, elevating distrust and the risk for an outbreak of violence. As described under the evaluation question 3, women are particularly vulnerable to these malign attacks. CEC officials said the commission itself was targeted by a disinformation campaign, including false accusations of foreign interference in the electoral process related to a draft memorandum of understanding (MoU) with IFES[19]. CEC officials requested assistance for the CEC to conduct countrywide, public discussions on the topic of electoral disinformation, as well as a Code of Conduct for political parties on social media during electoral campaigns. CEC officials said they intend to counter electoral disinformation by building a "one-stop shop" for verified election information through an open-data portal.

Due to other challenges and priority areas outlined above, SPPG in its first 18 months did not implement activities to address electoral disinformation and hate speech. However, IFES reported that a small grant awarded to local fact-checking organization Zašto ne, supported a broader initiative to address disinformation's impact on the 2020 local elections. IFES engaged the CEC in an initiative to strengthen its public relations and engagement with the community and to connect it with a wider network of stakeholders. With IFES support, Zašto ne produced a series of reports, events, and interviews to provide citizens with greater access to independent data and resources and to strengthen the information integrity during the entire electoral cycle.

CONCLUSIONS

The outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the change in the composition of the CEC, the delay of the 2020 local elections, the controversy over the MoU between IFES and CEC, and the general highly politicized and polarized pre-election environment all contributed to the delay of planned activities with CEC. Despite these challenges, however, IFES adapted its methodologies and mitigation measures and developed online, innovative tools and programming to respond to new demands.

After an initial pause of activities to readjust the scope of its work, IFES switched to delivering remote assistance to the CEC with an urgent focus on providing best practices and recommendations on conducting elections under the global COVID-19 pandemic. The CEC cited this assistance as one of the most valuable, as it contributed to safely conducting the elections according to global standards

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[19] At the beginning of the Activity implementation, CEC proposed to sign an MoU with IFES to help map areas of technical assistance provided by different international partners. The MoU was approved by the Bosniak and Croat Presidency members, but the Serb member disinformed the public about the nature of the MoU and CEPPS/IFES' role in supporting the CEC and election process in BiH.

while also respecting the principles of open, fair, and inclusive democratic electoral processes. Nearly all of IFES' recommendations were implemented, and the instructions were published in the Official Gazette. The CEC also used the e-learning platform developed by IFES to launch an online poll-worker training to improve and expand the reach of its education on electoral processes when in-person training was difficult.

Work was stalled on more substantive, long-term electoral reforms, including those addressing illicit financing and abuse of state resources. Meaningful change on electoral reform initiatives is unlikely, due to a lack of political will, despite the preliminary legal analysis done by the CEPPS partners and the comprehensive review of the electoral legal framework that IFES launched in spring 2021. Development of revised ASR definitions, political finance and ASR regulation review, and training for the CEC Audit Department are not expected to begin before summer 2021. IFES' activities on enhancing the oversight capacity of civil society and media to curb illicit political finance and ASR were also delayed and/or redirected.

SPPG included support for PSC impartiality and appointments in its program description, but did not conduct any work in this area. Although CEPPS intended to provide technical assistance to the CEC before the 2020 local elections to address IFES's voter registration recommendations, this assistance was not realized due to the overall programmatic delays.

Little substantive progress was made in improving the CEC cyber security, and their systems remain exposed to serious vulnerabilities. The primary achievement under SPPG was developing a locally adapted cyber-hygiene awareness course to address vulnerabilities and areas of opportunities, which increased staff awareness of the gravity of the problem and the need to develop a strategic approach to address it. Some minor, short-term IFES recommendations were implemented prior to the local elections, including developing the Cybersecurity Manual (not yet completed) and patching of servers. Severe budget deficits and lack of IT expertise pose key constraints for addressing IFES recommendations.

Planned activities to address electoral disinformation and hate speech in election campaigns were not conducted, with the exception of a small grant awarded to local fact-checking organization.

EVALUATION QUESTION 6: POTENTIAL FOR SUSTAINABILITY

Which interventions related to developing individual political parties' issue-based policy-development capacity and enhancing cross-party collaboration are most likely to bring about sustainable results?

INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL PARTIES' ISSUE-BASED POLICY-DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY

Candidate and campaign support

SPPG has not worked with parties on issue-based policy development, but CEPPS officials said they plan to do so before the 2022 elections, beginning in autumn 2021.

During key informant interviews with the ET, **12 individual mayoral candidates supported by SPPG in 2020 said** they can conduct issue-based campaigns in the future should they decide to run again**, and they cited SPPG support as an important element in developing this skill.** [20].

As noted above in the findings for EQ1, SPPG support for developing campaign platforms was of limited utility because it came late in the campaign cycle, after candidates had developed their

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[20] Four of the 12 candidates interviewed won their elections.

platforms. **Local candidates and CEPPS officials said support for developing campaign platforms, particularly public polling and focus group data, needs to be provided by outside organizations such as CEPPS because local candidates do not have the capability and resources.**

"Research costs a lot of money, and not all parties have the resources to invest in it." – A CEPPS official

Training of trainers

ToT programs are frequently used in political processes support programs around the world to build sustainability of training activities, particularly among political parties. ToT programs aim to develop a group of core, effective trainers within parties, who can train party members after the support program ends. Such programs aim to become self-sustaining, as USAID-trained trainers conduct their own ToT programs in their own parties, perpetuating transmission of knowledge initiated by the political processes program.

The ET found that the NDI ToT program had the necessary elements to facilitate sustainable training in participating political parties. The ET's online survey showed that those party members attending the trainings held generally positive views toward the ToT trainings, with an average rating of 3.8 out of 5, based on 13 responses. ToT trainers were rated as "professional" or "very professional" by 77 percent of respondents, and 62 percent said they learned a new skill in the ToT training. The low response rate to the survey, at only 33 percent, tempered the positive results. However, the trainers felt that, in most cases, the parties rejected the training for different reasons including thinking they already knew how to campaign or fear among some party members that the trainers obtain better positions in the party through the training. One trainer noted that parties reject new knowledge in general.

Several KIs from civil society, CEPPS, and other donors said party political academies (such as ALPI) could offer a more sustainable way to build individual political parties' issue-based policy-development capacity. Such academies would be operated by parties and become part of the parties' internal structures, but such an initiative requires additional resources from SPPG or the parties.

ENHANCING CROSS-PARTY COLLABORATION
Caucuses

Unlike parliamentary standing committees, caucuses are informal multi-party groups, outside the formal structures of parliament, that come together to advocate for a particular issue or out of common affinity. In Bosnia, where formal parliamentary structures can be gridlocked and ineffective, caucuses can act based on a majority or consensus of a relatively small number of members. They can undertake activities that parliamentary leadership might block a formal body from pursuing.

Based on KIs and focus group discussions, the ET found that sustainability and effectiveness of caucuses may be mutually exclusive. While most caucus members said their caucuses were effective because they were not a formal parliamentary institution, the continued existence of those caucuses in the next parliamentary term depends on the interest and initiative of their members and on those members being re-elected.

To rectify this challenge to the sustainability of caucuses, one implementing institution told the ET that caucuses should become formal parliamentary bodies. Such recognition would improve the sustainability of caucuses, integrate their work into the formal procedures of parliament, and help ensure that they persist regardless of election results. Members of one caucus – the Cultural

Heritage Parliamentary Group (CHPG) in the FBIH parliament –agreed, stating it would be advantageous for the caucus to have formal standing in parliament.

However, other implementers and caucuses were skeptical of formalizing the standing of caucuses. Those KIs and focus group participants said that coming under the authority of parliamentary leadership would undermine the autonomy of the caucuses and give parliamentary leadership control over the leadership and agendas of the caucuses, empowering parliamentary leaders to thwart caucus initiatives that threaten their interests. Caucus members said that they can use their formal committee assignments to bring caucus issues into formal parliamentary channels. CEPPS officials and caucus members cited the cautionary example of a women's caucus supported by a previous CEPPS program and given formal status, but that caucus ceased to exist when parliamentary leadership appointed a chairperson who undermined the operation of the caucus. "Informal work is better," one caucus member said, generating agreement from the other caucus members in a focus group discussion.

> *"Without parliamentary engagement to establish caucuses in a formal way, it's difficult to talk about the sustainability of this work."* – CEPPS official
>
> *"There wouldn't be any problem with being a formal group. It would be easier to work if we existed as a formal group."* – CHPG member
>
> *"Informality is a value: taking them out of parliament, creating a space where they feel safe, doing serious things in a less formal way. It gives better results and builds interpersonal connections. It's more versatile and more flexible than a commission in parliament."* – CEPPS official

Of the caucuses that SPPG has supported, the 10-member EISC is the longest-established (created in 2018 under CCPI) and has been active in its outreach to civil society, business, government officials, and local officials. IRI has also created a Parliamentary Expert Support Initiative (PESI), of parliamentary staff members from different parties and various levels of government, as a group to provide research and analysis to EISC members. **PESI staff members were skeptical that the body could continue to operate without IRI support**. In a focus group discussion, **EISC members said they were committed to continuing the caucus if they are re-elected.** However, MPs said IRI's logistical support is essential for the caucus to maintain its current level of activity.

> *"We differ in ideology, but our work keeps us truly in touch and connected."* – EISC member
>
> *"There are issues we agree on. This is an aspect of parliamentary work where we can work jointly."* – EISC member

Other caucuses assisted by SPPG are either smaller than EISC, such as the CHPG, or less established, such as the Youth Caucus of 11 legislators from cantonal assemblies and the Federation parliament, which was created in May 2020. **Caucus members and CEPPS officials expressed skepticism that those caucuses were sustainable.**

> *"It would be impossible to implement without the support of an international project."* – CHPG member
>
> *"We'll have no reason to continue after the NDI program ends."* – Youth Caucus member

Working groups and coalitions

As noted above in the findings for EQ1, implementing partners and mayoral candidates said the FBiH-RS Working Group, composed of the RS-based PDP and the Federation-based SDP, collaborates effectively across a range of policies. "You can see more and more trust between certain parties who are in opposition in both entities," one CEPPS official said. Referring to cross-entity policy development, a colleague added, "PDP and SDP are not thinking of not doing it."

Candidates noted that opposition parties can easily unite around the goal of ousting the ruling party, **particularly in the RS, but sustained cooperation becomes more difficult when the coalition comes to power and each party seeks to pursue its own political priorities.** Candidates also said that pre-election coalitions are unlikely because "every party will have its own policies to get the most seats in the assembly." They said coalitions are more likely to form after the election, when parties know how many seats they will have and can form a "mathematical" coalition. An NS member said that drafting a policy is not what cooperation is based on; the policy is the final result of cooperation.

While SDP-PDP cooperation is wide-ranging and supported by the structures of both parties, neither the Center-Left Group nor Cross-Cantonal Group have formally established cooperation in their parties or assemblies. Those two groups are also working on single issues. CEPPS officials said that their sustainability approach includes not only establishing institutions to facilitate cooperation, but also supporting applied skills development to sustain practices of cross-party collaboration. In a written comment, CEPPS officials noted: "It is through these initiatives that a broader environment of collaborative action can serve as a platform for future undertakings." Furthermore, CEPPS officials noted that their sustainability strategy aims at institutionalizing cross-party cooperation within the parties themselves. A written comment stated: "Political parties become experienced with the protocol and political elements of fostering such cooperation among them and can turn to the practice on any relevant and shared areas of public policy and/or legislative initiative." The institutional sustainability of the two working groups themselves is not certain, but the skills developed by participants can contribute to enhancing sustainable cross-party collaboration, and cooperation can become institutionalized within the parties themselves.

ALPI

The ALPI initiative, launched under the previous CCPI initiative, shifted to SPPG in December 2020. It began training its third generation of 23 participants (13 men, 10 women) from 12 parties in March 2021. Additional ALPI programming will need IRI support, but the demand side already exists.

The ET found that ALPI already produces sustainable results in the ongoing cross-party cooperation of ALPI alumni. Those alumni shared examples of how they cooperated on their own initiative outside of IRI interventions. SPPG reported 25 outreach activities implemented by ALPI members without SPPG assistance in the first 2 quarters of FY 2021, well on the way to the full-year goal of 30. "Once they establish connections and bonds through ALPI, the connections stay," a CEPPS official said. An implementer of another donor's assistance program said, "There is really good potential for sustainability with their cross-party programs." However, IRI officials said there is not a formal ALPI alumni organization.

Cross-party cooperation among ALPI members appears to be sustainable beyond their participation in ALPI programs, and alumni said they continue to meet with one another, in their professional capacities and privately. As noted earlier under the EQ4, in addition to IRI-sponsored engagement with subsequent ALPI classes and other ALPI alumni from the region, alumni have:

- Participated in an SPPG GOTV campaign aimed at Bosnian youth;
- Launched three social-media campaigns through the Making Youth Voice Heard Initiative including the Democracy Fight Club podcast, #StaTePali Social Media Challenge, and Generation D; and
- Launched blogs and posted blog articles on public affairs topics such as the COVID-19 pandemic, education, and support for children with Down's Syndrome.

CONCLUSIONS

SPPG support to municipal candidates before the 2020 elections produced a set of candidates able to conduct issue-based campaigns, and those individuals can conduct such campaigns in future elections.

SPPG's ToT program produced effective trainers who helped parties build a sustainable training capacity; however, the program was not as effective as it could have been because some party members were skeptical of the trainers' abilities and refused training. The ToT program could have been more effective if party members more respected by their colleagues had been selected to become trainers.

Established, informal parliamentary caucuses proved successful platforms for cross-party cooperation by MPs, but caucuses' informal nature threatens their sustainability and makes them dependent upon re-election of their members for continuity. While establishing the caucuses as formal parliamentary institutions can improve their sustainability, that would come at a cost of their independence and effectiveness. Most caucus members prefer to remain outside of parliamentary structures. The EISC shows particular promise for sustainable operation, given its sizable membership, years-long track record, and focus on security and European integration issues of particular importance to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Opposition parties in FBiH and RS have shown that they can coordinate policy, and 2022 offers opportunities for work on issue-based campaigns and cross-party cooperation on national level on mutually agreed issues. There is a window for SPPG assistance helping those parties formulate issues on which they can work together, contingent on parties' ability to come together.

The ALPI alumni network provides a base for sustainability of cross-party cooperation. Formalization of the alumni network could provide sustainability for the network, its cooperation with future ALPI generations, and its cross-party initiatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the key findings and conclusions elaborated in the sections above, we present the following key recommendations for the SPPG's consideration:

Recommendation 1: Start issue-based platform work with political parties early

In advance of the 2022 general elections, SPPG should start providing support to parties on issue-based platforms earlier to enable the parties to incorporate findings into their campaigns. In particular, SPPG should conduct and share public opinion polling results and focus group data with parties prior to the start of their campaigns, as they craft messages to appeal to voters. (EQ1)

Recommendation 2: Work with political candidates on messaging and communications

Prior to the 2022 elections, SPPG should continue supporting candidates and their campaign teams to distill broad policy platforms into focused messages to voters, and provide training on communications strategies, particularly on using social media. (EQ1)

Recommendation 3: Focus anti-corruption work on investigative committees

SPPG should concentrate its work with anti-corruption bodies on supporting the Interim Investigative Committee on the Judiciary, its Public Procurement Working Group, and to any other interim investigative committees that may form in the current parliamentary term, such as the proposed committee to investigate the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Support to investigative committees bolsters oversight activity in the country and enables SPPG to engage with the state-level parliament absent a dedicated legislative strengthening activity. Support to cantonal and entity-level anti-corruption caucuses could be provided upon request. (EQ2)

Recommendation 4: Ensure all interventions contribute equally to men and women's political leadership development.

SPPG should continue to ensure that all interventions contribute equally to men and women's political leadership development. SPPG should also ensure interventions are well coordinated with other donors to maximize available resources. (EQ3)

Recommendation 5: Conduct exit polling after the 2022 elections

SPPG should conduct exit polling during the 2022 elections to enable measurement of the effectiveness of the GOTV campaign. (EQ3)

Recommendation 6: Redirect resources to expand ALPI participation

SPPG should maximize the impact of the ALPI program by redirecting resources to help additional young political leaders participate in the program. SPPG should examine where funds could be redirected from other youth leadership programming – such as training for young candidates and the Youth Caucus – and redirected to support additional ALPI generations during the life of SPPG. SPPG should ensure that women comprise 50 percent of ALPI participants. SPPG should explore options for increasing ALPI participation, such as staggering training modules for two generations to participate concurrently. (EQs 3 and 4)

Recommendation 7: Support ALPI alumni to expand their role in their parties

ALPI alumni are well equipped and accustomed to issue-based cross-party cooperation. Realizing the potential of ALPI alumni depends on their ability to have their ideas and initiatives taken seriously by their parties. While some alumni successfully overcame this obstacle and assumed relatively important roles in their parties, there are also those whose role remains relatively marginal and those who have chosen to leave the party. SPPG should provide further individual capacity building and support to ALPI candidates during the 2022 campaign, such as expert assistance, polls, and focus groups. This support requires closer observation of alumni's general political engagement and their party activities. (EQ4)

Recommendation 8: Support ALPI alumni to build sustainability

SPPG should increase use of ALPI alumni in coaching and mentoring the current generation. Cross-generation linkages should be strengthened, and more active and engaged alumni could act as an advisory body regarding the work of the current generation. SPPG should support ALPI alumni to develop a formal institutional structure for the alumni network, perhaps as a registered non-governmental organization. ALPI alumni have demonstrated that the cross-party cooperation promoted by ALPI can be sustained after the program ends, and a formal alumni organization could facilitate continued interaction among alumni and engagement with ALPI and with other CEPPS youth initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Southeastern Europe, and worldwide. (EQs 4 and 6)

Recommendation 9: Continue engagement on electoral reform legislation

SPPG has conducted initial analysis on the electoral legislation and is finalizing a more substantive review. SPPG should continue to seek opportunities to engage on electoral reform initiatives prior to 2022 with particular focus on curbing illicit political party and campaign financing and abuse of state resources for electoral campaigns. (EQ5)

Recommendation 10: Improve donor and stakeholder coordination on election reform

SPPG should identify opportunities to improve donor and election stakeholder coordination efforts in electoral assistance, especially as it relates to work with PSCs and voter registration. (EQ5)

Recommendation 11: Continue collaboration with CEC on increasing use of technology

SPPG should continue to engage the CEC on identifying and implementing key recommendations from the cybersecurity assessment report ahead of the 2022 national elections, including the CEPPS/IFES' Cyber-Hygiene Awareness Training for both national and municipal election administration. In addition to cybersecurity, SPPG should continue intensive collaboration with CEC on increasing general use of technology to strengthen the CEC information management system and improve information and electoral integrity. SPPG should build sustainability strategies into all activities with CEC, including e-learning and training initiatives. (EQ5)

Recommendation 12: Continue integrity work on ASR and campaign finance reform

In advance of the 2022 elections, SPPG should continue robust engagement to enhance transparency around political finance and ASR in election campaigns, including support for the CEC, civil society, and the media. SPPG should complete activities with the Audit Department to revise its ASR monitoring methodology, develop training curricula for the Audit Department, build the capacity for political finance oversight, and ensure political finance reports and compliance. (EQ5)

Recommendation 13: Continue work to improve voter registry, including voters abroad

SPPG should continue to work on improving the accuracy of the Central Voter Registry, including creating an electronic notification system on updated records and introduction of an online portal to facilitate out-of-country voter registration. (EQ5)

Recommendation 14: Keep caucuses informal

SPPG should work with caucuses to keep them as informal bodies outside the control of parliamentary leadership. Caucus members overwhelmingly support continued operation as informal bodies, and institutionalizing caucuses within parliament risks their becoming co-opted and ineffective. SPPG should work with individual caucus members to use their parliamentary committee assignments to advance legislative initiatives of the caucus through official parliamentary channels. (EQ6)

Recommendation 15: Focus support for caucuses on EISC

SPPG should concentrate its support to caucuses on the EISC, a well-established caucus with members from most parties that has demonstrated the greatest likelihood of sustainability in the next parliament. Integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Euro-Atlantic institutions is the number one goal of United States policy in the country, and increased support to EISC would help to further this objective. Support to other caucuses could be provided upon request, but those are less likely to be sustainable due to small numbers of members. (EQ6)

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Statement of Work
Annex 2: Detailed Methodology
Annex 3: Information Sources
Annex 4: Interview Protocols
Annex 5: Evaluation Team
Annex 6: Conflict of Interest Forms
Annex 7: Evaluation Team's Responses to Comments Received From the Agreement Officer's Representative and Implementing Partner on the Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina Performance Evaluation Report

ANNEX 1: STATEMENT OF WORK

PURPOSE OF THE ASSIGNMENT

The United States Agency for International Development Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAID/BiH) has requested its Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II) to conduct a mid-term performance evaluation of the Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes (SPPG) Activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This performance evaluation will examine the SPPG's progress toward the expected outcomes and relative effectiveness of the Activity interventions contributing to the outcomes. The purpose of this evaluation is to provide credible and valuable insights for the Mission to make informed programmatic decisions and potential adaptations for the remainder of the Activity, maximizing the likelihood of achieving desired results. The implementing partner will use the evaluation results to take mid-term corrective actions (if needed) in terms of the Activity implementation. Because this is the first evaluation of USAID's program in the country, it will contribute to the body of evidence on development results in the sphere of fostering political pluralism and policy-driven governance.

SUMMARY INFORMATION

SPPG is a USAID/BiH-funded Activity implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS21). The Activity contributes to the Country Development and Cooperation Strategy's (CDCS) DO 1. Government Accountability to Citizens Strengthened. Rigorous methods and design will be applied to capture high-quality data and produce credible findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Exhibit 1 presents the SPPG Activity details.

Exhibit 1. Basic Information on the Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes Activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Activity Name	Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes (SPPG)
USAID Office	USAID/BiH Democracy Office
Implementer	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)
Cooperative Agreement #	Leader Cooperative Agreement: AID-OAA-L-15-00007 Associate Cooperative Agreement: #72016819LA00001
Total Estimated Cost	$4.000.000,00
Life of Activity	September 30, 2019 to September 29, 2023
Active Geographic Region	Across Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mission Development Objective (DO)	DO 1. Government Accountability to Citizens Strengthened
Required evaluation?	No
External or internal evaluation	External

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[21] Consortium for Political Process Strengthening comprising National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republic Institute (IRI), and International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).

BACKGROUND

COUNTRY CONTEXT

The BiH democratic transition process continues to be characterized by post-conflict grievances, nationalist rhetoric, and corruption. Since the end of the war, political competition has aligned along ethnic lines, limiting citizens' political alternatives beyond ethnic affiliation. Most of BiH's political discourse revolves around dividing power among the leading political parties representing the three major ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) instead of citizens' priority concerns such as unemployment and corruption,[22] particularly within the judicial system. Coalitions at all levels of government shift frequently, but incumbent parties maintain their positions with the help of vast patronage networks, making it difficult for smaller reform-oriented forces to achieve meaningful breakthroughs.[23] The entrenched and competing interests of the leading political parties perpetuate long-standing political conflicts, hindering reformist political and civic individuals' ability to meaningfully engage in government policy and decisionmaking.

The 2018 general elections saw democratic deficiencies ranging from fraudulent absentee voter registration schemes to Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) concerns about the integrity of the elections and a lack of confidence in the impartiality of all levels of the election administration, largely due to suspected commissioners' political and ethnic biases.[24] After the elections, BiH continued to grapple with the formation of a government, challenged at the Federation of BiH level by controversy over electoral reform and at the state level by conflict over potential North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accession. The prolonged process of government formation has further hindered already halted reform efforts aimed at advancing BiH democratic transition, improving socio-economic conditions, and achieving benchmarks for European Union (EU) candidacy status. This dysfunction contributes to the sense that parties are not acting in the public interest.

SPPG DESCRIPTION AND THEORY OF CHANGE

The Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes (SPPG) activity is a 48-month program designed to improve issue-based campaigning before the elections and policy-driven governance after the elections. By strengthening the capacities of candidates, coalitions, political parties, multi-party groups, and issue-based caucuses to coordinate on shared policy goals, engage in inclusive, responsive policy development, and conduct outreach to citizens, CEPPS was envisaged to foster increased pluralism in BiH's political life and support development and adoption of campaign approaches and good governance practices reflective of citizen concerns. The Activity design is based on the assumption that diverse party activists and elected representatives - across party, entity, and ethnic lines, and including women, youth, and other marginalized groups - share common policy priorities for BiH's reform agenda.

The SPPG's theory of change is specific for each target group (political parties, coalitions, multi-party groups, young and female leaders, Central Election Commission - CEC) and implies that capacity

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[22] 2019 National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions (NSCP)

23 Freedom House 2020 Country Report for BiH, https://freedomhouse.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/freedom-world/2020

[24] Freedom House 2020 Country Report for BiH, https://freedomhouse.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/freedom-world/2019

building of and technical assistance to various political actors and structures will improve representation of citizen interests and advance reform processes[25].

The SPPG interventions fall into four objectives, each with specific sub-objectives:

- Objective 1: To strengthen parties', coalitions', and candidates' capacity to respond to citizen interests in advance of the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections.
  - Sub-Objective 1.1: To improve the capacity and performance of candidates, parties, and coalitions in issue-based campaign skills and techniques.
  - Sub-Objective 1.2: To support parties and/or coalitions in building their policy and campaign platform development capacities to better respond to citizen concerns, particularly in areas of corruption and socio-economic policy.
  - Sub-Objective 1.3: To encourage voter turnout, particularly the youth vote, through get-out-the-vote campaigns.
- Objective 2: Improve governance through policy-driven technical assistance to parties, coalitions, caucuses, and elected officials at various levels of government.
  - Sub-Objective 2.1: To strengthen policymaking and legislative cohesion within political parties.
  - Sub-Objective 2.2: To advance multi-party legislative initiatives and increase stakeholder outreach.
- Objective 3: Enhance skills and capacity of young political actors to take a more visible role in deepening democratic values of BiH society.
  - Sub-Objective 3.1: Ethnic divisions are reduced among young politicians by shifting their attention on policy issues in a cross-party, cross-ethnic environment.
- Objective 4: Support to free and fair election processes.
  - Sub-Objective 4.1: Electoral framework and processes are improved and strengthened.
  - Sub-Objective 4.2: The CEC's capacity is strengthened to fulfill its mandate professionally and transparently.

SPPG intends to achieve its objectives by providing a broad range of technical assistance interventions (e.g., research and analyses, capacity-building interventions – training, mentoring, consultations) to the targeted stakeholders and by fostering cross-party collaboration and horizontal and vertical integration between different government levels and institutions.

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[25] The Award describes the Activity theory of change as follows: "If parties, coalitions, and candidates build their capacities in issue-based platform development, then they will be able to run more strategic and policy-driven campaigns during the 2020 and 2022 elections. If candidates build their capacities to conduct inclusive public outreach, then the elections will be more participatory, competitive, and reflective of citizen priorities. If parties and coalitions build their internal capacities in policy development, then they will be better equipped to address and respond to citizen concerns. If political parties have effective internal mechanisms for inclusive policy development, then they will be able to find areas of common interest and work together across party lines on shared goals that emerge. If coalitions, multi-party groups and caucuses develop clear mechanisms for joint policy development and cross-party dialogue, then they will be able to pursue joint policies in critical reform areas. If cross-party, multi-ethnic parliamentary caucuses are formed based on mutual interest for solving key issues, then political parties will be better able to convert joint policy proposals into legislative action and move the reform process forward. If new talent is cultivated and attention is given to future change makers, then future leaders will be empowered to make progress on the country's current challenges and safeguard the country's future. If electoral processes are brought into compliance with international obligations and if CEC's capacity is strengthened to fulfill its mandate professionally and transparently, then public trust in electoral processes will increase."

SPPG MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING PLAN

SPPG tracks 11 indicators to measure progress in meeting Life of Activity targets (see Exhibit 2).

Exhibit 2. Activity Indicators, with Targets and Actuals for FY 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and Life of Activity Targets

Level of Result	Narrative Summary	Indicators	Targets (actuals)				Life of Activity Targets
			FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	FY 2023	
Activity Purpose	Supported democratic actors' responsiveness to citizen concerns improved.	Number of individuals who receive SPPG capacity-building training.	410 (380)	148	333	25	916
		Number of issue-based policy proposals developed by parties and/or coalitions during the pre-election period with SPPG support.	17 (1)		8		25
		Number of previously identified recommendations on improving electoral processes that are accepted by the CEC	2 (1)		2		4
Activity Outcome/Output 1.1	Parties', coalitions', and candidates' capacity to respond to citizen interests in advance of the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections strengthened.	Number of issue-based electoral campaigns ran with SPPG assistance	7 (7)		7		14
Activity Outcome/Output 1.2	Governance capacity of parties, coalitions, caucuses and elected officials improved. .	Number of consensus-building forums (multi-party, civil/security sector, and/or civil/political) held with SPPG Assistance	95 (21)	54	63	37	249
		Number of joint issue-based policy proposals developed by multi-party groups, issue-based caucuses, or multi-party parliamentary initiatives developed with SPPG support	5 (2)	17	7	6	35
		Number of internal reforms adopted by parties to improve internal cohesion and communication	0	0	0	5	5
Activity Outcome/Output 1.3	Skills and capacity of politically engaged youth to take a more visible role in deepening democratic values of BiH society enhanced.	Number of outreach activities that are implemented by ALPI members without SPPG assistance	0	30	50	20	100
Activity Outcome/Output 1.4	Free and fair election processes supported	Number of laws or amendments, by-laws, procedures, and policies to ensure credible elections drafted with SPPG technical assistance	1 (1)	1	1	1	4
		Number of civil society organizations (CSOs) receiving SPPG assistance	2 (0)	2	2	2	8

	engaged in advocacy interventions					
	Number of individuals receiving civic education through SPPG-assisted programs	5000 (0)	1000	5000	1000	12000

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation team will answer the following evaluation questions:

1. To what extent has SPPG strengthened parties', coalitions', and candidates' capacity for issue-based campaigning and policy and campaign platform development in advance of the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections?

2. To what extent have issue-based caucuses built their capacities to promote anti-corruption reforms?

3. To what extent can the current SPPG design contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth? Sub-question: Is there any evidence that SPPG interventions contributed to increasing women and youth voter turnout in the 2020 local elections?

4. To what extent has SPPG contributed to increased cross-party cooperation by ALPI members?

5. How have CEPPS/International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) recommendations been used by electoral stakeholders to support electoral reforms prior to and after the 2020 elections?

6. Which interventions related to the development of individual political parties' issue-based policy development capacity and enhancement of cross-party collaboration are most likely to bring about sustainable results (and which produce the results difficult to sustain)?

EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The team will use a mixed-method data collection approach to assess the effectiveness of SPPG's capacity building interventions and their early outcomes. The proposed methodology ensures systematic and efficient collection of data from the following sources:

- **Activity documents** (including the Activity Award; Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plan; work plans; progress reports; lists of beneficiaries, experts, and other stakeholders involved in Activity implementation; documents produced by the Activity and its beneficiaries)

- **Secondary documentation relevant to the sector** (e.g., MEASURE-BiH/MEASURE II research reports; international organizations and civil society organizations (CSOs) reports and analyses; CEC statistics).

- **Key informant interviews (KIIs)** with USAID/BiH, SPPG, relevant international and donor organizations, Activity beneficiaries (representatives of political parties, coalitions,

multi-party groups, CEC staff, government agencies and institutions), and other stakeholders. The sample of key informants (KIs) and interview guide will be presented in the evaluation work plan and subject to USAID/BiH comments.

- **Focus group discussions (FGDs)** with beneficiaries, representatives of media, CSOs, and citizens. Draft FG guide(s) will be presented in the evaluation work plan and subject to USAID/BiH comments.

- (Optional) **Online survey(s)** of SPPG direct and indirect beneficiaries (representatives of assisted political parties) and representatives of multi-party groups, with a focus on individuals who received SPPG training.

Exhibit 3 presents the evaluation matrix, which details the methodological approach used to answer each evaluation question. The evaluation team will use Activity and secondary documentation, as well as primary data collected through KIIs, FGDs, and an online survey to gather and triangulate information and best inform the evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The evaluation team will review the Activity documentation; record, transcribe, and code the KIIs and FGDs; analyze and compare the survey data across different groups of Activities' beneficiaries; review the secondary data and compare them against the primary data.

EXHIBIT 3. EVALUATION MATRIX		
EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	DATA SOURCES/DATA COLLECTION METHODS	DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH
1. To what extent has SPPG strengthened parties', coalitions', and candidates' capacity for issue-based campaigning and policy and campaign platform development in advance of the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections?	Activity and secondary documents; KIIs; FGDs; mini survey of assisted political party members	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding, descriptive survey analysis
2. To what extent have issue-based caucuses built their capacities to promote anti-corruption reforms?	Activity and secondary documents; KIIs; FGDs	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding
3. To what extent can the current SPPG design contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth? Sub-question: Is there any evidence that SPPG interventions contributed to increasing women and youth voter turnout in the 2020 local elections?	Activity and secondary documents; KIIs; FGDs	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding
4. To what extent has SPPG contributed to increased cross-party cooperation by ALPI members?	Activity and secondary documents; KIIs; FGDs; mini survey of assisted political party members	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding, descriptive survey analysis
5. How have CEPPS/IFES recommendations been utilized by electoral stakeholders to support electoral reforms prior and post the 2020 elections?	Activity and secondary documents; KIIs; FGDs	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding
6. Which interventions related to the development of individual political parties' issue-based policy development capacity and enhancement of cross-party collaboration are most likely to bring about sustainable results (and which produce the results difficult to sustain)?	Activity and secondary documents; KIIs; FGDs; mini surveys	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding, descriptive survey analysis

EVALUATION LIMITATIONS

Potential limitations of this evaluation include:

- **Response bias:** For instance, representatives of political parties may overstate or understate the effectiveness of capacity building interventions, and young politicians may overstate or understate improvements in their collaboration. The evaluation team will triangulate data across multiple data sources to verify the credibility of findings, and use rigorous methodology to capture the Activity achievements and the SPPG contributions to these results. The evaluation team will ensure that respondents understand that their true opinions are the most appreciated. The evaluation team will also ensure that respondents are aware of confidentiality of any information provided.

- **Interviewer bias:** Interviewers' behavior and reactions may lead KIs to respond in a certain way. Therefore, the interviewers will be trained to ask questions in a non-leading way. In addition to avoiding any potentially leading questions, the evaluation team will ensure that respondents understand that their true opinions are the most appreciated and that their responses are confidential.

- **No (access to) data:** Availability of and access to data are particularly concerning when assessing effects of SPPG interventions on women and youth voter turnout, because data on voter turnout is not publicly available. The evaluation team will approach the CEC with the request for data. Should we be unable to obtain the official data, we will use the NSCP data to assess the potential changes in women and youth voter turnout.

- **Issues arising due to epidemiological situation:** Due to a serious epidemiological situation in the country, the evaluation team intends to conduct this evaluation remotely. This may limit access to some stakeholders unwilling to participate in online meetings or focus groups, or it may bias their responses. The evaluation team will consider and discuss all possible options and develop solutions acceptable to all parties involved without compromising the safety of any evaluation team members or key informants.

DELIVERABLES AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

All deliverables will be submitted electronically and in English. The deliverables will include:

1. **A detailed evaluation work plan**
   The evaluation work plan will include: 1) a detailed evaluation design matrix (including the key questions, methods, and data sources used to address each question and the data analysis plan for each); 2) draft data collection instruments (KII and FGD guides and survey questionnaires); 3) the list of potential KIs; 4) known limitations to the evaluation design; 5) a dissemination plan; 6) the anticipated schedule and logistical arrangements; and 7) a list of the members of the evaluation team, with their respective roles and responsibilities.

2. **Presentation of preliminary findings**
   MEASURE II will present a summary of preliminary findings and recommendations to USAID/BiH.

3. **Draft evaluation report**

The draft report will be consistent with the USAID Evaluation Report Requirements (ADS REFERENCE 201MAH, at
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/201mah.pdf
https://www.usaid.gov/ads/policy/200/201mah), USAID's evaluation policy (https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/USAIDEvaluationPolicy.pdf) and take into account criteria to ensure the quality of the evaluation report specified in ADS REFERENCE 201MAA at
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/201maa.pdf. ADS Chapter 201 - Operational Policy for the Program Cycle (usaid.gov)

4. **Final evaluation report**

After USAID provides comments on the initial draft to the evaluation team, the team will address comments and submit a revised final report within 10 calendar days. The final report will be up to 30 pages long, excluding any annexes.

5. **Evaluation follow-up workshop**

Upon the Mission's approval of the final report, MEASURE II will organize a follow-up workshop to discuss use of evaluation findings and conclusions, as well as application of recommendations to ongoing and/or future USAID/BiH development programming. The workshop will strengthen use of evidence and facilitate improved collaborating, learning, and adapting (CLA) practices for USAID/BiH.

TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team is expected to include six members. A Project Manager and Technical Expert will coordinate all tasks. Exhibit 4 presents the tentative key staff team composition and qualifications. Additional MEASURE II staff research analysts will also support this evaluation as team members.

EXHIBIT 4. KEY TEAM MEMBERS AND THEIR KEY QUALIFICATIONS	
POSITION	KEY QUALIFICATIONS
International Consultant: Subject Matter Expert/ Evaluation Co-Lead	Subject matter expertise in political and democratic processes and parliamentary strengthening; experience in evaluating CEPPS programs.
MEASURE II Staff Member: Project Management and Technical Expert/Evaluation Co-Lead	Project management skills; expertise in evaluation methodologies, data collection and analysis techniques; familiarity with the SPPG program.
USAID/W DRG Office Consultant: Subject-Matter Expert/Evaluation Team Member	Subject matter expert in political and democratic processes and election reforms; familiarity with BiH political and electoral system.
USAID/W DRG Office Consultant: Evaluation Expert/Evaluation Advisor	Expertise in applying rigorous evaluation methods and conducting evaluations according to USAID's standards and requirements.
Local Consultant: Subject Matter Expert/Evaluation Team Member	Subject matter expertise in local political system and democratic processes, political party dynamics and structures; research experience.

Support for the evaluation team will include:

- Home Office (HO) and Field Office (FO) support in reviewing evaluation deliverables and conducting general oversight of the evaluation process;

- HO CLA experts will contribute to applying CLA principles throughout the evaluation process;
- Transcribers experienced in transcribing audio recordings from KIIs and FGDs;
- Translators to ensure the non-BCS speaking team members understand any information provided in the local language; and
- An Office Manager to provide logistical support for contracting, payments, and field work.

The evaluation work plan will elaborate in detail the team composition and level of effort for each team member.

SCHEDULE

Exhibit 5 provides the overview of the tentative evaluation timeline.

EXHIBIT 5 TENTATIVE EVALUATION TIMELINE	
TENTATIVE DATES	TASKS AND DELIVERABLES
April 30, 2021	Submit a draft evaluation work plan (with data collection instruments) to USAID/BiH
May 3-7, 2021	Logistical preparation, scheduling KIIs interviews and FGDs, online survey preparation, piloting data collection instruments
May 10-June 4, 2021	Data collection through KIIs, FGDs, and online survey KIIs and FGDs transcription Initial data analysis Review of Activity documentation Review of secondary data
May 25, 2021	Evaluation briefing (optional)
May 26-June 13, 2021	Continuing data collection and analysis
June 14, 2021	Presentation to USAID/BiH to discuss the preliminary findings and recommendations
June 14-30, 2021	Finalize transcription of interviews Finalize data analysis Draft report
July 7, 2021	Submit the draft evaluation report to USAID
July/August 2021 (up to 10 days upon receiving comments)	Submit the final evaluation report to USAID
September 2021	Evaluation follow-up workshop

ANNEX 2: DETAILED METHODOLOGY

This section of the report details the main tasks the ET carried out during each phase of the evaluation. The ET conducted this evaluation from April to August 2021. The period comprised approximately two weeks for a desk review of SPPG documents and drafting the Workplan and evaluation methodology, including developing data collection instruments, protocols, and other planning for fieldwork. The evaluation period also accounts for a week of fieldwork logistical preparation, 5 weeks of data collection, 1 week of data analysis, and 2 weeks of report drafting. Following USAID review and comments on the draft report, the ET had 2 weeks to revise the report.

PHASE ONE: PLANNING AND PREPARATION

This independent midterm evaluation began on April 19, 2021, when the ET commenced document review and began preparing the evaluation Workplan, which ET submitted to USAID/BiH on May 5, 2021. During the planning phase, the ET reviewed and discussed the SPPG evaluation SOW, clarified team members' roles and responsibilities, reviewed SPPG documents, prepared the Workplan, and formulated the evaluation design.

PHASE TWO: DATA COLLECTION

The ET used a qualitative evaluation design consisting of document review, interviews with 58 key informants, 12 FGDs) with 50 individuals, and 2 online surveys. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ET conducted all data collection remotely.

Annex 4 presents the data collection protocols. The protocols 1) ensure the ET addresses all key issues during data collection; 2) elicit rich, sometimes unanticipated, information from respondents; and 3) help organize information in a form that the ET can efficiently analyze. The protocols consist of questions that address and derive from the EQs, as well as from the ET's document review, initial discussions with USAID, and evaluation design knowledge.

Data Collection Methods

Document Review

The ET conducted a review of available SPPG documents to better understand the Activity design and implementation, extract findings relevant to the EQs, and inform the data collection protocol development so that instruments appropriately supplement or cross-check information in the background documents. The ET reviewed the following document types:

- Quarterly reports for SPPG
- SPPG annual work plans
- SPPG monitoring and evaluation plan
- SPPG program description
- USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy for BiH
- CCPI final and quarterly reports
- Outside analyses and studies, e.g., Difference in Development Priorities of Male Versus Female Politicians and Voters, National Survey of Citizens Perceptions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Gender Analysis

Key stakeholders provided additional relevant documents for ET review during fieldwork.

Key Informant Interviews

Due to the pandemic, KIIs were conducted through Zoom. Interviews with USAID, SPPG personnel, and other donors and implementers were conducted in English. Because two evaluation team members were based in the United States, interviews that took place in the morning local time (08:00-13:00 Central European Summer Time/02:00-07:00 Eastern Daylight Time) were conducted in the local language by local team members based in BiH. They shared typed and translated interview notes with the U.S.-based team members in a timely fashion during fieldwork. Interviews

during the afternoon local time (13:00-18:00 CEST/07:00-12:00 EDT) were conducted in English or BCS, with simultaneous interpretation provided through the online platform when needed.

The ET conducted KIIs with key stakeholder groups, including officials from election committees; members of parliament at the state, entity, and cantonal levels; and mayoral candidates in the 2020 local elections. Findings from KIIs contributed to the ET's responses to all EQs.

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

The ET organized 12 FGDs using the Zoom platform. The FGD participants included members of youth groups supported by SPPG; women and youth local council candidates; parliamentary issue-based caucuses; and outside stakeholders including civil society and journalists. These discussions gathered background information on the effectiveness and utility of SPPG interventions and contributions to issue-based policy work.

Online surveys

The ET designed two Web-based surveys to better understand the effectiveness of SPPG interventions. The respondents included political party staffers trained by SPPG or by participants in the SPPG ToT component and municipal council candidates trained by SPPG. Annex 4 presents data collection instruments used for the KIIs, FGDs, and surveys.

The ET obtained informed consent from all collocutors participating in this evaluation. The ET used information obtained from the SPPG beneficiaries and other participants only for learning purposes within this evaluation. Beneficiaries' names or other private information have not been shared with any third parties or published in the evaluation report.

PHASE THREE: DATA ANALYSIS

The team co-leads oversaw and managed the systematic analysis of qualitative data. The ET's data analysis approach used data triangulation to crosscheck results, and applied several analysis methods to provide evidence for the evaluation's findings and conclusions.

Data Analysis Processes

ET members took detailed notes of KIIs and FGDs, cleaning and sharing electronic summaries on a rolling basis throughout fieldwork. Team members conducted internal debriefs during fieldwork to discuss progress and make any adjustments as needed in the evaluation schedule. The team discussed evidence collected to help answer the EQs, as well as identifying any discrepancies. The team also identified any emerging patterns and themes that were helpful in developing the analysis coding scheme. To the extent allowed by participants, the interviews were recorded, transcribed, and translated into English. The ET compared the notes with transcripts to maximize the quality of findings.

The ET captured preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations (FCR) in a matrix that categorized analysis by EQ. The matrix tallied themes that arose from the interviews and included metadata, such as respondent type or interview type (KII or FGD). This enabled the ET to look for trends within and across sub-groups. The matrix ensured that the ET prepared a systematic and thorough response to each EQ, verified preliminary analysis accounts for gender and social dimensions, identified any gaps where the ET needed additional clarification or analysis, and served as the basis for developing the evaluation report.

Data Analysis Methods

The ET employed several data analysis methods to identify key findings from the collected data, as well as to draw conclusions and make recommendations for SPPG in the final 2 years of the activity. The type of analyses depended on the specific data assessed (e.g., content analysis for qualitative KII and FGD data). Analysis methods included:

1. Content Analysis – Entailed the ET's intensive review and coding of KII and FGD data to identify and highlight notable examples of SPPG successes (or lack of successes) that contributed to the (or inhibited) achievement of its objectives.
2. Gap Analysis – The ET examined which aspects of SPPG, if any, fell short of anticipated performance, and the likely factors contributing to these gaps.
3. Comparative Analysis – The ET undertook comparisons of SPPG results across stakeholder groups to assess either convergence or divergence in perspectives.
4. Gender Analysis – All data the ET collected through KIIs and FGDs were disaggregated by sex and analyzed for effects on both male and female beneficiaries to show any significant differences.

Data Triangulation

The ET employed analytical triangulation approaches to developing the findings and conclusions. Triangulation enabled the ET to cross-verify and cross-validate findings that emerged from using the above data collection methods and data sources to validate responses and identify correlations among findings to determine SPPG's overall effectiveness.

The ET designed data collection protocols with the same or similar questions across its KIIs (for various stakeholder groups) and FGDs. This facilitated data triangulation because each method/stakeholder group addressed subsets of the same EQs, and their testimony validated or refuted that of the other techniques/stakeholders. This approach also enabled the ET to strengthen the potential linkages and accuracy of its data if the results obtained through one method or from one stakeholder group were less conclusive than those obtained through another method or stakeholder group.

EVALUATION MATRIX

Exhibit 6 below presents the evaluation matrix with a detailed description of data sources, data collection, and analysis approaches for each evaluation question.

Under Evaluation Question 1, the ET assessed the progress the Activity made in building capacity of assisted political parties, coalitions, and candidates to design and implement issue-based election campaigns and campaign platforms and to design policies in coalitions or multi-party groups. The ET focused on assessing beneficiaries' experiences with various SPPG interventions and collected examples of how they used the newly acquired knowledge and skills during the 2020 pre-election campaigns, their results, and lessons they learned for the 2022 elections. The ET used the Activity documentation, KIIs and FGDs with USAID, IPs, and beneficiaries (particularly, individuals trained as trainers) and conducted an online survey with party staff and municipal council candidates who received training.

To address Evaluation Question 2, the ET investigated whether SPPG has implemented any capacity-building interventions with anti-corruption or other caucuses to improve their capacity to facilitate anti-corruption reforms. Because the ET found that SPPG did not implement such interventions, the ET investigated the reasons and developed recommendations for potential future activities.

The ET addressed Evaluation Question 3 by looking into the activity theory of change on the topic, which states, "If candidates build their capacities to conduct inclusive public outreach, then the elections will be more participatory, competitive, and reflective of citizen priorities". The ET examined factors that hinder women and youth political leadership and voting. The ET conducted focus groups with women and youth to explore the factors behind their political engagement and voting behaviors, enabling conclusions about SPPG's potential contribution to voter turnout among women and youth.

Under Evaluation Question 4, the ET assessed the results of the interventions aiming to increase cross-party collaboration among participants in ALPI. The ET addressed this question by reviewing

the Activity documents, including the ALPI joint outreach activities, and conducting FGDs with ALPI members. The ET also explored the extent of ALPI's actions in focus groups with media and journalists.

The ET reviewed relevant Activity documents, focusing on recommendations formulated by SPPG, and interviewed several CEC staff members to address Evaluation Question 5. The ET analyzed interventions related to improving cybersecurity, a particular interest to the Mission. The ET investigated CEC officials' views about the SPPG's recommendations and assistance, the extent to which they have implemented these recommendations, and lessons learned for the 2022 elections and future CEC work.

To address Evaluation Question 6, the ET examined the four main interventions that aim to enhance cross-party collaboration: 1) Issue-based parliamentary caucuses; 2) Multi-party working groups; 3) Youth groups, including ALPI; 4) The Parliamentary Expert Support Initiative. In particular, the ET explored to what extent European Integration and Security Caucus members increased their engagement with other levels of government. The ET conducted focus groups with members of these entities to learn about interventions leading to improved results in cross-party cooperation. The ET also interviewed political party members to analyze the sustainability of their issue-based policy development capacity. The ET strengthened the primary data by reviewing the relevant Activity documents. The ET explored why some interventions work better than others in producing such outcomes and which interventions are most likely to secure solid local ownership and sustainable results.

EXHIBIT 6 EVALUATION MATRIX			
EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION METHODS	DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH
3. To what extent has SPPG strengthened parties', coalitions', and candidates' capacity for issue-based campaigning and policy and campaign platform development in advance of the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections?	1. Activity and secondary documents: USAID/BiH's CDCS; SPPG Award, work plans, progress reports, MEL Plan; CCPI progress reports; MEASURE II and other secondary documents 2. KIIs with USAID; CEPPS; donor/ international organizations; CEPPS experts/trainers 3. FGDs with SPPG-trained trainers; media; journalists 4. Mini surveys of political party staffers trained by ToT trainers; municipal council candidates trained by SPPG; and political party staffers and party poll watchers trained by SPPG.	KIIs, focus groups, mini online surveys	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding, descriptive survey analysis
7. To what extent have issue-based caucuses built their capacities to promote anti-corruption reforms?	1. Activity and secondary documents: USAID/BiH's CDCS; SPPG Award, work plans, progress reports, MEL Plan; CCPI progress reports; MEASURE II and other secondary documents 2. KIIs with USAID; CEPPS; donor/ international organizations; CEPPS experts/trainers; issue-based caucus members 3. FGDs with issue-based caucuses	KIIs, focus groups	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding

8. To what extent can the current SPPG design contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth? Sub-question: Is there any evidence that SPPG interventions contributed to increasing women and youth voter turnout in the 2020 local elections?	1. Activity and secondary documents: USAID/BiH's CDCS; SPPG Award, work plans, progress reports, MEL Plan; CCPI progress reports; MEASURE II and other secondary documents; CEC statistics (if available) 2. KIIs with USAID; CEPPS; donor/ international organizations; CEPPS experts/trainers; CEC staff 3. FGDs with women and youth	KIIs, focus groups	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding
9. To what extent has SPPG contributed to increased cross-party cooperation by ALPI members?	1. Activity and secondary documents: USAID/BiH's CDCS; SPPG Award, work plans, progress reports, MEL Plan; CCPI progress reports; MEASURE II and other secondary documents 2. KIIs with USAID; CEPPS; donor/ international organizations; CEPPS experts/trainers 3. FGDs with ALPI members, media and journalists	KIIs, focus groups	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding,

10. How have electoral stakeholders used CEPPS/IFES recommendations to support electoral reforms prior and post the 2020 elections?	1. Activity and secondary documents: USAID/BiH's CDCS; SPPG Award, work plans, progress reports, MEL Plan; CCPI progress reports; MEASURE II and other secondary documents 2. KIIs with USAID; CEPPS; donor/ international organizations; CEPPS experts/trainers; CEC staff 3. Mini survey of election observers	KIIs, mini online survey	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding, descriptive survey analysis
11. Which interventions related to the development of individual political parties' issue-based policy development capacity and enhancement of cross-party collaboration are most likely to bring about sustainable results (and which produce the results difficult to sustain)?	1. Activity and secondary documents: USAID/BiH's CDCS; SPPG Award, work plans, progress reports, MEL Plan; CCPI progress reports; MEASURE II and other secondary documents 2. KIIs with USAID; CEPPS; donor/ international organizations; CEPPS experts/trainers; ToTs; MPs; CEC staff 3. FGDs with multi-party groups 4. Mini surveys of political party staffers trained by ToT trainers, municipal council candidates trained by CEPPS, and political party staffers/poll watchers trained by CEPPS	KIIs, focus groups, mini online survey	Desk review, KII/FGD transcript coding, descriptive survey analysis

Following fieldwork and data analysis, the ET will present the preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations at a remote out-briefing to USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina on June 16, 2021.

MEASURE II submitted a draft evaluation report answering all of the EQs on July 14, 2021. The ET will revise the draft report to address USAID comments (and CEPPS comments, if USAID so requests). MEASURE II will submit the final evaluation report within 10 business days of receiving feedback from reviewers. The Mission and the ET understand that availability of personnel in July and August may necessitate slight modification of these deadlines.

The evaluation follow-up workshop will be scheduled in August 2021 with USAID/BiH, implementing partners, and other stakeholders that USAID may invite. USAID/BiH will disseminate the final evaluation report. Upon final approval, MEASURE II will upload the report to the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC).

LIMITATIONS

Activity Timeframe

SPPG did not begin work on several interventions until March 2021, after the predecessor CCPI activity ended. As a result, the ET had only 1 month of reporting data on those interventions, because the January-March 2021 quarterly report was the most recent progress report available during the evaluation.

This limitation was particularly relevant to SPPG work with anti-corruption caucuses and ALPI, which were the subjects of an evaluation question. To answer those evaluation questions despite limited data, the ET reviewed activities under CCPI and used that information to formulate interview questions about possible future anti-corruption interventions. The ET also reviewed SPPG work with ALPI alumni, both alumni engagement with the third generation of ALPI participants and other SPPG engagement with alumni.

Bias

- **Response bias:** Because beneficiaries may have overstated or understated the effectiveness of capacity-building interventions or improvements in their skill sets, the ET triangulated data across multiple data sources to verify the credibility of findings and used rigorous methodology to capture the Activity achievements and the SPPG contributions to these results. The ET ensured that respondents understand that their true opinions are the most appreciated, and ensured that respondents were aware of the confidentiality of any information they provided.

- **Interviewer bias:** Interviewers' behavior and reactions may lead KIs to respond in a certain way. Therefore, the interviewers asked questions in a non-leading way. In addition to avoiding any potentially leading questions, the ET made sure that respondents understood that their true opinions were the most appreciated and that their responses are confidential.

- **Data access:** Availability of and access to data are particularly concerning when it comes to assessing the effects of SPPG interventions on women and youth voter turnout, because data on voter turnout is not publicly available. The ET obtained some data after requesting them from the CEC, and used data from the 2013 census or other sources when necessary. The biggest gap was the lack of data for the 2016 municipal elections, which made it impossible to compare 2016 and 2020 municipal election data.

ANNEX 3: INFORMATION SOURCES

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1. Activity's Leader Cooperative Agreement: AID-OAA-L-15-00007
2. Activity's Associate Cooperative Agreement: #72016819LA00001
3. USAID SPPG Year 1 First Quarterly Report
4. USAID SPPG Year 1 Second Quarterly Report
5. USAID SPPG Year 1 Third Quarterly Report
6. USAID SPPG Year 1 Fourth Quarterly Report
7. USAID SPPG Year 2 First Quarterly Report
8. USAID SPPG Year 1 Work Plan
9. USAID SPPG Year 2 Work Plan
10. USAID SPPG Monitoring and Evaluation plan, April 2020
11. USAID SPPG COVID-19 Activity Risk Mitigation Plans
12. CEPPS/IFES Information Integrity and Trust in the Election Process and the Central Election Commission. Bosnia and Herzegovina
13. CEPPS/NDI Evaluation Report, Training of Trainers
14. CEPPS/NDI Political Campaign Planning Manual
15. CEPPS/IRI Joint statement by leaders of the Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute
16. CEPPS/IFES Summary Report for Focus Group Discussions on Electoral Disinformation
17. CEPPS/IFES Instruction on operations of the election management bodies on the Election Day under extraordinary circumstances and state of natural disaster
18. Baseline study on barriers to political participation of women in BiH, UNDP, December 2019
19. National Survey of Citizens' Perception (NSCP) 2020, MEASURE II, Preliminary Data Findings
20. Gender (IN)equality in 2020 Local Elections- Issue Brief, MAY 2021
21. Representation of women in local government in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 2020 elections, Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFP), April 2021
22. Youth participation in national parliaments, Inter-Parliamentary Union. For Democracy. For Everyone, 2021
23. Monthly ranking of women in national parliaments, Inter-Parliamentary Union. For Democracy. For Everyone April 2021
24. Election Indicators 2018, CEC, Sarajevo 2019
25. Freedom in the world 2020, Freedom House Country Report Bosnia and Herzegovina
26. National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2019, MEASURE II, June 2020
27. Gender analysis for Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2019 follow-up, MEASURE II, August 2019
28. National Youth Survey in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018 (NYS-BiH), MEASURE II, July 2018
29. Difference in development priorities of male versus female politicians and voters: evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina, MEASURE II, September 2017
30. Bosnia and Herzegovina 2020 Report, EU, Brussels, 6.10.2020 SWD(2020) 350 final
31. 2020 Country Report Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2020, 2020
32. BASELINE study on barriers to political participation of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Women and UNDP, 2020
33. Violence Against Women in Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Western Balkans Democracy Initiative, Sarajevo, May 2019
34. Bosnia and Herzegovina – elections with surprising results, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, November 2020
35. Executive Summary Cybersecurity and Elections Assessment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, IFES, March 2020
36. IFES COVID-19 Briefing Series: Safeguarding Health and Elections, IFES, 2020
37. 2018 General Elections - Challenges of the Electoral Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, CEC, Sarajevo, April 2019
38. Disinformation and Electoral Integrity - A Guidance Document for NDI Elections Programs, NDI, May 2019

KEY INFORMANTS

1. Donor (4)
2. International organizations (10)
3. Embassies (3)
4. Implementing partners (16)
5. MPs (3)
6. Local election mayoral candidates (12)
7. Caucus members (14)
8. Young candidates (3)
9. Female candidates (3)
10. Interim Investigative Committee on the Judiciary IICJ (2)
11. ToT (4)
12. ALPI participants and alumni (13)
13. Parliamentary Expert Support Initiative members (4)
14. CSO representatives (6)
15. Media representatives (8)
16. CEC officials (3)
17. Political party representatives, survey respondents (15)
18. Local election local council candidates, survey respondents (29)

ANNEX 4: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENTS

Key Informant Interviews

Purpose: Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. My name is [NAME]. I am a researcher from MEASURE II, USAID/BiH's Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity. Our team is in Bosnia and Herzegovina to conduct a study about the work of a USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina project known as the Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes, or SPPG for short. Implemented since 2019 by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), SPPG provides support to elections and political processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. You have been asked to participate today so that we can learn more about the support your institution received from SPPG/your involvement in the implementation of the SPPG program. We are speaking with about 50 individuals who participated in the program either as implementers or recipients of program services. We would like your honest impressions, opinions and thoughts about various issues related to this Activity's implementation and outcomes. We are independent consultants who have no affiliation with those who implemented SPPG nor do we represent the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Procedures: If you agree to participate, we ask you to discuss your experience and opinion of the activities and services implemented under the SPPG program. The interview will take about one hour of your time. Although USAID may decide to publish the evaluation findings, all of your answers will be kept confidential. Nothing you tell us will be attributed to any individual person. Rather, the report will include only a composite of all of the answers received by all of the individuals we interview. Although we may use quotes, none of the individuals interviewed will be named in the report.

Risks/Benefits: There are no significant risks to your participation in this study. You will not receive any direct benefit or compensation for participating in this study. Although this study will not benefit you personally, we hope that our results will help improve potential future institutional capacity-building programs for government institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Voluntary Participation: Participation in this interview is completely voluntary. You do not have to agree to be in this study. You are free to end the interview at any time or to decline to answer

any question which you do not wish to answer. If you decline to participate in the interview, no one will be informed of this.

Do you have any questions at this time? [Interviewer should answer any questions]

Permission to Proceed: I understand the purpose of the interview as outlined above and understand that I can withdraw from the interview at any time and for any reason. I agree to participate in the interview (Evaluator records).

☐ Yes   ☐ No

Permission to Record:

☐ Yes   ☐ No

Initials of evaluator to indicate receipt of verbal consent: _____

Date: _____

Focus Group Discussions

Purpose: Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. My name is [NAME]. I am a researcher from MEASURE II, USAID/BiH's Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity. Our team is in Bosnia and Herzegovina to conduct a study about the work of a USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina project known as the Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes, or SPPG for short. Implemented since 2019 by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, SPPG provides support to elections and political processes. You have been invited to participate in this discussion because you participated in SPPG training. We would like your opinions and thoughts about SPPG or interventions that you attended. We are independent consultants who have no affiliation with SPPG or the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Procedures: If you agree to participate, we ask you to discuss your experience and opinion of the activities and services implemented under the SPPG program. The FGD will take up to two hours of your time. Although USAID may decide to publish the evaluation findings, all of your answers will be kept confidential. Nothing you tell us will be attributed to any individual person. Although we may use quotes, none of the individuals interviewed will be named in the report. However, as this is a group setting, to preserve confidentiality, we ask you not to share anything we discuss here today with anyone outside of this group.

Ground Rules: While the ground rules will vary depending on the FGD, they will generally include:

- Everyone is encouraged to share their ideas, and the FGD is stronger if everyone participates.
- There are no wrong answers, and everyone's perspective is equally valued.
- The ideas shared during the FGD should not be shared outside the FGD with non-participants in order to respect participants' privacy.
- Disagreements about ideas can be valuable and productive, but personal attacks will not be tolerated.

After establishing these ground rules, the moderator should ask if there are any questions or concerns participants have, and these issues should be addressed as a group before moving on.

Risks/Benefits: There are no significant risks to your participation in this study. You will not receive any direct benefit or compensation for participating in this study. Although this study will not benefit you personally, we hope that our results will help improve potential future institutional capacity building programs for government institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Voluntary Participation: Participation in this interview is completely voluntary. You do not have to agree to be in this study. You are free to leave the FGD at any time or to decline to answer any question which you do not wish to answer. If you decline to participate, no one will be informed of this. Do you have any questions at this time? [Interviewer should answer any questions]

Permission to Proceed: I understand the purpose of the interview as outlined above and understand that I can withdraw from the interview at any time and for any reason. I agree to participate in the interview (Evaluator records).

☐ Yes   ☐ No

Permission to Record:
☐ Yes   ☐ No

Initials of evaluator to indicate receipt of verbal consent: _____

Date: _____

USAID

1. Pease describe your overall experience with and impressions of SPPG.

2. Why id SPPG begin prior to the end of the CCPI program?

3. In the run-up to the 2020 municipal elections, how did SPPG strengthen issue-based campaigning and development of policy-based party platforms?

4. Have parties developed internal capacities to formulate common policies with coalition partners or other multi-party groups? What is the evidence that this has happened?

5. Has SPPG done any work to support the anti-corruption caucuses that were initiated by its predecessor activities, Catalyzing Cross-Party Initiatives (CCPI) and the Domestic Election Monitoring Activity? How would you describe SPPG's work in terms of anti-corruption reforms?

6. Has SPPG done any work with the Central Election Commission or other bodies to combat abuse of state resources or to enhance campaign finance oversight?

7. What have been the obstacles to political leadership and voting by women and youth?

8. How has SPPG addressed those obstacles?

9. How can SPPG, as it is currently designed, contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth?

10. Is there evidence that SPPG contributed to increasing women and youth voter turnout in the 2020 elections?

11. One element of the SPPG theory of change holds that: "If candidates build their capacities to conduct inclusive public outreach, then the elections will be more participatory, competitive and reflective of citizen priorities." In your experience, is this theory of change reasonable to increase women and youth voter turnout in BiH context?

12. How have participants in the Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute contributed to increasing cross-party cooperation? To what extent have they improved cross-ethnic collaboration?

13. How did the Central Elections Commission and other electoral stakeholders utilize IFES recommendations to support electoral reforms, both before and after the 2020 elections?

14. To what extent has SPPG support enabled the CEC to strengthen its capacity and ability to adapt to emerging issues throughout the electoral process?

15. Which recommendations should be the focus of CEC and other stakeholders as they prepare for the 2022 national elections?

16. How likely is it that issue-based parliamentary caucuses will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023?

17. How likely is it that multi-party working groups will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023?

18. How likely is it that the cross-party collaboration promoted by youth groups like ALPI and Making Youth Voices Heard will be sustained by participants after SPPG ends in 2023?

19. How likely is it that the Parliamentary Expert Support Initiative (PESI) will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023?

20. How sustainable are the internal policy development capacities of individual political parties that have received NDI support?

21. In your opinion, what are the most significant outcomes achieved by the SPPG by now?

22. To your knowledge, which SPPG interventions have been the most useful to beneficiaries in producing desired outcomes?

23. What would you like to see achieved by SPPG in its final two years of operation?

CEPPS

1. Please describe your overall experience with SPPG.

2. In the run-up to the 2020 municipal elections, how did SPPG strengthen issue-based campaigning and development of policy-based party platforms? (NDI and IRI)

3. Have parties developed internal capacities to formulate common policies with coalition partners or other multi-party groups? (NDI and IRI) What is the evidence that this has happened?

4. What has the SPPG done so far in terms of the anti-corruption reforms? Has SPPG done any work to support the anti-corruption caucuses that were initiated by its predecessor activities, Catalyzing Cross-Party Initiatives (CCPI) and the Domestic Election Monitoring Activity? (NDI and IRI)

5. Has SPPG done any work with the Central Election Commission or other bodies to combat abuse of state resources or to enhance campaign finance oversight? (IFES)

6. What have been the obstacles to political leadership and voting by women and youth?

7. How has SPPG addressed those obstacles?

8. How can SPPG, as it is currently designed, contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth?

9. Is there evidence that SPPG contributed to increasing women and youth voter turnout in the 2020 elections?

10. One element of the SPPG theory of change holds that: "If candidates build their capacities to conduct inclusive public outreach, then the elections will be more participatory, competitive and reflective of citizen priorities." Is this theory of change reasonable to increase women and youth voter turnout?

11. How have participants in the Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute contributed to increasing cross-party cooperation? (IRI) To what extent have they improved cross-ethnic collaboration?

12. How did the Central Elections Commission and other electoral stakeholders utilize IFES recommendations to support electoral reforms, both before and after the 2020 elections? (IFES)

13. To what extent has SPPG support enabled the CEC to strengthen its capacity and ability to adapt to emerging issues throughout the electoral process?

14. Which recommendations should be the focus of CEC and other stakeholders as they prepare for the 2022 national elections? (IFES)

15. How likely is it that issue-based parliamentary caucuses will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023? (NDI and IRI)

16. How likely is it that multi-party working groups will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023? (NDI and IRI)

17. How likely is it that the cross-party collaboration promoted by youth groups like ALPI and Making Youth Voices Heard will be sustained by participants after SPPG ends in 2023? (NDI and IRI)

18. How likely is it that the Parliamentary Expert Support Initiative (PESI) will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023? (NDI and IRI)

19. How sustainable are the internal policy development capacities of individual political parties that have received NDI support? (NDI and IRI)

20. In your opinion, what are the most significant outcomes achieved by the SPPG by now?

21. To your knowledge, which SPPG interventions have been the most useful to beneficiaries in producing desired outcomes?
22. What changes do you expect to see due to your program in the following years?

23. What recommendations would you suggest for SPPG programming in its final two years of operation?

Other donors and implementers; non-beneficiary CSOs and journalists

1.   Please describe your organization's democracy and governance programming in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Other donors)

2.   Are you familiar with the Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes activity, or SPPG, that is implemented by NDI, IRI and IFES? If so, what are your overall experience with and impressions of SPPG?

3.   In the run-up to the 2020 municipal elections, how did political parties campaign on issues and develop policy-based party platforms? Have you noticed any changes in this regard before and during the 2020 elections?

4.   Have parties developed internal capacities to formulate common policies with coalition partners or other multi-party groups? Have you noticed any changes in this regard before and during the 2020 elections?

5.   How do you explain some of the surprising results of 2020 local elections?

6.   Are you familiar with any work by caucuses to fight corruption in the Federation and Republika Srpska parliaments? If yes, how effective has this work been?

7.   Are you aware of efforts by the Central Election Commission or other bodies to combat abuse of state resources or to enhance campaign finance oversight? If yes, how effective has this work been?

8.   What have been the obstacles to political leadership and voting by women and youth?

9.   How can donors best contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth?

10. Are you familiar with the work of NDI and IRI in trying to increase women and youth political leadership and voter turnout in the 2020 elections? If yes, do you believe their efforts helped to increase women and youth turnout?

11. One element of the SPPG theory of change holds that: "If candidates build their capacities to conduct inclusive public outreach, then the elections will be more participatory, competitive and reflective of citizen priorities." Is this theory of change reasonable to increase women and youth voter turnout? How can SPPG improve its design to be more effective in improving women and youth political leadership and voter turnout?

12. Are you familiar with IRI's Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute (ALPI)? If yes, do you believe ALPI contributed to increasing cross-party and cross-ethnic cooperation?

13. What have been the key electoral reforms in BiH, both before and after the 2020 elections?

14. Which reforms should be the focus of CEC and other stakeholders as they prepare for the 2022 national elections?

15. NDI and IRI have promoted cross-party collaboration through support to: 1. issue-based parliamentary caucuses; 2. Multi-party working groups; 3. Youth groups like ALPI; 4. the Parliamentary Expert Support Initiative (PESI). How likely is it that any of these four initiatives will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023?

16. How sustainable are the internal policy development capacities of individual political parties that have received NDI support?

17. What recommendations would you suggest for SPPG programming in its final two years of operation?

Elections officials

1. Please describe your overall experience with and impressions of SPPG.

2. In preparing for the 2020 elections, which IFES recommendations did you implement?

3. Which IFES recommendations did you implement after the 2020 elections?

4. As you prepare for the 2022 elections, which IFES recommendations are you planning to implement?

5. What initiatives should be the focus for the 2022 elections?

6. What digital solutions and cybersecurity initiatives should be the focus for the 2022 elections?

7. Have you done any work with SPPG to combat abuse of state resources or to enhance campaign finance oversight?

8. What have been the obstacles to political leadership and voting by women and youth?

9. How can SPPG contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth?

10. Is there evidence that SPPG contributed to increasing women and youth voter turnout in the 2020 elections?

11. One element of the SPPG theory of change holds that: "If candidates build their capacities to conduct inclusive public outreach, then the elections will be more participatory, competitive and reflective of citizen priorities." Is this theory of change reasonable to increase women and youth voter turnout? How can SPPG improve its design to be more effective in improving women and youth political leadership and voter turnout?

12. What are the most significant outcomes you achieved with the SPPG assistance?

13. To what extent has SPPG support enabled the CEC to strengthen its capacity and ability to adapt to emerging issues throughout the electoral process?

14. Which SPPG interventions have been the most useful to you in producing desired outcomes?

15. What recommendations would you suggest for SPPG programming in its final two years of operation?

MPs

1. Please describe your overall experience with and impressions of SPPG.

2. What are the most significant outcomes you achieved with the SPPG support by now, if any?

3. Which SPPG interventions have been the most useful to you in producing desired outcomes?

4. What changes do you expect to see due to your program in the following years?

5. IRI helped you and your colleagues to work with a local NGO representing freelancers to discuss proposed changes to the Tax Law and amendments to the government's proposal. Could you please describe the experience and whether it was useful?

6. Will MPs in the future meet with CSO representatives without the support of a program like SPPG?

7. How likely is it that issue-based parliamentary caucuses will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023?

8. How likely is it that multi-party working groups will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023?

9. Are you familiar with any work by caucuses to fight corruption in the Federation and Republika Srpska parliaments? If yes, how effective has this work been?

10. What types of assistance are most needed by parliaments?

11. What have been the key electoral reforms in BiH, both before and after the 2020 elections?

12. Which reforms should be the focus of CEC and other stakeholders as they prepare for the 2022 national elections?

13. What recommendations would you suggest for SPPG programming in its final two years of operation?

Mayoral Candidates

1. Please describe your overall experience with and impressions of SPPG.

2. In the run-up to the 2020 municipal elections, how did SPPG help you to campaign on issues?

3. What was the most important issue in your campaign?

4. Did you win election?

5. How important was SPPG support to your campaign? What types of assistance were most useful to you?

6. During the campaign, did you collaborate with candidates from other parties who are in your coalition?

7. In the run-up to the 2020 municipal elections, how did SPPG help your party to develop policy-based platforms?

8. Have parties developed internal capacities to formulate common policies with coalition partners or other multi-party groups?

9. Will your political party maintain its internal policy development capacity after NDI support ends in 2023? Will you continue to design issue-based pre-election campaigns?

10. What results have you or party achieved during the 2020 elections? How has the SPPG assistance contributed to these results (if any)? What lessons have you learned for the 2022 elections?

11. What have been the obstacles to political leadership and voting by women and youth?

12. In general, what is the best way to improve political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth?

13. SPPG has a theory that: "If candidates build their capacities to conduct inclusive public outreach, then the elections will be more participatory, competitive and reflective of citizen priorities." Is this reasonable to increase women and youth voter turnout? How can SPPG be more effective in improving women and youth political leadership and voter turnout?

14. What have been the key electoral reforms in BiH, both before and after the 2020 elections?

15. Which reforms should be the focus of CEC and other stakeholders as they prepare for the 2022 national elections?

16. What recommendations would you suggest for SPPG programming in its final two years of operation?

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDES

Youth and women FGDs

1. Please describe your overall experience with and impressions of SPPG.

2. In the run-up to the 2020 municipal elections, how did SPPG strengthen issue-based campaigning and development of policy-based party platforms?

3. Have parties developed internal capacities to formulate common policies with coalition partners or other multi-party groups? Please provide us with examples.

4. What are the most significant outcomes you achieved with the SPPG support by now, if any?

5. Which SPPG interventions have been the most useful to you in producing desired outcomes?

6. What have been the obstacles to political leadership and voting by women and youth?

7. How can SPPG, as it is currently designed, contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth?

8. Is there evidence that SPPG contributed to increasing women and youth voter turnout in the 2020 elections?

9. SPPG has a theory that: "If candidates build their capacities to conduct inclusive public outreach, then the elections will be more participatory, competitive and reflective of citizen priorities." Is this reasonable to increase women and youth voter turnout? How can SPPG be more effective in improving women and youth political leadership and voter turnout?

10. How can SPPG be more effective in improving women and youth political leadership and voter turnout?

11. How likely is it that the cross-party collaboration promoted by youth groups like ALPI and Making Youth Voices Heard will be sustained by participants after SPPG ends in 2023?

12. How sustainable are the internal policy development capacities of individual political parties that have received NDI support?

13. What recommendations would you suggest for SPPG programming in its final two years?

Caucus/PESI FGDs

1. Please describe your overall experience with and impressions of SPPG.

2. Please describe the operation of your caucus/initiative.

3. Does your caucus have any interaction with civil society advocates?

4. How likely is it that issue-based parliamentary caucuses will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023?

5. Has SPPG done any work to support the anti-corruption caucuses that were initiated a few years ago by NDI and IRI?

6. Have the anti-corruption caucuses made any progress in the fight against corruption?

7. How likely is it that multi-party working groups will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023?

8. How likely is it that the Parliamentary Expert Support Initiative (PESI) will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023?

9. How likely is it that the European Integration and Security Caucus (EISC) will continue to operate after SPPG ends in 2023? (EISC members)

10. How sustainable are the internal policy development capacities of individual political parties that have received NDI support?

11. What recommendations would you suggest for SPPG programming in its final two years?

Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute (ALPI)

1. Please describe your overall experience with ALPI.

2. Please describe your overall experience with and impressions of IRI.

3. How have participants in the Advanced Leadership in Politics Institute contributed to increasing cross-party cooperation?

4. Have parties developed internal capacities to formulate common policies with coalition partners or other multi-party groups?

5. What has been the obstacles to political leadership and voting by women and youth?

6. How can SPPG, as it is currently designed, contribute to improving political leadership and voter turnout among women and youth?

7. Is there evidence that SPPG contributed to increasing women and youth voter turnout in the 2020 elections?

8. SPPG has a theory that: "If candidates build their capacities to conduct inclusive public outreach, then the elections will be more participatory, competitive and reflective of citizen priorities." Is this reasonable to increase women and youth voter turnout? How can SPPG be more effective in improving women and youth political leadership and voter turnout?

9. How can SPPG improve its design to be more effective in improving women and youth political leadership and voter turnout?

10. How likely is it that the cross-party collaboration promoted by youth groups like ALPI and Making Youth Voices Heard will be sustained by participants after SPPG ends in 2023?

11. What recommendations would you suggest for SPPG programming in its final two years of operation?

ONLINE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES

Party staff

1. I participated in training with: A. A trainer from my political party OR B. A trainer provided by NDI or IRI.

2. On a scale of 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive), please rate your training experience.

3. On a scale of 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive), how would you rate the expertise of your instructor.

4. Did you learn a new skill in the training? (Y/N)

5. What is the most useful skill that you learned?

6. Did you utilize a new skill during your work for your political party? (Y/N)

7. How did you utilize this skill?

8. During the campaign, did you collaborate with staff from other parties who are in your coalition? (Y/N)

9. Did your party have an issue-based platform during the campaign? (Y/N/DK)

10. What was the most important issue in your party's platform?

11. Age

12. Sex

Municipal council candidates

1. On scale of 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive), please rate your experience working with IRI or NDI.

2. Did you learn a new skill from NDI or IRI? (Y/N)

3. What is the most useful skill that you learned?

4. Did you utilize a new skill during your campaign? (Y/N)

5. How did you utilize this skill?

6. During the campaign, did you collaborate with candidates from other parties who are in your coalition? (Y/N)

7. Did you have an issue-based platform during the campaign? (Y/N)

8. What was the most important issue in your campaign?

9. Did you win election? (Y/N)

10. If you won your election, to what extent you believe that NDI or IRI support helped you to win? (Not at all, Slightly, Moderately, Extremely)

11. Age
12. Sex

ANNEX 5: EVALUATION TEAM

EXHIBIT x. TEAM COMPOSITION AND TEAM MEMBERS KEY QUALIFICATIONS	
Position	**Key Qualifications**
International Consultant: Subject Matter Expert/ Evaluation Co-Lead John Lis	Subject matter expertise in political and democratic processes and parliamentary strengthening; experience in evaluating CEPPS programs.
MEASURE II Staff Member: Project Management and Technical Expert/Evaluation Co-Lead Salminka Vizin	Project management skills; expertise in evaluation methodologies, data collection, and analysis techniques; familiarity with the SPPG program.
USAID/W DRG Office Consultant: Subject-Matter Expert/Evaluation Team Member	Subject matter expert in political and democratic processes and election reforms; familiarity with BiH political and electoral system.
Local Consultant: Subject Matter Expert/Evaluation Team Member Adnan Huskic	Subject matter expertise in local political system and democratic processes, political party dynamics and structures; research experience.
Evaluation Team Member Sandina Bosnjak	Experience in qualitative data collection and analysis, research experience, familiarity with the SPPG program.
Evaluation Team Member Erol Barina	Experience in quantitative data collection and analyses, research experience.
Evaluation Team Member Amer Cekic	Ability to ensure smooth data collection and support quantitative and qualitative analyses.

John Lis, Team Leader: John Lis, a democracy and governance consultant, has 2 decades of experience in the U.S. Congress and international parliamentary bodies. He has conducted evaluations and assessments of USAID and State Department programs in Romania, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, Bangladesh, Burma, Haiti, and Kenya. From 2003 to 2013, he was a professional staff member for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, including 8 years as Staff Director of the House Democracy Partnership, the peer-to-peer legislative strengthening initiative of the U.S. House of Representatives, which worked in 17 countries, including those of the former Yugoslavia. He worked in Brussels from 1999 through 2002 as Director of the Defense and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where he worked with the Bosnian observer delegation. A former journalist, he has worked at the Congressional Budget Office and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Stanford University and a master's degree in international affairs from Columbia University, where he earned the Certificate of the Institute on East Central Europe.

Evaluation Team Co-Lead: Salminka Vizin, MEASURE's MEL manager. Ms. Vizin has 11 years of experience in social research, including project management, creating data collection instruments, conducting interviews and focus groups, carrying out qualitative and quantitative analyses, and reporting. She is an experienced researcher on many different topics, including: governance and politics, human rights and discrimination, justice and rule of law, European integration, and corruption. As member of MEASURE II team, Ms. Vizin has been involved in MEL Plan designs and MEL reporting for USAID activities and conducting surveys, assessments, and evaluations. She was a lead researcher on 2017-2020 rounds of the National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions in BiH, National Youth Survey in BiH (2018), and Brief Basic Education Assessment Follow-on (2018). In addition, she participated in the impact evaluation of the USAID/BiH's PRO-Future Activity (2017), performance evaluation of the USAID/BiH's Justice Activity (2018), and led the performance evaluation of the USAID/BiH's

Marginalized Populations Support Activity. She holds an M.A. degree in Psychology from the University of Sarajevo.

Evaluation Team Member: Renne Traicova is a Senior Field Advisor in USAID's Democratic Elections and Political Processes Division at the DRG Center in Washington, DC. She has more than 17 years of experience co-designing and managing international development programs focusing on political transitions, democratization, elections, parliamentary and political party capacity building, as well as empowering women, youth, and other underrepresented groups to become politically engaged. She taught Public Policy and Democratization at Link Campus University and Luiss University in Rome, Italy, and served in senior management roles with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Prior to joining USAID, Ms. Traicova founded and managed the Initiative for Social Empowerment (ISE), helping women (particularly victims of trafficking), youth, and other marginalized groups in Europe to leave poverty through social entrepreneurship. She is also the co-founder of the Indiana University's McLoskey Fund, which brings emerging political leaders from the Western Balkans to the United States for training. Ms. Traicova is an active mentor in the Inspired Women Lead international network, a regular speaker at the global women's WINConference, and helped co-produce the documentary *Girls for Sale* to advocate against human trafficking. Ms. Traicova has a BA degree in Political Science from Purdue University and an MPA/MA in Public Finance and Russian and East European Studies from Indiana University.

Evaluation Team Member: Adnan Huskic, MEASURE's subject matter expert, works as a country representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in BiH. His subject matter expertise includes local political system and democratic processes, political party dynamics and structures, political campaigning, and elections. Mr. Huskic also works as a lecturer at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, as the first Chair of Christian Schwarz Schilling Professorship, and is the President of Center for Election Studies. His most recent published works include *Thirty Years of Political Campaigning in Central and Eastern Europe* (Palgrave) 2020, *The Western Balkans in the World* (Routledge) 2019 and *The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States: From Yugoslavia to Europe* (Palgrave) 2014, where he authored chapters on BiH. Furthermore, Mr. Huskic worked as an analyst for Political Capital, Hungary (Political analysis), BHRI (Political analysis), PSSI (Foreign influences), UK DfID, Transparency International (Integrity analysis), and often provides commentaries for both domestic and international media outlets.

Evaluation Team Member: Sandina Bosnjak, MEASURE's Senior Research Analyst. Prior to her employment at MEASURE II, Ms. Bosnjak worked as a program manager in the civil society sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing on enhancing government transparency and accountability. Apart from having worked with several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), her work experience also includes the UN Office for Project Services Applied Research Unit as a researcher/M&E consultant, and with an EC-funded agency that specialized in reforming tax and customs administration in BiH and aligning its legislation and procedures with the European Union acquis. Ms. Sandina holds a BA in Political Science from the University of Sarajevo as well as an MA degree in Human Rights and Democracy from the University of Bologna. She joined MEASURE II at the beginning of 2020 and has contributed to a number of deliverables such as Brief Media Assessment Update for BiH, Youth Focus Group Research, and two rounds of National Survey of Citizens' Perception.

Evaluation Team Member: Erol Barina, MEASURE's Senior Research Analyst. Erol Barina has 5 years of working experience in the Monitoring and Evaluation sector within international organizations. Along with regular monitoring tasks, his experience includes designing and leading baseline and evaluation exercises of technical programs, projects, and specific topic-based studies and surveys. Before joining the MEASURE II in March 2020, he worked as monitoring and evaluation assistant in the IOM and as design, monitoring, and evaluation officer in World Vision BiH. Erol holds a Master's degree in psychology from the University of Sarajevo.

Evaluation Team Member: Amer Čekić, MEASURE's Analyst. Amer Čekić has 4 years of experience in the NGO sector, as an NGO representative to United Nations with the American-based NGO Project 1948, with the aim of promoting and supporting human rights to promote greater local and international awareness about the democratic decadence in BiH. He joined the MEASURE BiH team in February 2020, and was a team member for the performance evaluation of the USAID/BiH's Financial Reform Agenda Activity evaluation in 2020 and contributed to the 2019 Judicial Effectiveness Index and National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions reports. He holds an MA degree in Integration and Governance from the University of Salzburg, with a specialization in Economics of Conflict at Sciences Po in Paris.

The CLA team, Office Manager, transcribers, and Home Office staff supported the evaluation team. The exhibit below represents their Key Qualifications and LoEs.

ANNEX 6: CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORMS

Name	John Lis
Title	Consultant
Organization	MEASURE II
Evaluation Position?	☒ Team Leader ☐ Team member
Evaluation Award Number	USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II), implemented by IMPAQ International, LLC, Contract Number: AID-167-I-17-00004
USAID Project(s) Evaluated	USAID/BiH Supporting Political Pluralism and Governance Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina Activity (SPPG), implemented by Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), Leader Cooperative Agreement: AID-OAA-L-15-00007 Associate Cooperative Agreement: #72016819LA00001
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☒ Yes ☐ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* 1. *Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 2. *Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* 3. *Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* 4. *Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 5. *Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 6. *Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	I worked as a short-term consultant for NDI and IRI between 2014 and 2016 on several short-term legislative strengthening activities under the auspices of the House Democracy Partnership. None of those activities involved the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, SPPG, or previous NDI or IRI projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	*(signed) John Lis*
Date	July 12, 2021

Name	Salminka Vizin
Title	MEL Manager
Organization	USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II)
Evaluation Position?	☒ Team Leader ☐ Team member
Evaluation Award Number	USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II), implemented by IMPAQ International, LLC, Contract Number: AID-167-I-17-00004
USAID Project(s) Evaluated	USAID/BiH Supporting Political Pluralism and Governance Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina Activity (SPPG), implemented by Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), Leader Cooperative Agreement: AID-OAA-L-15-00007 Associate Cooperative Agreement: #72016819LA00001
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ☒ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* 7. *Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 8. *Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* 9. *Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* 10. *Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 11. *Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 12. *Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	

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Signature	
Date	July 2, 2021

Name	ADNAN HUSKIĆ
Title	Mr
Organization	LOCAL CONSULTANT
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ☒ Team member
Evaluation Award Number	USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II), implemented by IMPAQ International, LLC, Contract Number: AID-167-I-17-00004
USAID Project(s) Evaluated	USAID/BiH Supporting Political Pluralism and Governance Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina Activity (SPPG), implemented by Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), Leader Cooperative Agreement: AID-OAA-L-15-00007 Associate Cooperative Agreement: #72016819LA00001
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ☒ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* 13. *Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 14. *Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* 15. *Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* 16. *Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 17. *Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 18. *Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	

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Signature	
Date	13 July 2021

Name	Sandina Bosnjak
Title	Senior Research Analyst
Organization	USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II)
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ☒ Team member
Evaluation Award Number	USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II), implemented by IMPAQ International, LLC, Contract Number: AID-167-I-17-00004
USAID Project(s) Evaluated	USAID/BiH Supporting Political Pluralism and Governance Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina Activity (SPPG), implemented by Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), Leader Cooperative Agreement: AID-OAA-L-15-00007 Associate Cooperative Agreement: #72016819LA00001
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ☒ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* 19. *Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 20. *Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* 21. *Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* 22. *Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 23. *Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* 24. *Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	*Sandina Bosnjak*
Date	July 2, 2021

Name	Erol Barina
Title	Senior Research Analyst
Organization	USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II)
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ☒ Team member
Evaluation Award Number	USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II), implemented by IMPAQ International, LLC, Contract Number: AID-167-I-17-00004
USAID Project(s) Evaluated	USAID/BiH Supporting Political Pluralism and Governance Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina Activity (SPPG), implemented by Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), Leader Cooperative Agreement: AID-OAA-L-15-00007 Associate Cooperative Agreement: #72016819LA00001
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ☒ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* *25. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *26. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* *27. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* *28. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *29. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *30. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	*Barina*
Date	7/12/2021

Name	Amer Cekic
Title	Analyst
Organization	USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II)
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ☒ Team member
Evaluation Award Number	USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II), implemented by IMPAQ International, LLC, Contract Number: AID-167-I-17-00004
USAID Project(s) Evaluated	USAID/BiH Supporting Political Pluralism and Governance Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina Activity (SPPG), implemented by Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), Leader Cooperative Agreement: AID-OAA-L-15-00007 Associate Cooperative Agreement: #72016819LA00001
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☐ Yes ☒ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* *31. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *32. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* *33. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* *34. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *35. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *36. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	12.07.2021

CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORM

Name	RENNE TRAICOVA
Title	SENIOR ELECTIONS ADVISOR
Organization	USAID
Evaluation Position?	☐ Team Leader ☒ Team member
Evaluation Award Number	USAID/BiH Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II), implemented by IMPAQ International, LLC. Contract Number: AID-167-I-17-00004
USAID Project(s) Evaluated	USAID/BiH Supporting Political Pluralism and Governance Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina Activity (SPPG), implemented by Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), Leader Cooperative Agreement: AID-OAA-L-15-00007 Associate Cooperative Agreement: #72016819LA00001
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	☒ Yes ☐ No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: *Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:* *1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.* *3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.* *4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.* *6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.*	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	*[signature]*
Date	July 28, 2021

ANNEX 7: EVALUATION TEAM'S RESPONSES TO COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE AGREEMENT OFFICER'S REPRESENTATIVE AND IMPLEMENTING PARTNER ON THE SUPPORTING POLITICAL PLURALISM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE PROCESSES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT

General MEASURE II comment: The ET is noting that the purpose of the mid-term performance evaluation of the SPPG Activity was to address the evaluation questions as defined collaboratively between the Mission and MEASURE II in the evaluation scope of work. The purpose of the evaluation was not the provide a comprehensive assessment of the BiH's political context, to cover all SPPG components, activities or successes, or to evaluate former USAID's Activities implemented by CEPPS or any of the partners individually.

Comment number	Comment	MEASURE II Evaluation Team Response
AOR 1	check with MEASURE on updated indicator data, i.e. the number of individuals trained as explained in CEPPS's comments	The ET used the PITT submitted in the BIHPERFORM system together with the quarterly report as the source of the indicator data. According to the table, SPPG trained 380 individuals in FY2020.
AOR 2	In general, the performance evaluation was done in a way to provide valuable information on the amount and type of technical assistance done so far and also suggested some adjustments that may be taken into account for the future work through September 2023. However, a general impression remains that the evaluation did not assess the political situation thoroughly thus it is not clear if the recognized windows of opportunity are big enough for the proposed adjustments, particularly in the part related to issue based platform part of the activity, campaigning assistance and anti-corruption efforts? For instance, the election campaign expenses for political parties is around $12M job, while CEPPS's technical assistance is estimated at around $0.5.M in the election year. Nevertheless, it is a valuable suggestion and makes quite sense to request the IPs to set some milestones and propose a contingency plan in case those milestones cannot be reached	A thorough assessment of the political situation is out of the scope of this evaluation. The overarching theme of the ET's recommendations is to narrow the scope of activities and focus on what really works. Regarding the issue-based platform development, the recommendation is to start providing assistance early to take advantage of the short window of opportunity, and we recommend a narrower focus on messaging and communication for campaign assistance. As for anti-corruption, we recommend narrowing the focus to investigative committees, as this has the best window of opportunity.

AOR 3	the evaluation team did not say if they met with parties' leadership apart from beneficiaries. This is an important part as some beneficiaries may be subjective in their statements as rightly said in a part of potential biases for this evaluation while party leaderships provide a more strategic view on their respective parties It is worth to say here that NDI and IRI firstly approach party leaderships at various levels to agree on the type of party assistance to be provided and leave to parties to select their representatives in campaigning training programs.	The ET did not meet with political parties' leadership. According to SPPG reports and the implementers, SPPG did not work directly with political parties on policy and campaign-platform development in advance of the 2020 municipal elections. Hence, the ET does not find exclusion of party leadership from the evaluation sample to be a limitation to addressing any evaluation questions. Instead, the ET mostly focused on collecting data directly from the SPPG beneficiaries, and, when relevant, substantiated findings by talking to non-beneficiaries. The ET does not believe that parties' leadership would provide the evaluation team with more objective, relevant or useful insights than SPPG beneficiaries.
AOR 4	Further, It is quite understandable that the SPPGP performance evaluation had a bit narrow focus on two-year implementation while not getting insights into a series of efforts done by USAID and CEPPS through previous years to bring political parties to the level where they are capable of making issue-based policies. For instance, the evaluation found that "Five Bosnian political parties have developed internal capacities to formulate policies, and two of them – SDP and PDP – have demonstrated the ability to formulate coalition policies. However, these results cannot be attributed to SPPG assistance, but rather stem from long-term donor support and parties' own". It is fair to say that CEPPS's efforts through the years made these two political parties capable for formulation of common policies and brought them together to come up with their joint legislative proposals in areas of electoral legislation and media regulation.	The ET agrees with the AOR's comment. The scope of work limited the evaluation to the first 18 months of SPPG; it did not include evaluation of CCPI interventions. The ET does not have sufficient information to conclude whether CEPPS's previous efforts contributed to these parties' internal capacities. We did, however, include a footnote related to this in the evaluation report, stating: "According to the Activity AOR, CEPPS's former activities contributed to capacity development of SDP and PDP in this regard. The evaluation team did not collect any data on this, as this is out of the evaluation's scope."

- Results of the 2018 general elections in BiH, which to a large extent, confirmed the dominance of ethnically-driven politics at both the State and Entity levels. The 2018 pre-election political rhetoric focused on the promotion of exclusive ethnic rights and interests, often without taking into account the interests of other ethnic groups.
- Furthermore, the country made very slow progress in improving overall social and economic situations and, moreover, slowed progress with regards to Euro-Atlantic integration.
- Nevertheless, the 2018 elections also witnessed limited successes of a few civic political parties who based their platforms on economic and social issues for all citizens regardless of their ethnic affiliation. For instance, a significant number of votes in Banja Luka, the capital of the Republika Srpska (RS) and a traditional stronghold of the ruling party, went to an opposition party. However, the RS remains fully dominated by one ruling coalition and its leader, since this coalition won a strong majority in the RS National Assembly (RSNA), which allows it to fully control the legislative agenda. Overall, there is limited room for a genuinely competitive and pluralistic system in the RS. While the Federation of BiH (Federation) traditionally has experienced more pluralism, it is not immune to the concerns that plague the RS. However, there have been a few interesting developments contrary to the ethno-nationalist trend at the polls. For instance, a few cantons in the Federation have formed governments consisting of coalitions of several civic parties, most notably Sarajevo which has formed the BH Block. While important, these limited pluralistic developments exist against a backdrop of dominance by ethnic-focused parties.
- Although public surveys in BiH continued to show that citizens cared most about the economy and jobs, in addition to other real life concerns like healthcare and education, the election campaigns mostly spin around ethnic protection issues and, so far, such rhetoric seems to be decisive for winning elections. CEPPS will assist parties, candidates and coalitions to develop and communicate their economic and social policies in a more effective way. Facilitating the ability of elected political actors to fulfill their responsibilities to citizens through better governance practices.

All these above convinced USAID to enhance political pluralism, including the ability of smaller and/or newly established civic parties and individual candidates to compete in elections, improve policy development based citizens' interest and otherwise for country's economic and

The ET tried to capture the context in the report's introductory section. We added several sentences to this section to reflect the AOR's comment regarding a lack of progress in improving the socioeconomic situation, EU and NATO integration, and political obstacles that the program faced during implementation.

SPPG did not work to create coalitions in advance of the 2020 municipal elections, and SPPG reported one issue-based policy proposal developed by parties and/or coalitions during the pre-election period with SPPG support, well short of the target of 17 for FY 2020.

The ET stands by its finding that most caucuses are not likely to bring about sustainable results. The ET understands what the activity tried to achieve; in this area, though our data suggest that achievements were limited and are unlikely to be sustained.

	social progress, and for this policy work to be more effectively achieved in coalitions or in cross-party initiatives. Not least important is to mention that when selecting parties to benefit from such assistance, USAID required the application of its Political Party Assistance Policy to select genuine democratic political actors and the outlining of clear selection criteria coordinated with USAID/BiH. In addition to enhancing political pluralism, the activity focuses on improving policy-driven governance at all levels of the country's administrative structure. This governance approach is essential to improving governance accountability and support for the country moving forward on its path to Euro-Atlantic integration, which is being tried to achieve through informal caucuses formed in the parliamentary structure of the country.	
IP 1	*Political environment* Perhaps due to its remote nature, the report does not account for Bosnia and Herzegovina's complex political situation and, in particular, the ethnic divisions that challenge the political coherence of the country's governing system and how it shapes and impacts CEPPS program activities. CEPPS wishes to note the salience of its many activities with regard to strengthening political and civic initiatives that cross partisan, ethnic, and entity lines. This includes such work as the multiple cross-party policy working groups and the parliamentary caucuses, as well as CEPPS' on-the-ground presence in Republika Srpska. This presence and the program's mainstay focus on building political, policy, and institutional bridges across stark partisan, ethnic, and entity divides, while perhaps not captured in the evaluation framework, is an important contribution that the CEPPS program is able to make in its support to Bosnia and Herzegovina	We appreciate the IP's input regarding the scope of the activity. We would like to note that not all components or aspects of the SPPG Activity were subjects of this evaluation. The ET agrees with the commenter that a comprehensive analysis of the BiH political situation was neither part of the evaluation scope of work nor of the evaluation questions that the ET was requested to answer.

| IP 2 | *Sustainability*

CEPPS' sustainability approach revolves around applied skills development and institutional capacity to sustain practices developed under the program. As much of the program concerns bridging partisan, ethnic, and entity divides in an institutional context of political parties, parliaments, and election processes, the ability to seed multiple initiatives across an array of public policy and legislative matters that speak to citizens' social-economic, anti-corruption, and good governance priorities, along with European integration, reflects CEPPS capacity to support program initiatives, see common policy ideas and platforms emerge, and draft legislation put forward and debated. It is through these initiatives that a broader environment of collaborative action can serve as a platform for future undertakings.

At the same time, CEPPS has to contend with a polarizing political environment in sustaining these practices, one that often goes far beyond normal partisan contestation.

In this sense, context analysis of the political environment in which these initiatives form and exist would have been welcomed in order to gain a better understanding of sustainability pathways for cross-party working groups, parliamentary caucuses, and election administration. | We appreciate these comments. The ET stands by its findings regarding which interventions are most likely to bring about sustainable results. The point about the working groups is well-taken and has been incorporated in the revised report. Any broader context analysis is out of scope of this evaluation. |

| IP 3 | *CEPPS' stakeholder approach*

Much of CEPPS/NDI program activity centers on multiple stakeholders, whether political parties and candidates contesting elections, or in elected leaders coming together in issue-based caucuses to advance legislation in response to corruption, environmental protection and economic development, and Euro-Atlantic integration. These are very large areas of public policy, and CEPPS/NDI's support to these political and governing initiatives is rightly spread among important political and governing institutions at all levels. Some of the assessment recommendations suggest that a considerable amount of this work be concentrated, and effectively narrowed, to one or two existing program components. CEPPS/NDI respectfully notes that such an over-concentration of resources would distort its ability to reach the various political and social stakeholders--including those wielding current political power and legislative authority--who have committed themselves to policy reform on the array of issue areas that speak to citizens' interests | Given the small budget for the SPPG activity, the ET tried to find ways in which CEPPS could devote more resources to those interventions that have shown the most promising results and are most likely to be sustainable. The ET found areas in which CEPPS seemed to be spread too thin; e.g., no work has been done under SPPG with the anti-corruption caucuses, which have generated limited interest from MPs, so the ET recommended focusing on IICJ. |

| IP 4 | *Assessment interlocutors*

The remote nature of the assessment may have limited and perhaps skewed the full range of partners, stakeholders, and beneficiaries covered under the program. The volume of beneficiaries falling under CEPPS/NDI activity portions may have been inadvertently limited in the sample secured for assessment inquiry. CEPPS/NDI notes the following gaps and omissions in assessment findings:

    ▪ A relatively small sample of the CEPPS/NDI political party training of trainer participants (ToT) appears to have been included in the assessment, potentially bypassing a fuller range of experience and accomplishment that may have affected assessment findings. The ToTs collectively trained approximately 200 party members, and one of the trainers has been appointed to serve as director of a political party academy (PDP), which suggests that, contrary to a broad assessment finding, political parties are making use of the capacity developed under the program on a sustainable/structural basis.

    ▪ The Interim Investigative Committee on Judiciary (IICJ), which has emerged as a major activity area. The assessment included interviews with only two of eight commissioners and seems to not have reached a broader stakeholder group within civil society.

    ▪ The IICJ component and related work on public procurement reform should have been included as among key findings related to continued support.

    ▪ Under Objective One, it is unclear how many individuals were able to participate directly in the assessment. CEPPS/NDI trained approximately 600 individuals in 10 municipalities during the 2020 election cycle, including mayoral candidates whom NDI supported on an extensive and tailored basis. Much of that assistance, concerning platform development and election outreach, was conducted in four Tier 1 municipalities across both entities, among them the most politically significant local governments in the country.

    ▪ CEPPS/NDI would have welcomed more consideration of the activity and impact of participants and stakeholders in Tier 1 municipalities. | The ET does not find that remote data collection affected the response rate for key informant interviews or focus groups. By the time the data collection started, we were a year into the pandemic, and everyone had already been adapted to teleworking. We had no refusals from the key stakeholders due to the remote approach to data collection. Given limitations of time and budget, we were unable to speak to all beneficiaries and stakeholders. However, our sampling approach for this evaluation aligns with standard research practice. During the data collection, we reached the saturation point where we were not learning new things from additional interviews. Hence, the ET members agree that the evaluation sample was sufficiently large and representative for relevant categories of SPPG beneficiaries.

The ET contacted all ToTs from the list we received from CEPPS; however, they were not all responsive, and we invested weeks of efforts to successfully carry out the focus groups/interviews. However, the ET agrees that the finding formulation could mislead the reader to conclude that the trainings were not delivered at all. Hence, we revised the finding to state: "NDI implemented a ToT program from March to October 2020 completed by 24 party members (17 men, 7 women) from 12 parties. The trained individuals in turn provided training for members of their parties. According to the IP and progress reports, the ToTs delivered several trainings during the SPPG implementation training more than 200 political party members. However, several party trainers trained by NDI in 2020 said they encountered resistance from their party peers, who did not recognize them as experts and were skeptical that the trainers had anything to teach them. Some trainers were lower-level party staff who did not command respect in their party."

Because SPPG only began to work with the IICJ in March 2021, there had been only one SPPG intervention supporting IICJ during the evaluation data collection. Nevertheless, the ET soon recognized that work with the IICJ was an important activity area and invested considerable time and effort to arrange an interview with the |

	▪ As always, senior CEPPS regional representatives based in Washington, D.C. overseeing programming in Bosnia and Herzegovina are at the disposal of USAID-funded evaluation teams and welcome the opportunity to engage with them on program design and implementation from historical and institutional perspectives. CEPPS regrets that this opportunity did not materialize.	chairman. The ET provided nearly a full page of findings on SPPG's work with IICJ (page 12), reached positive conclusions about the IICJ component (top of page 13), and drafted a recommendation that CEPPS focus continued anti-corruption support on IICJ (Recommendation 3). The ET interviewed 12 out of 17 mayors who received the SPPG assistance under Objective 1, including two (out of four) from Tier 1 municipalities. The ET intended to interview all mayors, but we were not able to reach others, however this is still a very good response rate. The ET finds that the mayors are the most suitable beneficiaries for addressing the related evaluation question, as the Activity worked with them directly and they are the primary decision-makers in their campaigns. The ET finds that individuals most knowledgeable of implementation details are best key informants. We did not find that CEPPS senior staff could provide this type of detail, but IRI and NDI were free to invite anyone to our meetings. For instance, IFES's representative invited a home-office senior staff member, who participated in our meetings.

| IP 5 | *2020 Public Opinion Research*

The assessment report notes that CEPPS polling in the 2020 election cycle was seen by many participants as too late in the cycle to be of use, and that its focus on public policy was not relevant given that many voters do not make their choice based on public policy platforms of parties/candidates. It is not clear that the assessment benefitted from a full array of participant views, particularly with regard to candidates supported by CEPPS/NDI in Tier One municipalities. Prior CEPPS/NDI polling and anecdotal evidence, for example at candidate town-hall meetings with voters that CEPPS/NDI has organized, does suggest that a significant portion of voters take into consideration the leading issues and policy prescriptions of candidates.

The assessment report infers a causative effect between polling and other assistance provided to candidates and parties with actual outcomes in the elections. Because CEPPS/DNI works on a multi-party basis, i.e. among political parties contesting each other in the elections, this should not be construed as an indicator of CEPPS/NDI impact. The purpose of the public opinion research is not to predict the electoral chances of single parties or individual candidates; indeed, CEPPS/NDI wishes to underscore that, as a time-specific snapshot of voter sentiment, polling products are not predictive of outcome and cannot be construed as such.

The purpose of the research is two-fold: to inform parties and candidates on voter priorities with which to maximize both their engagement of voters while standing for election and subsequently in holding elected office, whether in government or opposition; and to guide beneficiaries to learn how to partner in building their internal capacities to conduct surveys, read data, and analyze results into policy platforms and public-facing initiatives.

CEPPS/NDI would have appreciated an assessment on the utilization of public opinion research--both polling and focus groups--with these two purposes in mind. | The ET revised the finding, adding that "several" candidates stated that the CEPPS polling assistance came too late in the campaign. However, this type of assistance was provided to a limited number of municipalities. Based on progress reports, the evaluation team concludes that this type of assistance was implemented in nine municipalities. The ET obtained feedback from six out of nine municipalities, including two Tier 1 municipalities, and four of six mayoral candidates agreed that the assistance came late in the election cycle.

The ET did not conclude anywhere in the report that issue-based campaigning is irrelevant. Our finding is that many voters do not take this into account when forming their voting decisions. The ET still finds that the issue-based campaigning is the right campaigning approach. The question is how to make the voters more receptive to such campaigns and ensuring parties' accountability in fulfilling their pre-election promises.

The ET disagrees with the comment that the evaluation report "infers a causative effect between polling and other assistance provided to candidates and parties with actual outcomes in the elections". The report does have one sentence noting the success rate of SPPG-supported mayoral candidates; one would expect readers to ask themselves this question, so the ET included this statistic. The ET did not infer a causative effect between polling and other support with actual outcomes in the elections.

The scope of work asked the ET to evaluate only the first purpose of polling and focus groups: to inform candidates on voter priorities. Findings and conclusions on this point can be found on pp. 9-11. |

IP 6	*Exit Polling* CEPPS/IRI supports the findings and agrees with most of the recommendations as they pertain to CEPPS/IRI-related activity components, with the exception of recommendation number five. CEPPS/IRI would like to highlight that exit polling would be quite a costly undertaking, requiring a more robust GOTV component and more funding than what is currently allocated to the GOTV component in the budget. However, CEPPS/IRI would welcome discussion on strengthening this activity and recognizes that exit polling would be potentially useful in measuring youth turnout, if carried out using an appropriate and accurate methodology	Recommendation 5 was included because exit polling is the only way to accurately measure the effect of the GOTV component. The ET was asked to evaluate: "Is there any evidence that SPPG interventions contributed to increasing women and youth turnout in the 2020 local elections?" The ET was unable to answer this question because it lacked sufficient data, which can be acquired through exit polling. We do however recognize the potentially prohibitive cost of exit polling.
IP 7	*Central Election Commission* Under Evaluation Question 5: Support to the Central Election Commission relating to "Cybersecurity," the report mentions the implementation of a cybersecurity manual for the CEC. CEPPS/IFES would like to clarify that the CEC has agreed to develop a cybersecurity manual with CEPPS/IFES support, but the manual has not yet been completed. CEPPS/IFES recommends that the evaluation team make this clarification throughout the report, where mentioned	The ET clarified this point throughout the evaluation report.

IP 8	_Anti-Corruption_	
	CEPPS/NDI notes that anti-corruption is a primary but not unique focus under this objective, and has engaged political parties and members of parliament in a variety of good governance and social and economic topics, such as environmental protection, that do not appear to have been duly considered in the assessment. CEPPS/NDI anti-corruption work extends beyond parliamentary caucuses to cross-party working groups, whereas the assessment findings do not appear to have reflected the full range of activity and accomplishments. For example, the PDP-SDP cross-party group developed with CEPPS/NDI assistance the Law on Political Parties. Similarly, the Public-Private Partnership working group (SDP-DF-NS) developed a draft law currently on the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly agenda. The ability to pass legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina's complicated political environment and governance structures is by definition a long-term and often arduous process. That CEPPS' assistance has led to draft legislation reflects on its ability to support the political, organizational, and legislative array of factors that must be in place to drive these initiatives.

Closer and more informed scrutiny by the assessment team of the depth of these initiatives would have been welcomed. | Evaluation question 2 focuses solely on anti-corruption, not on other areas mentioned (e.g., good governance, environmental protection), and on the work of issue-based caucuses. The ET reread all of the SPPG quarterly reports from September 2019-March 2021 and found no mention of the Law on Political Parties. The ET assumes that this was a CCPI initiative. There was one mention of the draft Public-Private Partnership law in the SPPG FY21 Q2 report; however, there is no mention in that sub-section of any connection to anti-corruption work. The ET would like to note the scope of work for this evaluation is limited to specific evaluation questions and SPPG Activity. |

| IP 9 | Cross-party work

The purpose of the cross-party policy development component is not based on election-based outcomes, as is construed in the assessment report. It is instead to develop shared policy goals around which parties can cooperate in their role in governance, whether in government or opposition. The sustainability approach to the cross-party work is practice-oriented, in that political parties become experienced with the protocol and political elements of fostering such cooperation among them, and can turn to the practice on any relevant and shared areas of public policy and/or legislative initiative. In that sense, the cross-party working groups feed into the legislative caucuses being supported by CEPPS/NDI. The component is designed to go beyond individual capacity building to structural change with parties, individuals, cross- and multi-party caucuses, etc. to drive institutional change with parliaments.

CEPPS/NDI would have welcomed due consideration of cross-party policy working groups along these lines. | The evaluation report addressed specific evaluation questions as defined in the evaluation scope of work. Evaluation Question 1 asked: To what extent has SPPG strengthened parties', **coalitions'**, and candidates' capacity for issue-based campaigning and **policy** and campaign platform **development in advance of the 2020 municipal and 2022 general elections.** In the "Coalitions" section under EQ1, the ET evaluated the policy-development aspect of the cross-party working groups. The section includes a transition between the elections work and the policy work: "**Outside of elections**, NDI under SPPG has worked with three parliamentary working groups at the Federation, cross-entity, and cantonal levels:" To improve the clarity of the finding, the ET separated the paragraph into two sub-topics in the final report.

The ET agrees with the IP's comment regarding the sustainability approach to cross-party work, and the relevant paragraph has been edited to incorporate the IP's points. |
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| IP 10 | Youth Caucus

Among the legislative caucuses not featured in the assessment is the CEPPS/NDI cross-party Youth Caucus spanning the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament, five cantons within the Federation, and representing six political parties. The Youth Caucus, as a cooperative group of young elected officials, has created sustainable internal structures for maintaining communications, professional and educational development, and coordinating legislative initiatives between members. This also includes the implementation of joint external activities, such as public outreach events, site and parliament visits for youth and CSO leaders, and open forum discussions with local constituents and stakeholders.

CEPPS/NDI would have welcomed thorough consideration of this component and its inclusion in the report as among the most active and promising of legislative groups under the program. | The ET notes that the Youth Caucus is addressed on page 27, under EQ6. The ET's findings do not indicate that the Youth Caucus is among the most promising of legislative groups, but that it is unlikely that the group will continue their activities after SPPG ends, as stated by the caucus members themselves. |